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ABSTRACT

Luis N. Morones, the subject of this biography, is not the
lackluster, insipid individual who fills countless pages of history
books.

This fascinating and complex man led a thrilling life

during the 1920's and 1930's in Mexico.

An electrician well-

acquainted with the problems of the exploited laboring classes,
he founded the Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), the
first significant workers' central to be established in Mexico.
Sentenced to death by President Venustiano Carranza for his part
in a general strike in 1916 , Morones was released from his death
cell before his scheduled execution.

Eight years later, while

serving as a Federal Deputy, Morones was almost fatally wounded
in a gunfight which occurred in the Chamber of Deputies.
Morones' tenure as Secretary of Industry, Commerce and
Labor, 192^-28, included exciting and momentous events —

the

Cristero Rebellion of the Roman Catholics, the heated controversy
with the United States over President Plutarco Calles' contemplated
seizure of foreign petroleum companies in Mexico, and the assassi
nation of President-Elect Alvaro Obregon.

The petroleum difficulty

precipitated a possible armed intervention and invasion of Mexico
by the United States.
Realizing that politics was not an exercise in civics-book
morality, Morones acted accordingly.

He was surrounded by a group

of "yes men" of the elite Grupo Accion and even organized Mexico

ix

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without p erm ission .

City prostitutes, whom he perhaps visualized as a source of union
dues = He had an unconcealed disdain for manual labor and a love of
luxury.

Frugality was not a trait of this bon vivant who became

immensely rich through graft and collusion.

Believing the interests

of labor and his own to be one and the same, he applied this prin
ciple to the CROM treasury.

Reminiscent of a Chicago gangster par

excellence during the prohibition era, this well-groomed, pistoltoting, diamond bedecked labor czar kept an arsenal in his home and
ministry office, rode in costly bullet-proof automobiles, and had
opposition congressmen kidnapped or gunned down in the streets.

He

achieved a position of power unparalleled in Mexican labor history
in that from 1920 to 1929 he was labor personified.

At the same

time, his name became synonymous with crime, violence, venality,
and corruption.
Few persons were indifferent to Morones.

He was one of

those men who inspired fierce loyalty or undying animosity.

A

charismatic leader and a man of action, he was (partly as a result
of his thirst for power and mounting political ambition) accused
of being the intellectual author of the assassinations of two men:
Juan Field Jurado, Senator from Campeche, and Alvaro Obregon,
President-Elect of Mexico in 1 9 2 8 . Morones was also blamed for
complicity in the dynamiting of a passenger train carrying rival
politicians in 1936.

Partly because of this alleged crime he was

exiled to the United States.
Due to Morones' capacity as an organizer, personal magnetism,
ability as a speaker, and valor as a leader, he was interesting to
observe in action.

He was highly emotional and prone to performing
x
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dramatically before audiences.

Because of bis numerous confrontations

with political foes, be was tbe target of several assassination
attempts.

Considering bis numerous enemies and tbe political mores

of Mexico during the 1920's when Morones and his CROM were at the
apogee of their power, bis natural death is ironic.

XL
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INTRODUCTION

Without a knowledge of labor there can be no real under
standing of the substantial role labor has played and continues
to play in Latin American politics.

Although we need more work

in the field of labor history, this study is neither a history
of the Mexican labor movement nor of the CROM.

Much labor

history has been included, however, in order to give proper
perspective to Morones' life.

The story of his rise is intimate

ly linked with the growth of organized Mexican labor, yet so
many individuals were involved with that development that it would
be inaccurate to consider Morones more than a contributing factor
to it.

Nevertheless, one must not underestimate the importance

of his role in this respect.
Since there is no comprehensive or authoritative biography
of Morones, this study is undertaken to shed more light on this
controversial person.
of this complex man.

It is not intended to cover all aspects
The writer has attempted to be as objective

and detached as possible, a seemingly rare characteristic of other
accounts of Morones' life, since they are distorted by partisan
ship.

A study of Morones must show his involvement in Mexico's

politics, petroleum problems, and her Church-State crises during
the twelve years, 1918-30, that CROM was powerful.

As a rule,

studies in economics and political science only mention Morones
in connection with this period; and consequently there are large
gaps in his biography.

This dissertation, based largely on data

xii
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gathered during field research in Mexico, attempts to supplement
this early period, and to correct the oversimplified portrayals
of Morones as a man who devoted his life only to the labor move
ment.
In spite of the fact that most of his private papers are
not available, enough data from personal interviews and other
sources have been collected to reconstruct his private life.
following materials have been utilized:

The

(l) Mexican and United

States government documents and publications; (2) books and
articles; (3) encyclopedias and dictionaries; (1+) Argentine,
English, Mexican, and United States newspapers; (5) Masters'
and Ph.D. theses written in United States universities; (6 ) inter
views in 1 96 8 , 19 7 0 j and 1971 with individuals personally acquainted
with Morones (including, among others, his widow, Senora Berta Pena
Viuda de Morones; one of his sons, Luis Enrique Morones Pena, his
personal secretary for twenty-seven years, Jose Ortiz Petricioli;
Carleton Beals; an American journalist and historian, and ex
president Emilio Portes Gil, one of Morones' persistent critics
and bitter adversaries); (7 ) various photograph archives in
Mexico City, (8 ) and the writer's personal correspondence with
American and Mexican historians.^

Since Morones died in I96 U,

four years before the idea of this biography was conceived, none
of the conferences was with him.

However, his speeches and

unless otherwise specified, all Mexican newspapers cited
are from Mexico City. Personal correspondence which is located in
the Louisiana State University Department of Archives and Manuscripts
will be listed merely as "L.S.U. Archives."

xiii
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writings which appeared in newspapers, Ministry publications, and
in official CROM organs have formed a major segment of the source
material.

Primary sources also include some of Morones' personal

correspondence, and the writings and memoirs of many of his
friends and enemies.

A few of these include Jose Petricioli,

Ricardo Trevino, Samuel Gompers, Carleton Beals, Frank Tannenbaum,
Ernest Gruening, Vito Alessio Robles, Serafino Romauldi, Jose Zuno,
Emilio Portes Gil, Luis Araiza, Rosendo Salazar, Alberto Pani, and
Vicente Lombardo Toledano.

Some of these writings are so charged

with rancor that they are unreliable and must be used with caution.
Newspapers also are not always accurate, but they have been
checked against each other and against official records, and
constitute a valuable source of important details.

xiv
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CHAPTER I

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN LABOR MOVEMENT TO 1911

A change of great importance for Mexico is the surprisingly
rapid mass organization of its working population.

This growth

has occurred in a country where organization and collective action
on the part of the masses were unknown before 1911.

The fact

that powerful trade unions and political labor movements should
exist in early twentieth-century Mexico, which was so largely
agricultural in nature, is somewhat a paradox.

Industry was

underdeveloped, the masses illiterate, and the Roman Catholic
Church with its tremendous hold on the people was vigilant in
obstructing theories that might upset the traditional status of
the lower classes.
Although there were beginnings of an organized labor
movement as early as the middle decades of the nineteenth century,
the most important group, the Gran Cxrculo de Obreros (Grand
Circle of Workers), was not founded until 18 7 6 .
of unionism were mutualistic societies —
tional, social, and burial purposes.

The usual forms

ostensibly for educa

These societies existed as

weak and isolated groups which broke and reformed repeatedly, and
exerted little influence outside their own local spheres.

PORFIRIO DIAZ'S LABOR POLICY, I8 7 6 -I9 IO
President Diaz stressed the industrialization of Mexico.
invited foreign capital into the country.

Railroads were built

1
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He

and factories appeared.

One of the favorable terms Diaz promised

foreigners was a docile and cheap labor force.

By the later l880's

his regime no longer tolerated the opposition and political
"sedition" represented by the labor movement.

Its press was

suppressed, and the labor organizations themselves found it
increasingly difficult to pursue their activities.
The most outstanding labor events during the years pre
ceding the Revolution were two strikes in 1907 both led by
adherents of Ricardo Flores Magon, who sought to overthrow
Diaz by means of a huelga general. These occurred in the impor
tant Cananea copper mines in the North and among the textile
workers of Puebla in the South.

Although the workers lost these

strikes, they contributed considerably to the development of
labor discontent during Diaz's rule, revealing that the president
vigorously opposed any action which disturbed the social or
economic order.

FRANCISCO MADERO AND LABOR
Since one of Francisco Madero's goals was the advancement
of labor, there was widespread support among the workers for the
revolutionary movement launched by him in 1910.

The working class

in the early revolutionary period was a main source of military
manpower.

It provided capable fighters who, unlike the peasants,

were concentrated in strategic urban areas.

Madero's forces did

bring about the overthrow of Diaz: and the liberal policies of the
Madero government, 1911-13> permitted labor to organize.

In

December, 1911, President Madero created a Labor Office to carry
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out needed studies of the workers' condition and to intervene in
industrial disputes.

In eight months this office contributed to

the settlement of seventy strikes.

CASA. DEL OBRERO MUNDIAL
The first group to give any semblance of coherence to the
Mexican labor movement was the Casa del Obrero Mundial, or House
of the World's Workers.

The Casa was not a labor union, but its

aid in later union development is of importance.

It served as a

meeting place where ideas were exchanged and developed, and where
propaganda pamphlets were prepared and disseminated to other parts
of the country.

Thus, to organize and coordinate the labor move

ment in Mexico, these first leaders were obliged to experiment in
forms of organization, to theorize, learn, and study existing
conditions.
Founded in Tampico in September, 1912, by a group of foreign
and Mexican left-wing intellectuals, the Casa's guiding voices
were Mikhail Bakunin and Pierre Proudhon rather than Karl Marx.*'
The Casa soon evidenced tendencies to:

(l) depend on the govern

ment for meeting places, money, and assistance in conflicts with
employers; (2 ) rely on legislation as a means of protecting the
interests of organized labor; and (3 ) support anarcho-syndicalist
methods of direct violent action, such as sabotage and the general

Harvey A. Levenstein, "The United States Labor Movement and
Mexico, 1910-1951" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Wisconsin, 1 9 6 6 ), 22. Bakunin's principal tenets were destruction
of the state and ultraindividualistic rights.
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b

strike-

2

Anarcho-syndicalism begins with the assumption that private

property and the capitalistic system are responsible for man's
material anguish and sufferings.

Inasmuch as capitalism is inherent

ly evil, the anarcho-syndicalist concludes that the worker and
employer can never have any common interests.

In order to defeat

capitalism and accomplish a fundamental transformation of society
and the economy, the worker must be prepared to use direct action —
bombing, dynamiting, arson, murder, terror, single or partial
strikes, the general strike, boycott, slow-down (sometimes called
O
hacer la perra in Mexico), and sabotage.
The Casa's founders wanted to reduce working class aims to
concrete doctrine and dispatch agents throughout the country to
organize the proletariat into unions instilled with class conscious
ness.

Once established in revolutionary unions, the workers would

be in a position to use their economic power in forming a general
strike to topple the entire bourgeois capitalist economic and
political structure and to replace it with an anarcho-syndicalist
state based on the ownership by the workers of the factories and
farms.
Although the Casa's leaders were at first sympathetic to
President Madero, many soon became disillusioned with him.

When

the Casa urged upon Madero the necessity for a broad program of
legislation on behalf of the working classes, he apparently had

William S. Stokes, Latin American Politics (New York, 1959 )>
2b0.

3 Ibid., 2 3 5 -
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little realization of the force of social protest which had been
released by the overthrow of Dxaz.

He thus failed to enact the

reform programs which were being pressed upon him in labor relations
by the Casa and in the agrarian field by Emiliano Zapata, an impor
tant revolutionary leader operating southwest of Mexico City.
Zapata was seizing and distributing estates of large landholders
among landless peasants.

Consequently, there were some strikes

during Madero's administration.

Although at first giving the

Casa full freedom to conduct its activities, Madero tended to
become impatient with it in the last months of his rule, fearing
its radicialism and the introduction into the labor ranks of
foreign influence and doctrines.

Marjorie Ruth Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico (Chapel Hill,
193*0, 2U. This scholarly monograph treating pre-C.T.M. developments
continues to be the standard work on the Mexican labor movement.
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CHAPTER II

EARLY CAREER AND PRE-CROM PERIOD

BIRTH
Ignacio Morones and Rafaela Negrete, two weavers in the
cotton factory of Atemajac near Guadalajara, Jalisco, were
married in La Capilla de Jesus in the state capital in 1888.
Since there was little opportunity for economic advancement in
Guadalajara, Morones, his wife, and other textile workers quit
their jobs in the mills of Atemajac, La Experiencia, and El Batan
and moved to work in the factory of San Fernando de Tlalpan near
Mexico City.

In honor of their abandoned and beloved city, they

named their neighborhood El Barrio de Guadalajarita. At 10:00 P.M.
on October 11, 189 O, Rafaela gave birth to a son in her home.

The

infant was named Luis Morones Negrete.

EDUCATION
Following the closing of San Fernando in 1895 because of
economic difficulties, a majority of the workers returned to
Jalisco.

Choosing not to return to his native state, Ignacio

moved his family to Mexico City where they lived in a small house
for which he paid eight pesos rent monthly.

Since Ignacio's

earnings were insufficient to support his wife and son, Rafaela
supplemented the family's income by selling arroz con leche and
other snacks in the vestibule of their home.

6
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Luis was the only offspring of Ignacio and Rafaela, and his
nine maternal aunts took special interest in him.

They attempted

to satisfy many of the youth’s material needs hut did not spoil
him with numerous g i f t s B e c a u s e of his aunts, Luis was able to
attend a primary school near his home until he reached the sixth
grade level.

Later he studied shorthand and typing in a nearby

institute on Las Escalerillas Street.

Although Morones disliked

these skills and never used them during the rest of his life, this
opportunity enabled him to receive some instruction beyond a rudi
mentary education.

EARLY LABOR AGITATION
At age seventeen, despite his father's wishes that he be a
weaver, Luis was earning wages at an electrician's shop.

A fac

simile of his electrician's card states that Luis N. Morones could
repair "all types of motors and electrical apparatus" in a shop
located at Puente de San Antonio, No. 10.

2

Luis Araiza, Historia del moviini ento obrero mexicano
vols.
Mexico, D.F., 196 ^-1 9 6 5 ), III, 190? Jose Ortiz Petricioli, El
companero Morones: biografia de un gran lxder (Mexico, D.F., 19 6 8 ),

is, 29.
^Beginning in 1907 Luis Morones Negrete began using the
initial "N" between his Christian name and his surname. Jose
Petricioli, Morones' private secretary for 27 years, states that
this practice caused numerous writers and politicians to err about
the motivation for the change. Some did it in good faith, some
from ignorance, others deliberately^to attack Morones. Petricioli,
El companero Morones, 37* Felipe Lopez Rosado, for example, in his
El hombre y la economxa states, "Luis Napoleon Morones era visto
con deslumbrantes joyas y se hablaba de orgxas en su quinta de
Tlalpan." Ibid., 38-39- Victor Alba in his Historia del movimiento
obrero en America Latina (Mexico, D.F., 196*0,
likewise erred
about Morones' name. Alba writes, "La C.R.O.M. esta dirigida en
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Morones' early years were ones of self-education in the school
of hard knocks and trial and error.

In his youth he devoted much

attention to listening and learning and developed an interest'in
social and labor problems.

Morones joined the Casa in 1913-

At

realidad, por el Grupo Accion, congregado en t o m o a Luis Napoleon
Morones." Alba's Politics and the Labor Movement (Stanford, 1 9 6 8 ),
contains this and other minor errors about Morones, 307- In
Morones' obituary in Tiempo: semanario de la vida y la verdad,
his name is given as "Luis Napoleon Morones Negrete," (April 13,
196 ^), 3 3 ; and the labor leader is listed in the Diccionario
enciclopedia, U.T.E.H.A. as "Morones, (Luis Napoleon) , ' 1 (Mexico,
D.F., 195 2 ), 7^7- Others have interpreted the initial "N" as
meaning Nepomuceno, Nicandro, or since Morones was born on October 11
as Nicasio, the saint's name for that date. Inigo Medina in Morones'
obituary wrote of "Luis Nicasio Morones," Las Novedades, April 6 ,
I96 U. One prominent American Mexicanist accidently listed the labor
leader as "Luis G. Morones." Howard F. Cline, The United States
and Mexico (Cambridge, 1963 ), 193j ^-79- This mistake was probably
a typographical error because although Professor Cline never met
Morones, he knew his name was Luis N. Morones. Howard F. Cline to
Nick Buford, February If, March 10, 1970, L.S.U. Archives. Petricioli
explains that this confusion began because Morones, for caprice,
euphony, or perhaps some other reason placed the "N" from Negrete
between his Christian name and his surname. Petricioli, El
companero Morones, b o . Morones was once referred to as "Luis Eliseo
Morones" by an opposition deputy. Diario de los Debates de la
Camara de Diputados del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
XXX Legislatura, tomo III, No. 1, September 21, 1923» 3• Even
though this name confusion is in itself trivial, it illustrates tbe
difficulty of obtaining objective facts about Morones. Petricioli
even claims that the name controversy is an example of one of the
many "legends" surrounding Morones: one which is "filled with
passion." Jose Petricioli, interview, Mexico City 19> 19 6 8 . In
1968 Petricioli published El companero Morones, a rambling, partisan
attempt at a biography based mainly on conversations with Morones
instead of sound historical records. He devoted a brief chapter to
the name problem, and as Petricioli explained about his sources,
"La mayor parte de los datos que doy a conocer, me fueron platicados
en diversas ocasiones por el propio companero cuya biografia trato
de hacer, y es posible que falten muchos aspectos que otros companeros conocen, omitidos por mi al no conocerlos." El companero
Morones, preface; interviews, Mexico City, June 1 9 , 25, 30, 19^8.
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the age of twenty-two, the youngest member in that organization, he
was very active and spent time attempting to organize workers.

By

speaking to his fellow workers, he became popular and gradually
worked himself through the ranks of the Sindicato Mexicano de
Electricistas. Morones represented the S.M.E. in various labor
federations.

An ambitious man, he saw these union activities as

a means to advance his political career.

VENUSTIANO CARRANZA AND LABOR
In January, 1913 > President Francisco Madero was assassinated
and General Victoriano Huerta seized the presidency in order to re
establish order.

Huerta was obliged to employ violent methods —

methods which involved the execution and incarceration of many
leaders of the trade and labor unions and the closing of the Casa
in 191 ^.

His successful coup d 1 etat and ruthless practices united

various conflicting elements in a struggle against his dictatorship.
Huerta’s three principal opponents were Venustiano Carranza, who
was strongest in northeastern Mexico; Francisco Villa, in the
Northwest; and Emiliano Zapata, in the Southwest.
By the last months of 191 ^, the anti-Huerta forces were vic
torious and occupied the capital.

Temporarily all the major forces

recognized the supremacy of Carranza, "a big, white-bearded man
behind blue spectacles —
of the revolution.

3

3

a calm iceberg of a man," as "First Chief"

This victory was only the prelude to continued

Carleton Beals, Glass Houses:
(Philadelphia, 1938), 22.

Ten Years of Free-Lancing
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hostilities and Carranza soon faced further problems.

The forces of

Villa and Zapata aligned themselves against the president.

These

circumstances compelled the conservative Carranza to evolve a social
program which would attract workers to his banner.
Carranza, in need of all the forces he could muster to break
the power of Villa, delegated General Alvaro Obregon, principal
leader of the Carranza forces, to negotiate with the labor unions
of the Federal District for their help.

A pact was drawn up in

February, 1915, between the Casa, then the most powerful labor body
in the country, and the government.

It was agreed that the Casa

would have governmental assurance of full freedom to carry on its
organizational activities and establish unions among workers within
the areas controlled by the carrancistas. In return, the labor
leaders would recruit thousands of laborers from the capital to
furnish "red batallions" to fight in the ranks of Carranza's troops.
These contingents made an important contribution to the eventual
military victory of the carrancistas. General Celestino Gasca,
Samuel Yudico and Salvador Alvarez, who were later important
cromistas, fought with these red batallions.
Morones opposed the S.M.E. representative on a Casa steering
committee who supported the formation of these units to aid Carranza.

1+

Morones did not trust Carranza and was not sure if he would win.
Therefore, Morones avoided irrevocable commitment to the Constitution
alists .

k

La Prensa, February 21, 1915-

R e p rod uced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

11

In 1915 when Obregon, Carranza's general, arrived in Mexico
City, the S.M.E. was having a conflict with the Telegraph and
Telephone Company.

Inflation caused the telephone workers to grow

more insistent in their demands for higher wages.

After weeks of

discussion with management about a wage increase, the union
suddenly cut off all power in the Federal District on the morning
of August 13, 1915*

Five hours after the strike began, Morones

met with a member of the government to discuss union demands.

An

offer from General Pablo Gongalez, senior military commander in the
area, to pay a wage increase for a month pending further negotiations
was rejected by the S.M.E. leadership.
The company was taken over by the government, and Morones was
appointed to head the Telegraph and Telephone Company.^

He remained

in the office only a few months and left under the charge of misappropriation of funds, which was never proved.

This allegation

was not the last time Morones was accused of corruption while
serving in a public office; such complaints became commonplace in
his later career.
Carranza, who had little conception of labor's potential, did
not wish to create the impression that he was antagonistic to

^Jose Petricioli in El Excelsior, April 6 , I96 U; Luis N. Morones
in Petricioli, El conrpanero Morones, lh; Confederacion Regional Obrera
Mexicana, Memoria de los trabajos realizados por el H. Comite Central,
durante el e,1ercicio comprendido del 1°. de agosto de 1963 a .iulio de
196$ (Mexico, D.F., 1965), 21. Hereinafter this CROM publication will
be cited as "C.R.O.M. Memoria" and the appropriate year given.
g
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 5 8 , 170.
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capital, or rather, too friendly to organized labor.
•with the latter was brief.

His flirtation

After Obregon's military victories over

Villa at Leon, Agua Prieta, Hermosillo, and Celaya, Carranza no
longer needed labor's support and discouraged its development.

With

the Constitutionalist cause triumphant, the workers expected pro
gressive changes.

Not only did these fail to materialize, but with

soaring costs resulting from the huge volume of paper money issued
by the Constitutionalists, the workers found their economic condition
worse than ever.

Because of the consequent decline in real wages,
■7
labor called a general strike for higher wages in May, 1 9 1 6 .
When
this strike (which suspended telephone service, electric power,
and streetcar operation) paralyzed Mexico City, Carranza pronounced
the strike an act of aggression and treason against his government
and made a half-century-old law decreeing capital punishment of

highwaymen applicable to the strikers.

Carranza also closed the

Casa, which he had earlier endowed with lavish quarters, arrested
many of its prominent leaders, and condemned them to death.
of the victims of his wrath was Morones.

One

Obregon interceded and,

by a timely reprieve, managed to obtain a commutation of the death
sentence to a term in a military prison.
to leave Mexico.

Some leaders were forced

Others like Jose Barragan Hernandez, a typographer

fj

Ernest Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage (New York, 192 8),
3 3 8 ; Victor Alba, The Mexicans; the Making of a Nation (New York,
1987), 1^5; Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico (3rd ed.
rev.; Boston, i 9 6 0 ), 3 6 3 .
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and one of the ablest labor chiefs, were gunned down by government
. 8
agents.
Following his near fatal encounter with Carranza, Morones spent
a brief time in Pachuca, Hidalgo.

In 1916 the labor leader Pedro •

Rivera Flores was elected presidente municipal of this small silvermining town.

Remembering his old friend, Rivera appointed Morones

secretary of the ayuntamiento. For a year Morones lived in this
9

provincial community and continued his efforts to organize labor.

SAMUEL GOMFERS AND MEXICAN LABOR
Morones' future ally, Samuel Gonrpers, first became cognizant
of Mexican labor problems in 1883 when he worked at Stachelberg's
making cigars with three Mexican cigarmakers.

Through them he

learned of the Mexican laborers' misfortunes, lack of material
possessions, and "poorness of spirit," all of which appealed to
his sympathy. 10

g
Alba, The Mexicans, 1^5, Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage,
338; Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America, 187; Nathaniel
and Sylvania Weyl, The Reconquest of Mexico: the Years of Lazaro
Cardenas (London, 1939)-. 60; J. H. Retinger, Morones of Mexico: a
History of the Labour Movement in that Country (London, 1926), 9-3-0According to Retinger, the fact that Carranza relented was not due
to any sudden sentimental change on his part, "but to the fact that
even at that early date Morones and his friends were outstanding
figures in Mexico and that Carranza feared the consequences of
killing them." 9 . He fails to substantiate this assertion.
9

Retinger, Morones of Mexico, 10.
10Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor;
Autobiography (2 vols.; New York, 19 ^8 ), II, 303-30^-

an
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Gompers wired Mexican labor organizations asking that they
send delegates to El Paso for a labor conference.

Twenty delegates

were selected to meet with Gompers, Morones, and the impressionist
painter Gerardo Murillo, or "Dr. Atl," were among them.

On June 21,

1916, twelve American soldiers were killed and twenty-three cap
tured in the skirmish with Carranza forces at El Carrizal.

President

Wilson issued an ultimatum calling for the release of the imprisoned
American soldiers.
seemed imminent.

Wilson called up the National Guard, and war
Morones and other delegates arrived in El Paso

two days after the Carrizal clash for their conference with
Gompers.
No reply from Carranza was received, so to avoid war these
Mexican labor representatives telegraphed Gompers to wire an
appeal to Carranza for the prisoners' release.^

Gompers sent

Mexico's president the following telegram on June 28:
In the name of common justice and humanity,
in the interest of a better understanding between
the peoples and the governments of the U.S. and
Mexico, for the purpose of giving the opportunity
to maintain peace and avoid the horrors of war,
upon the grounds of highest patriotism and love,
I appeal to you to release the American soldiers
held by your officers in Chihuahua.^
The following day Gompers received a telegram from Carranza informing
him that the Mexican government had ordered the freeing of the

^ American Federationist, August, 1966 , 633-6 3 8 .
^"‘^William C. Roberts, comp., American Federation of Labor:
History, Encyclopedia and Reference 3ook (2 vols.; Washington,
1919), I, 287-
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Americans whom the Mexicans had taken captive at El Carrizal.
Carranza's release of the prisoners and a deluge of anti-war mail
sent to the White House diverted Wilson from his warlike path; and,
instead of the "war message" he had prepared to deliver to Congress,
Wilson read a moving, conciliatory address.

13

Because of the conditions along the border and the fact that
the executive council of the A.F.L. was scheduled to meet in
Washington, Gompers suggested that twenty Mexican delegates select
\

two of their number to proceed to Washington as a sub-delegation
to meet with the A.F.L. executive council for the purpose of
establishing closer relations between the labor movements of the
neighboring republics.

14

Before departing for the American

capital, a communication was signed by Morones, Edmundo Martinez,
Carlos Loveira, and Salvador Gongalez Garcia, and sent in the name
of Mexican organized workers to the A.F.L. urging it to use its
influence to secure the withdrawal of the Pershing Expedition.^
Upon their arrival in Washington, Morones and Gongalez
Garcia found two labor representatives of Governor Salvador
Alvarado of Yucatan awaiting them as well.

Thus, a reasonable

semblance of a joint Mexican-American labor conference could be

^Arthur Link, Wilson, IV, 31^-318 in Levenstein, "The
United States Labor Movement and Mexico, 1910-1951," 55lU
Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, II, 313;
Morones’ speech in "La C.R.O.M. ni se muere ni se rinde," C.R.O.M.,
November, 1920, 13.
15

Carleton Beals, Mexico;
1923), 137.

an Interpretation (New York,
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held.

The violation of Mexican sovereignty by United States troops

served as the catalyst win oh prompted Gompers to suggest

meetings

between the two labor movements.
According to cromistas (who ignore President Wilson's role),
Morones entered into relations with Gompers and with the help of
the American labor movement, Gompers and Morones were able to
obtain withdrawal of the American soldiers.

This reunion was

also important because it was a forerunner of the Pan-American
Federation of Labor.
Morones returned to Mexico after the joint meeting, and
later that year Gompers wrote him and other leaders recommending
that they follow the organizational scheme of the A.F.L.

This

would include organizing skilled and unskilled labor into trade
unions, not industrial unions.

Gompers was anxious to form a

Pan-American federation of labor.

Progress in this field was

retarded, however, by World War I, and it was not until the war
was over that the long-anticipated organizing convention occurred.

SOCIALIST WOEKERS’ PARTY
After the failure of the general strike in May, 19 16 , many
leaders of the labor movement, including a number of S.M.E.
members, were convinced that vigorous political action was the
only way to assure labor that the fiasco of 1916 would not be

*

Jose Petricioli, interview, Mexico City, June 25, 19 6 8 ;
Luis Enrique Morones Pena, interview, Mexico City, August 2 k , 1 9 6 8 ;
C.R.O.M. Memoria, 196^-1965. 27; Rogelio de la Selva in Las
Novedades, April 1 , 196 ^.
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repeated.

Thus they organized the Partido Socialista Obrero to

advocate political activity as a supplement to economic actions
by unions.

The candidacy of Morones and eight other leaders for

congressional seats was put forth on February 20, 1917» to
compete against Carranza's Liberal Constitutional Party.

All

were defeated and the Socialist Workers' Party made few noteworthy gains in the election.

17

Nevertheless, this cadre

coalesced in 1918 and provided the leadership for what became
Mexico's most powerful trade union.

Furthermore, no Mexican

union or political party has since really denied the P.S.O.'s
principle of supplementing economic activity with political
action.

ABORTIVE EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A NATION-WIDE LABOR ORGANIZATION
An attempt was made at Tampico to create a labor organization
when unions of the Casa convoked a national assembly there in
October, 1917*

The delegation from the Federal District consisted

of Morones, Reynaldo Cervantes Torres, Amado Ortiz, Rodolfo
Aguirre, Gabriel Hidalgo, and Francisco Cervantes Lopez.

18

L7
Araiza, Historia del movimi.ento obrero mexicano, III, 3 6 ;
Rosendo Salazar and Jose G. Escobedo, Las pugnas de la~gleba
(Mexico, D.F., 1923)j 2 3 6 ; Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 71*

18Cervantes Torres represented the Federacion de Sindicatos
Obreros del Distrito Federal y Sindicatos de Carpinteros y Costureras
Morones, the Sindicato de Electricistas; Amado Ortiz, the Sindicato
de Sastres de Mexico, D.F.; Aguirre and Hidalgo, the Federacion
de Obreros y Empleados de Tranvias de Mexico, D.F.; and Cervantes
Lopez, the Partido Socialista Obrero de Mexico, D.F. Salazar and
Escobedo, Las pugnas de la gleba, 2 k 3 -2 k k .
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During the conference labor leaders from different areas fought for
control.

The conference quickly split into two opposing groups.

The trade unionists from the Federal District, headed by Morones,
were opposed by the anarchists, mostly from Tampico, and led by
Ricardo Trevino.

Opponents of the Federal District delegates

accused them of attending the congress to act as informants for
the government -which was subsidizing them.

Some from the Federal

District were arrested, but none of these were moronistas whom
competitors alleged had the protection of the secret police.

19

Because of such discord, a nation-wide labor organization did not
materialize until the following year.

Ricardo Trevino, El movimiento obrero en Mexico. Su evolucion
ideologica (Mexico, D.F., 19^+8), 48. Trevino is vague in his one
brief paragraph describing this incident. He neither identifies the
"opponents," the specific group arrested, nor who apprehended them.
One assumes government agents seized them since Trevino mentions
secret police. He does, however, praise Morones' cleverness for
pretending to be a government instrument. In reality, according
to Trevino, Morones outwitted the administration and used its
generosity to finance his delegation.
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CHAPTER I I I

CROM, P.A.F.L., AND P.L.M. FOUNDINGS

CROM FOUNDING
CRCM was founded as a result of a split -which took place among
the laborers in Mexico, as some (the most radical, called "reds")
believed that they should always go against the government, while
others, (less radical, called the "yellows") thought that, on the
contrary, to give greater protection to the workers they should
enter into politics and endeavor to get as many legislative posts
as they could.
In January, 1 91 8 , Licenciado Gustavo Espinosa Mireles,
governor of Coahuila, called a convention to meet in Saltillo to
form a nation-wide labor organization which President Carranza
hoped to dominate.^"

Morones was one of the first to know the

governor's intentions, because Juan Lozano, a member of the
organizational committee, explained the situation to him.

Since

travelling expenses and lodging were paid by the Coahuila govern
ment, Morones received 150 pesos to journey to Saltillo from
Mexico City; he unsuccessfully asked for more, alleging that
this was a paltry sum for a leader of his caliber.

2

^Trevino, El movimiento obrero en Mexico, 7^5 Vicente Lombardo
Toledano, Teoria y nractica del movimiento sindical mexicano
(Mexico, D.F., 1 96 1 ), 53-5^.

2

Carlos Tresguerras in La Prensa, May 31 5 1939*

19
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The congress -which opened May 1 in Saltillo's Teatro Obrero
included 121 representatives from all the Mexican states.

In this

meeting Morones 1 fiery orations and behind-the-scenes maneuvering
pushed him rapidly to the front as the obvious leader of the new
organization.

Morones' national reputation was based largely on

the Mexicans' believing that he had ended U.S. military presence
in Mexico.

This, added to the following he gained at the Veracruz

and Tampico congresses, made Morones the most prominent man in the
Mexican labor movement at Saltillo.

Through sheer energy and a

sense of political direction which other leaders lacked, Morones
and Ezequiel Salcedo, leader of a small group from the Federal
District, manipulated the convention and imposed their will upon
the congress.
Fernando Rodarte, in the name of the assembly, declared the
Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana to be in existence, with
the following selected as the provisional executive committee:
Jacinto Huitron, Secretary General; Luis N. Morones, Secretary
of Interior; Teodoro Ramirez, Secretary of Exterior; and Ricardo
O
Trevino, Secretary of Acuerdos.
At the 8:00 F.M. session of
May 11 the central committee was elected by the assembly for the

^C.R.O.M. Memoria, 19^1 -19^-3, xix; Atlas, June 15, 1 9 6 8 .
Huitron was an anarchist; Morones, a trade unionist; Ramirez, a
syndicalist; and Trevino, an adherent of the Industrial Workers
of the World. Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 6 l. The founders
chose the word "Regional" because it conveyed the concept that the
syndical organization of Mexico was a fraction of the international
labor movement. Lombardo Toledano, Teoria y practica, 5^.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

21
corning year.

Morones was chosen secretary general by a vote of

85 to 6 and Trevino and J. Marcos Tristan corresponding secretaries.
Morones demonstrated his intelligence by maneuvering the
Saltillo convention in a form to his liking.

Carranza intended

that the new labor organization would give him unquestioned
support; in fact, it turned out to be one of his strongest
opponents.

CROM STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION
CROM was a loose federation of autonomous national, state,
and local unions organized much on the pattern of the American
Federation of Labor.

It was composed of trade, labor, and

directly affiliated workers' syndicates.

The sindicato, or

syndicate (single unit), combined laborers either of similar
occupations, like the United States trade unions, or of the
same establishment, like the United States industrial unions.
The terms union, liga, and sociedad were also used, generally

C.R.O.M. Memoria, 19^1-19^-3, xxxviii-xl; John W. F. Dulles,
Yesterday in Mexico (Austin, 19ol), 2T(b. The committee was to have
its headquarters at Aguascalientes, but in 1921 the central committee
was permanently transferred to the Federal District, the center of
the Mexican labor movement. According to Retinger, Morones was,
"Born when the process of the invasion of Mexico by foreign
capitalism was at its height, his life is the unique story of a
boy who, from being an electrician's apprentice, became in less
than ten years the greatest moral leader of his country, the
founder of an important labour movement and the object of hero
worship of multitudes of his fellow countrymen." Morones of
Mexico, xv-xvi. That Morones was "the greatest moral leader of
his country" is as questionable as is the statement "the object
of hero worship of multitudes of his fellow countrymen." These
panegyric remarks incorporate more propaganda than concrete fact.
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indiscriminately, to designate these organizations.

In addition to

the state and federal federations, CROM in the 1920's included fournational industrial federations:

those of printing trades, port

and harbor workers, railroad workers, and theater employees.
In a country filled with impoverished laborers, CROM was
not confined to the industrial population.

While industrial

workers, such as miners, railwaymen, textile workers, electricians,
and petroleum workers joined, CROM included non-industrial vocations
also.

Especially strong in Mexico City and among factory and farm

workers, CROM organized a multiplicity of elements comprising,
among others, gravediggers, bullfighters, domestic servants,
fruit vendors, government employees, department-store workers,
newsboys, and a union of Mexico City prostitutes.^

CROM even

dominated the entertainment industry, shouting down theatrical
performances in which non-unionized actors were employed; and,
by controlling the printers, CROM was able to exercise unofficial
censorship over the Mexican press.
Despite its federative framework, CROM was centralized.

The

central committee, (composed of three general secretaries together
with a variable number of secretaries for agriculture, transporta
tion, treasury, and heads of the national federations), was the

^Clark, Organized labor in Mexico, 108; Edward Alsworth Ross,
The Social Revolution in Mexico (New York, 1 92 3 ), 103; Parkes, A
History of Mexico, 3 8 2 .

£
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico. 119s Parkes, A H istory of
Mexico, 3 8 2 .
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executive of tlie ■whole federation.

It carried out agreements of the

annual national conventions, enforced the confederation's constitu
tion, and handled emergency situations of national importance.

GRUPO ACCION
Although elected delegates from each union acting in assemblies
gave CROM a democratic appearance, internal politics were actually
managed by a small inner clique called the Grupo Accion which dic
tated pre-convention policies.

Before the formation of CROM, when

the Casa was leading the Mexican labor movement, a number of young
men met frequently in Mexico City to plan and direct union activity.
From these meetings Morones got the idea of the Grupo Accion which
he formed in 1918.

The purpose of this cadre was to study important

problems, prepare plans, and present a united front to the labor
organization.

Although this body was unmentioned in the CROM con

stitution, it became the policy-making and chief governing body
conducting day-to-day affairs.

7

The hierarchical structure of CROM and the fact that a cadre
which met in secret, perpetuated itself in office, and exercised an
influence out of proportion to its size, ensured that no refbrm

7

At first the Grupo Accion consisted of eighteen members, twothiras of whom were from the Federal District and all of whom had
played an active part in Mexico's incipient organized labor movement.
Original members included Morones, Salcedo, Celestino Gasca, Juan
Rico, Ricardo TreviSo, J. Marcos Tristan, Eduardo Moneda, Juan B.
Fonseca, Fernando Rodarte, Juan Lozano, Jose Lopez Cortes, Reynaldo
Cervantes Torres, Adalberto Polo, Pedro Suarez, Pedro Rivera Flores,
Salvador Alvarez, Samuel Yudico, and Jose Gutierrez. From time to
time new members would be added, but at no time were there more
than twenty in the select group.
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could "be made except from the top downwards.

Morones was the

acknowledged leader and most authoritative member of the Grupo,
in spite of the fact that forty years later he attempted to
underplay his commanding position when he stated, "I, like any
other member of the Grupo Accion, was subject to the determination

g
of the majority."

Although C-rupo members were not figureheads,

they were subordinate to Morones; he was the dominant figure and
more than anyone else shaped policy.

CROM IDEOLOGY
With CROM's foundation, an elite of the organized working
class began to formulate, clarify, and build its program.

In its

early years CROM was militant, because its ranks contained many
elements that had formed the Casa.

Nevertheless, it adopted a

platform less radical and less influenced by Russian thought than
that of the Casa.

Although CROM utilized the anarcho-syndicalist

"salud y revolucion" as its official motto, adopted the Casa's
organizational flag, (a red banner crossed by a black stripe) and
freely used anarchist jargon, it abandoned syndicalism and gene
rally followed the United States labor movement.
Through ideological eclecticism, CROM combined elements of
diverse systems to form a new unit.

The constitution abandoned

the anarcho-syndicalist doctrine and accepted the theory of class
conflict, the breaking up of large estates and land distribution,

g
Luis N. Morones in Petricioli, El companero Morones, lU.
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ownership of industry by workers, and the reform of the conciliation
and arbitration labor boards.

g

Although advocating ultimate owner

ship and management of industry by the workers, CROM leadership
stressed immediate economic and social improvements such as agrarian
reform and enforcement of the newly-adopted labor laws of the 1917
Mexican Constitution.

Broadly stated, two goals of CROM were

(l) the legitimate defense and execution of the workers' interests
guaranteed under the Mexican Constitution, and (2) the solution of
economic problems that confronted the country.^

In achieving its

goals CROM used both economic and political means.
anarchism's direct action with multiple action.

It replaced

This meant com

bining the use of strikes to extract better working conditions from
the employers with direct political action; and, thus in the manner
of British unions, it would change the socio-economic system.^

P.A.F.L. FOUNDING
John Murray, correspondent for the New York Call, and Santiago
Iglesias, Puerto Rican organizer for the A.F.L. and a man. who was
familiar with Mexican affairs, became convinced of the necessity

%eals, Mexico: an Interpretation, 136; Joe C. Ashby,
Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution under Lazaro Cardenas
(Chapel Hill, 1963), 1^; William P. Tucker, The Mexican Govern
ment Today (Minneapolis, 1957)? 5^- Morones had earlier observed
trade unions in France, Germany, England, and the United States
and decided to adapt these principles to the Mexican environment
and conditions.
■^Luis N. Morones in El Universal, August 27, 195^-j Ashby,
Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution Tinder Lazaro Cardenas,

T k.
^Lombardo Toledano, Teoria y practica, 55*
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for a formal Pan-American labor organization.

These two men aided

by various other factors helped convince President of the A.F.L.
Samuel Gompers that the A.F.L. should enter into some kind of a
formal alliance with CROM.

There was, for example, a strong

current of opinion in Mexico favorable to Germany during World
War I.

A Pan-American federation, as Gompers saw it, could

counteract Germanophile tendencies and create favorable opinion
for the Allied cause.

With this in mind, Gompers continued to

urge Mexican labor leaders to push for the joint meeting.

Gompers'

hopes were fulfilled by events of autumn, 1 91 8 .
The Pan-American Federation of Labor, which the CROM joined
for opportunist reasons, was founded in November, 1918 , in Laredo,
Texas.

November 13, the first day of the conference, was devoted

to welcoming the deputies, speech-making, and ceremonial activities.
W. B. Wilson, United States Secretary of Labor, attended the con
ference as President Woodrow Wilson's emissary, and General Pablo
de la Garza represented and spoke in behalf of President Carranza.
Following addresses by Wilson and Ricardo de Leon, the Guatemalan
delegate, Morones spoke emphasizing the fact that Mexican delegates
came to the conference not as subordinates to A.F.L. members but
as their equals.

He said:

Let it not be supposed that, lacking respect,
we have crossed the boundary line which divides
the two countries to render vassalage to a
powerful labor organization. No, that is not
our mission. With due regard to the American
Federation of Labor, we have come to deal with
it as one organization deals with another
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organization, and discuss the far-reaching
problems that directly affect the workers
12
of Mexico and the workers of the United States.
Morones terminated his speech by appealing for Pan-American-workingclass solidarity which brought prolonged applause from the audience.
Following Gompers' address, the meeting adjourned until that
afternoon.

The conference reconvened in Laredo's Latin-American

Club, where the remainder of its s e s s io n s w ere held.
several important demands:

Morones had

(l) the appointment by the A..F.L. and

CROM of resident representatives in the border cities who would try
to secure proper treatment of Mexican immigrants, (2) the extension
to Mexicans of facilities for joining American unions with full
privileges, (3 ) agreement to secure justice for workers imprisoned
in the United States, and, (h) the exclusion from the conference
of questions bearing on Mexican neutrality in World War I, and on
the internal policies of either country.

The first two points were

referred to the A.F.L. executive council for investigation and
action.
Point 3 developed into a debate between Gompers and Morones
over the Industrial Workers of the World.

Their disagreement was

occasioned by CROM's demand that the A.F.L. exert influence to
secure justice and protection for I.W.W. members imprisoned in the
United States.

Gompers, impatient and angry, answered that they

were not incarcerated for their socialist theories, but for criminal

T ’an American Labor Press, December U, 1 91 8 , in Sinclair Snow,
"Samuel Gompers and the Pan-American Federation" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Virginia, i 960 ), 80.
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reasons; that is, they were "American Bolsheviks" and had sought to
hinder the progress of the Great War by their propaganda activities
against the recruitment of soldiers.

Gompers assumed a hard line

and warned against I.W.W. activities in Mexico.

Disputing this

view, Morones asserted that the A.F.L. should allow the I.W.W. to
disseminate propaganda without any interference.

Gompers called

Morones1 bluff, and the Mexican was quick to capitulate by deliver
ing a conciliatory speech.

Later, he remarked to Gompers that the

discussion on the I.W.W. issue had been staged to satisfy "the
people back home" who had heard that the A.F.L. had encouraged the
jailing of these American workers.
Despite point

Gompers introduced a resolution endorsing

the Treaty of Versailles, League of Nations, and the International
Labor Organization.

John Alpine, a member of the A.F.L. executive .

council, moved that the resolution be adopted.

Morones, however,

instantly objected to its consideration because it was extraneous
to the convention's objects.

Realizing that Mexicans would interpret

discussion of peace terms as a violation of Mexican neutrality,
Morones demurred, and the ensuing dispute was more heated than the
one concerning the I.W.W.

Citing the fact that these proposals had

already been adopted by the labor movements of the United States,
Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandinavian
countries assembled at the recent Interallied Labor Conference in
London, Gompers insisted that this resolution definitely treated
labor's concern.

Reynaldo Cervantes Torres of the Grupo Accion

supported Morones’ contention that, while they as individuals
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understood and approved the resolution, they were unauthorized to
discuss political problems.

Gompers then challenged the Mexican

delegation to go on record as opposing the peace terms, but follow
ing a strenuous objection, Morones declared that the Mexican
delegates would each sign the resolution, but only in a personal,
and not an official, capacity.

Finally, Morones and his adherents

supported the controversial resolution "subject to ratification by
their Mexican co-workers."

13

Morones had been confronted by a

dilemma, since he did not want to vote for any measure pertaining
to United States foreign policy.

Voting for some parts of the

resolution and against others would have probably been the worst
thing he could have done, because it would have exposed him to
attacks from all sides.

Morones and Cervantes Torres knew that

their action would be rejected by other cromistas; nevertheless,
they signed the resolution in order to maintain harmonious relations
with Gompers.
Shortly before the conference closed, it discussed the exchange
of union cards.

A Mexican delegate from the Mine, Mill, and Smelter

Workers' Union directed three questions to the chairman of the
Resolutions Committee;

"Will the American unions agree to admit

Mexican workers into their ranks?

Will Mexican members have the

same rights and privileges as American members?

Will the antagonism

of races continue within (labor) organizations?"^

William Green

answered the first question by stating that each component union of

I3Ibid., 8 6 -8 7 .
Xl|Ibid., 8 9 .
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the A.F.L. had its own regulations covering admission.

Since an

agreement on the exchange of uni on cards had been one of the major
reasons the Mexican trade unionists had supported the idea of a
federation of Pan-American labor, Morones was dissatisfied with
Green's reply.

Gompers ended the discussion by emphasizing that

the A.F.L. had no authority to compel its unions to exchange cards
The election of officers of the new Pan-American Federation
of Labor was accomplished without difficulty.

Gompers was chosen

president; John Murray, English-Language secretary; and Canuto
Vargas, a Mexican member of the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers'
Union of Arizona, Spanish-Language secretary.
Disagreement arose over the site of the first congress, but
the conference finally decided to hold it in Panama, beginning in
July, 1919*

After some Mexican representatives objected to Panama

this problem was reconsidered at a joint meeting of Mexican dele
gates and the A.F.L. executive council, held in San Antonio, Texas
a few days after the Laredo conference had adjourned.

Morones

suggested that the meeting be held in Havana, but when James
Duncan of the A.F.L. executive council suggested that New York
City was more convenient because it was a center of information
and publicity, New York was unanimously selected.

P.L.M. FOUNDING
Although CROM's development was influenced through the
proximity and frequent intercourse with the A.F.L., in one very
noticeable aspect it was the antithesis of the A.F.L.; it utilized
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direct political party intervention.

The Grupo Accion was convinced

that if“ a trade unionist movement were to succeed, it must do so by
political, as well as by union, organization.

Realizing that as long

as the government remained free from labor control it was useless
to expect the creation of a new social order, Morones employed poli
tical power by founding the Partido Laborista Mexicano or Mexican
Labor Party.
Following Eduardo Moneda's invitation, more than seventy
cromistas met in Mexico City on December 21, 1919> to found the
P.L.M.

Following Morones' and Gasca's speeches about the need of

worker participation in politics to hasten desired revolutionary
achievements, the founders decided that the party should consist
entirely of workers and exclude professional politicians.
Morones claimed that the P.L.M. was founded to create a force
of socio-political character and place it at the service of CROM to
make the CROM program viable.

15

According to him, the P.L.M's only

program was that of CROM; it was to be the "loudspeaker" of the
CROM's social platform.
Nominally an entity separate from the CROM, the P.L.M. actually
was its political wing.

Morones' transformation of direct action

into multiple action necessitated participation in politics as a
means and not as an end.

The P.L.M. planned to "carry class war

15

"Discurso pronunciado por el Sr. Luis N. Morones en la velada
por el Partido Laborista Mexicano la noche del 21 de diciembre de
1931? para conmemorar el XII aniversario de su fundacion." C.R.O.M.,
January 1, 1932, 3 1 .
^"Discurso por el c. Luis N. Morones en el mi tin que tuvo
lugar en el Teatro Hidalgo, la noche del 8 de enero de 1 9 3 8 ."
C.R.O.M., February, 1938, 7.
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into the field of politics," and at the same time to put the Grupo
*
17
Accion in lino for political jobs.

At the height of CROM's power,

Ricardo Trevino, secretary general, explained that CROM was itself
no more in politics than was the A.F.L., but "Mexican wage earners
function politically through the Labor Party, organized specifically

10
to keep the unions as unions out of the political arena."

Leaders

of CROM became leaders of the P.L.M.; and these leaders subordinated
P.L.M. to CROM, whose instructions it executed.
therefore, is misleading.

Trevino's assertion,

Morones' critics charged that he founded

the Partido Laborista to serve instead as the "Partido Moronista,"
and in lieu of serving the masses it served as a stairway for his
ambition.^
A chief reason for forming the Labor Party was to support
Alvaro Obregon's candidacy for the Mexican presidency against that
of Carranza’s protege, Ignacio Bonillas.

Cromistas held their first

annual convention of the P.L.M. in Zacatecas, where the governor,
General Enrique Estrada, was an obregonista. Among the forty-four
delegates who met at Calderon Theater in Ciudad Zacatecas March 1-9,
1920, to endorse Obregon were Morones, who was elected secretary
general of the party. General Francisco Serrano, Licenciado Emilio

^Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 70; Jose 0. Petricioli,
et_al., Estudio's proletarios (2 vols.; Mexico, D.F., 1959), I, 182,
describes P.L.M. as "a political class party."
1Q
Chester Wright, "Mexico's Peaceful Revolution under Calles,"
Current History, XXTV (July, 192 6 ), 506 .
1%iguel Gil in La Prensa, January 26 , 28, 1938 .
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Portes Gil, and Felipe Carrillo Puerto, Yucatan's reformist
governor.

20

The union's support of Obregon was promised after the future
president and CROM leaders formed a secret pact on August 6, 1919*
The following are some of provisions of that clandestine agreement:
1. A ministry of labor should be created, and placed in
charge of a person closely identified with labor interests.
2. Until the creation of such a special ministry, the
existing Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor should
be in charge of a person closely identified with labor.
3- The Ministry of Agriculture should be entrusted to
a person well qualified for the position, and recommen
dations of the labor groups in matters of agriculture
should receive attention.
4. In appointing the persons mentioned in clauses 1, 2
and 3, the recommendations of the labor party that was
to be created should be taken into consideration.
5. As soon as a labor law could be approved, it should
be promulgated and put into immediate effect.
6 . The Central Committee of the Mexican Federation of
Labor should be granted legal personality, so that it
might deal directly with the Secretary of Industry,
Commerce and Labor, and with the President.
7- On at least one day each week the Central Committee
should be given opportunity to consult with the President
on labor problems.

20

Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 275; Clark, Organized Labor in
Mexico, 71; Moises Poblete Troncoso, El movimiento obrero latinoamericano (Mexico, D.F., 19^+6), 223; Jose Petricioli in El Excelsior,
April 6, 196 ^; Miguel Gil in La Prensa, January 26, 1938. It would
have been necessary for Carranza to have chosen a candidate of
eminent qualities with a long record of distinguished service, a
man of immense popularity. He did just the opposite and selected
the little-known ambassador to Washington, Ignacio Bonillas, a man
who had spent most of his life away from his native land.
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8 . Every facility should he given the Mexican Federation
of Labor to aid it in putting its plans and resolutions
into effect.
9- The opinion of the labor organizations of the country
should be given consideration in any reforms or changes
of general interest in the country.
10. Facilities for propaganda and labor organization
throughout the country should be given the Mexican
Federation of Labor and the Labor Party. ^
This arrangement, •which was made public on August 21, 1930, was
signed by Morones and ten members of the Grupo Accion.
In the political sphere Morones proved to be just as astute
as he was in the union organizing arena.

By doing what was

politically expedient, Obregon secured the support of Morones*
CROM, at that time the predominant Mexican labor organization.
Morones, with political foresight, allied with Obregon during
Carranza's administration.

He thus joined the future of the

organized labor movement with the possible incoming government
in order to strengthen the workers' movement.

This alliance

proved most profitable for Morones' when Obregon became president
of Mexico.

21

Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 72-73.
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CHAPTER IV
MORONES AND CROM DURING OBEEGON'S PRESIDENCY, 1920-24

Relations between President Carranza and CROM bad always been
at best tenuous, so when be showed signs of planning to perpetuate
himself in office, Morones allied with Obregon.

The general, partly

because of Morones' aid, escaped from Mexico City and led the
rebellion that overthrew Carranza.

Morones and various cromistas

were rewarded with political patronage, money, and special privi
leges, and Morones continued his rise to the apogee of his power.

PLAN OF AGUA PRIETA
Carranza's agents harassed Obregon as he directed his
presidential campaign from Mexico City.

One day he received word

that Carranza planned to jail him on charges of conspiracy and
treason.

Morones, having heard these rumors, urged Obregon to flee

the capital.

Obregon departed from the home of Miguel Alessio

Robles on the evening of April 11, 1920.

Obregon, Licenciado Rafael

Zubaran, and Alessio Robles sat in the back seat of the automobile;
Morones and the driver sat in the front.

Noting that their car was

being followed by government motorcyclists, the presidential candi
date exchanged his prominent straw hat for Zubaran's hat.

When

their vehicle reached the Plaza de Orizaba, Obregon leaped from the
slow-moving car and hid among the trees.

He then entered a Ford

which had been placed in readiness by two friends.

Obregon's swift

departure had been unnoticed by the police because of the straw hat
change.
36
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When the others arrived at the Cafe Colon on the Paseo de la
Reforma to drink cognac, they were interrupted by the officers
seeking Obregon.

After the police departed, Morones, Zubaran, and

Alessio left the restaurant, each going in a different direction
to confuse the carranci sta s.
Before leaving his companions, Obregon gave Morones a 500 peso
check which he was to cash at Comision Monetaria.

Morones was to

use the money to purchase Obregon some medicine for his respiratory
ailment.

Obregon told Morones that he could use the remainder for

his family.

Morones was warned that he might have difficulty

cashing the check and was informed to meet Obregon in Margarito

2
Ramirez's home which he did.
Having been told by Obregon to join him somewhere between
Mexico City and Chilpancingo, Morones went to Iguala on April 13.
Not finding Obregon there, he journeyed to Mexcala where he succeeded
in linking up with the general.

They continued southward to

Chilpancingo, where various pronouncements were issued on April 20.
In their manifesto to Labor Party members, Morones, Alvarez, and
Trevino stated that the Party's Directive Committee would work to
further Obregon1s cause.
to do likewise.

All working class members were advised

3

^"Luis N. Morones to J.W.F. Dulles, February 16, 1957, photocopy,
L.S.U. Archives.

2Ibid.
3
Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 32.
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The Sonora rebellion against Carranza began April 11, the same
day that Obregon had fled the capital.

Carranza dispatched troops

to Sonora where the governor, Adolfo de la Huerta, considering this
action an attack on his sovereignty, pronounced against the president.
By the fifteenth,General Enrique Estrada, governor of Zacatecas, and
General Pascual Ortiz Rubio, governor of Michoacan, endorsed the
revolt.
Morones sailed from Acapulco north to Sonora but activities
which he had planned, such as conferences at Cananea, were curtailed
by de la Huerta.

While Morones was in Sonora, opponents defying

Carranza's efforts to control their state issued the Plan of Agua
Prieta on April 23, 1920.

This plan was largely the work of de

la Huerta and generals Plutarco Calles and Salvador Alvarado.

k

On May 7 Carranza and his entourage fled Mexico City and on
May 9 Obregon entered the capital.

Two days later Obregon's forces

routed the carrancistas at San Marcos.

The "First Chief" fled to

U
Ibid., 33* According to Ariel Ramos, Morones left Sonora
and "participated in the Plan of Agua Prieta" with Yudico, Gracidas,
Juan Rico, Rafael Quintero, Moneda, and Celestino Gasca. El
Universal, April 6 , I 96 I. Unfortunately, Ramos fails to specify
Morones' exact role in the insurrection. Cline in The United States
and Mexico writes that "Obregon was assisted in his displacement of
the 'First Chief' by a great many people, the most notable of whom
were Luis G. (sic) Morones, a labor leader of the Core, and northern
henchmen of Obregon, Plutarco Elias Calles and Adolfo de la Huerta,"
1 9 3 . In forming this evaluation, Cline had no access to any classi
fied information and used only published material. Cline to Buford,
November 6 , 1970* L* Vincent Padgett also states that "When Carranza
attempted to name Ignacio Bonillas his successor, Obregon, Calles,
Morones, and Adolfo de la Huerta rebelled and brought him down."
The Mexican Political System (Boston, 1 9 6 6 ), 25.
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the hills where

he was assassinated May 21 in San Antonio

Tlaxcalantongo, Veracruz.

Dr. Carlos Sanchez Perez, •who performed

an autopsy the following day, revealed that the victim had five
wounds inflicted by firearms.^
Obregon, elected president in July, 1920, assumed office
in December of that year.

The newly-elected president, full of

quips and yarns, jokingly described his "itchy palm" to Blasco
Ibanez, the noted Spanish novelist whom the government had invited
to Mexico.
have two.

"I have only one hand," Obregon said, "while the others
That's why people prefer me.

I can't steal so much or

g
so iast."

Typical of campaign promises in all countries, many of

Obregon's were never fulfilled.

Although Obregon displayed more

willingness than his predecessor to enforce the labor provisions
of the Mexican Constitution, no general labor law was enacted
during his presidency.

UNOFFICIAL ENVOY TO WASHINGTON
Shortly after taking power Obregon sent Morones to Washington
as his special representative to deliver an oral message to President
Wilson.

Morones went first to Gompers, who arranged interviews for

Francisco L. Urquiza, Carranza: el hombre« el polxtico, el
caudillo, el patriota (6 a ed.; Mexico, D.F., n.d.), 71.

6

~
,
Blasco Ibanez, Mexico in Revolution, 60. Obregon was
referring to his left hand, his right arm having been amputated
as a result of a wound sustained at the Battle of Celaya, his
significant victory over Pancho Villa in 1915.
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him with Wilson and Secretary of State Bairibridge Colby.

7

It appears

that Morones' task was to assure Wilson that Obregon did not intend
to harm American financial interests in Mexico; Obregon's pride and
nationalism prevented him from putting this in writing before the
United States granted recognition.

In addition, Morones brought a

letter from Obregon to Gompers in which Obregon asked the American
labor leader to lend Morones any possible assistance in this important
mission.

The fact that Morones was one of the first men dispatched

by the new Mexican government to smooth things over in the capital
of the United States shows that Obregon was aware of the role which
CROM could play in Mexican-American diplomatic relations and partly
explains the privileged position which Morones' CROM achieved.

CROM PATRONAGE
CROM had supported a winner and the winner began to support it
with various concessions.

Although Morones wanted a ministry which

the newly-elected president did not give him, he was named superin
tendent of the Departamento de Establecimientos Fabriles y Militares
(Department of Military and Manufacturing Establishments) and of the
army purchasing department.

This office, created in 1917 to manufacture

rj

Memo by R. Lee Guard, May 24-25, 1920, Gompers Papers, in
Levenstein, "The United States Labor Movement and Mexico, 1910-1951,"
1 3 6 . According to El Excelsior, "Informally and in his character
as socialist workers' leader,...Morones, has in fact, gone to the
United States to confer with workmen's organizations in that country,
including the American Federation of Labor, in order to urge American
labor to exercise its collective influence upon the Government of
President Harding, to the end that diplomatic relations with Mexico
might be resumed." March 13, 1920.
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and repair war materials, was abolished by the decree of December 29,
I93 U, which made it a dependency of the Secretary of War and Navy on

0
.Ta.TYHfl.-ry l, 1935-

It had been an important bureau ranking just below

a cabinet position.

The Department of Military and Manufacturing

Establishments consisted of eighteen factories which produced
uniforms, saddlery, rifles, ammunition, and repaired larger military
pieces obtained from abroad.

With a combined budget of 30>000j000

pesos its head had one of the most lucrative posts in the government.
Charges of maladministration and malfeasance were soon levelled
against Morones.

In 1921, Vito Alessio Robles, director of El

Democrata, accused Morones of having stolen at least 7 0 0 ,0 0 0 pesos
from the Military Factories.3-^

In August, 192*+, General Jose Marxa

Sanchez denounced Morones in the Senate for "exploiting" the Depart
ment to help support the Labor Party.

For this purpose he had used

deductions from salaries of employees of the Military Establishments
and Mexico City municipal employees in 1922 and 1 9 2 3 . When the
issue was revived in 193 6 , thirteen years after his resignation,
Morones, in an attempt to vindicate himself of charges of graft
while serving in this office, cited a letter dated in the early
1920's in which Plutarco Calles, Minister of Gobernacion, stated
his satisfaction with the efficiency with which Morones had dis
charged his duties.

Morones contended that Calles praised him for

g
Diario Oficial, LXXXVII, December 3 1 , 193 ^.
^Beals, Glass Houses, 70-71.
10Vito Alessio Robles, Desfile sangriento (Mexico, D.F., 1936),
70.
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his "unquestionable honesty, zeal, and energy"; this, Morones claimed,
endorsed his conduct as a public functionary.^"

Morones had been

charged with graft during his tenure as director of the telephone
company, and similar accusations recurred as long as he held this
position.

Criticism of his concessionary view of public office and

of his dishonesty became commonplace during his later term as
Secretary of Industry, Commerce, and Labor.
During Obregon's administration other CROM chieftains were also
rewarded with political patronage:

Celestino Gasca, the labor leader

who had commanded workers' battalions, became Governor of the
Federal District,

12

and through his patronage many positions were

filled with cromistas.

Two of Obregon's other appointments were

Ezequiel Salcedo, head of the Graphic Shops, and Eduardo Moneda,
Director of the newly-created Department of Social Prevision.

Luis E. Morones in El Universal, August 23, 1936; Luis E.
Morones in El Universal, August 2 k , 1956. CROM also propagandized
that Morones organized and converted the Military Establishments
into "a dignified model." "El festival en honor del companero
Luis E. Morones," C.R.O.M., 1926, 3 6 . Miguel Gil, on the other
hand, alleges Morones divided his time between "Fabriles y las
parrandas" (factories and sprees), La Prensa, January 26, 1938.
Gil, one of Morones' most vocal critics, asserts that Morones
wanted to be a powerful labor leader and was unconcerned about
the methods he used to fulfill his limitless ambition. Morones,
disappointed about his not being named to a ministry, accepted
the Military Factories post to acquire more prestige in political
spheres. La Prensa, February 21, 1938.

12

Obregon had more confidence in Gasca than in Morones.
Miguel Gil in La Prensa, January 26, 1 9 3 8 .
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COUNTERBAIANCE TO CROM
Although CROM chiefs were rewarded with political patronage,
money, and special privileges, Obregon was too clever to allow the
concentration of excessive power in the hands of the ambitious
Morones.

The president encouraged CROM, but attempted to counter

balance its power by allowing campesinos to organize in the
Confederacion Nacional Campesina (C.R.C.) under Antonio Diaz Soto
y Gama, an intellectual lawyer from San Luis Potosi.

Soto y Gama,

who had been Emiliano Zapata’s advisor and orator, was now an
obregonista.

Since the peasants outnumbered the industrial

workers, Obregon pinned his hopes largely on the agrarian move
ment.

Facing the obstacles of isolation, illiteracy, and Indianism,

the campesinos were difficult to mobilize and by far the most
successful early mobilization turned out to be that undertaken by
the cromistas.
Leaders of the Labor Party and the Agrarian Party became
bitter enemies and frequent clashes occurred between the two
factions in the Chamber of Deputies.

Soto y Gama, for example,

openly attacked Morones for implanting gomperismo with its "bastard"
cooperation between labor and capital in Mexico, "...C.R.O.M. is
sacred because it is a MAFIA of ex-workers converted into bureauTO
crats."
Morones openly broke with Obregon's agrarian supporters,
^

Soto y Gama and the bearded Aurelio Manrique in I9 2 3 .

QO
Diario de los debates de la Camara de Diputados, September
30, 1925, 13, 19.
^
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Although CROM was repaid with political favors and aid in
crushing rival unions, Morones was not as strong under Obregon
as he would he under the next president,

Plutarco Calles.

Hubert

Herring overestimated Morones’ power during Obregon's administra
tion when he wrote:
Morones, buttressed by the CROM's inner council
(Grupo Accion) and defended by his private
guards, exercised a power second only to that
of the president. Armed with Article 123 of
the Constitution and supported by Obregon1s
courts and police, Morones1 CROM exercised
the power of life or death over every factory,
mill, and shop.
Under Calles' presidency, when Morones was at the apogee of his
influence, he did not have much success in enforcing Article 123.
ih.
Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America from the
Beginnings to the Present (3rd ed.; New York, 1968), 3^9* Among
other things Article 123 declares an eight-hour day; a seven-hour
night; one day's rest in seven, equal pay for equal work; legal
strikes; legal lock-outs; no labor for children under twelve;
double wage rates for overtime and limitation on hours of over
time; wages to be paid in currency; employer liability for accidents
and occupational diseases; maximum wages; profit sharing; and
vacations with full pay for pregnant women in industry, both before
and after the birth of the child. One interesting incident illus
trating Morones' power was the one-man El Universal strike of 1922.
Felix Palavicini, founder of this metropolitan daily in 1916, had
signed individual contracts with all its workers. One man, Moreno
Irrazabal, through an oversight had no contract. He presented
himself to Palavicini, saying he represented an organization
affiliated with CROM and demanded recognition for it. It was
explained to him that the rest of the newspaper's staff was satis
fied with their conditions of employment, and that there was no
reason why a special and different contract should be made in this
case. He insisted, however, and was asked to leave. On the night
of September 1 , 1922, a group of armed men, cromistas from the
military factories then under Morones' direction, invaded the plant,
placed the CROM red and black banner in the doorway, and stationed
workers and police on guard. At the end of a week, Morones per
mitted Palavicini to reopen after agreeing to pay the wages of all
his men during that week. Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 355-357-
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The extent of enforcement depended upon the strength of the local
labor organizations, and in each state the extent of organization
depended on -whether or not the local governor was favorable to the
trade-union movement and its leaders.

The geographical remoteness

of the state and local governments from the central authorities
meant that these units could formulate interim policy.

In addition,

Morones could not intimidate strong governors who exerted indepen
dence and vitality.

To opine that Morones "exercised his power of

life or death over every factory, mill, and shop," is to overstate
his authority.

CROM GROWTH
CROM experienced a tremendous growth, one without precedence
and equal in the history of Mexican organized labor.

Without

precise data concerning the rank and file cromistas who were
inarticulate, it is impossible to determine accurately the con
federation's membership totals.
ship were nebulous.

Limits that defined formal member

No sharp barriers separated dues-paying members

from non-dues-paying members.

Large numbers of campesinos' names

remained on the rolls without their paying union dues, and the
central committee kept no exact count of individual membership.
Data often conflict, are deliberately overestimated, inaccurate,
and untrustworthy.

Sources state numbers, obviously wild guesses,

rather than calculated estimates.

Furthermore, exaggerations of

membership claims and strength reached an all-time high in the
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1 9 2 0 1s . ^

From its founding, in 1918 to 192*+, Obregon's last year as

president, CROM claimed the following, obviously overestimated,
figures as its membership:

1 9 1 8 , 7 ,0 0 0 ; 19 1 9 » 1 0 ,0 0 0 ; 1920 , 5 0 ,0 0 0 ;

16
19 2 1 , 1 5 0 ,0 0 0 ; 1922 , h0 0 ,00 0 ; 1 9 2 3 , 8 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; and 192 U, 1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
P .L .M . PLATFORM

At its first a.nnua l convention in 1 9 2 0 , the P .L .M . adopted a
platform which articulated its interests.

The party pledged itself

to support CROM and to carry out that organization's program in the
political field.

The party advocated the subdivision of large

estates among laborers as a basic welfare measure for farm workers
and society in general.

The platform also called for effective

15

For a brief discussion of the complications involved in
ascertaining exact membership figures in Mexican trade unions, see
Horace B. Davis, "Numerical Strength of Mexican Unions," South
western Social Science Quarterly, XXXV (June, 195*+), 1+8-55According to Davis there are several reasons why unions habitually
overstate their membership. First, many unions pay no benefits and
collect dues irregularly or not at all, so that there is an unsatis
factory definition of what constitutes a union member. Second,
the strongly political nature of the organized labor movement makes
it appear to the union desirable that it should claim a large
membership for the sake of the influence that a large membership
brings. Third, dual unionism is a serious problem in the Mexican
labor movement, and a union is reluctant to admit that is has less
members than its rivals. Fourth, bookkeeping is so casual that
officials do not know themselves the extent of membership.
^C.R.O.M. Memoria, 1 9 2 U -1 9 2 6 , 1 9 - 2 0 ; Poblete, El movimiento
obrero latinoamericano, 226; Edward Ross, citing no source, gives
the 1 9 2 0 figure as 1+00,000 and that of 1 9 2 2 as 6 5 0 ,0 0 0 , The Social
Revolution in Mexico, 1 0 3 . The American Labor Year Book gives the
1 9 2 2 total as 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 and cites 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 for 1 9 2 3 - Arthur P.
Whitaker gives the 192 *+ membership as "over 1 million." Arthur P.
Whitaker and David G. Jordan, Nationalism in Contemporary Latin
America (New York, 1966) , 1+2.
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enforcement of labor laws, the establishment of experimental granges,
irrigation projects, and mechanical and vocational schools; dissemi
nation of primary education especially among adults, men and women
alike; autonomy for state and municipal government; and regulation
of the manufacture, sale and use of alcoholic beverages in order to
curb drunkenness.

17

Leaders of P.L.M. sought to picture it as the

true advocate of social change in Mexico and as the only valid
defender of the organized working class and marginal workers.

C.G.T.
One year after founding its political party, P.L.M., CROM;
now two years old, underwent a major change.

The Morones faction

continued to control CROM, but not without a major struggle.
Complete harmony within any interest group is a fiction.

Large

or small, organizations experience altercations over policies
involving both means and ends.

These disputes, which CROM also

experienced, both produced and reflected struggles for leadership.
Within CROM, a splinter movement sprang up.

The ultra-radical

elements ■which were in considerable force at the first CROM con
vention and were still recalcitrant at the second convention held
in Aguascalientes in July, 1920, left CROM after the communists,
socialists, and radical agrarians led by Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama
clashed with the rightists headed by Morones.

l8

Soto y Gama

■^"The Mexican Labor Party," Survey, XLIV (May 8, 1920),
202-203. The P.L.M. also half-heartedly attempted to incorporate
Indians into the nation by granting them land and education.
-*-®Poblete Troncoso, El movimiento obrero latinnnmericano, 22b;
Ashby, Organized Labor and~the Mexican Revolution under Lazaro
Cardenas, 13; Beals, Mexico: an Interpretation, 1M-0; Clark, Organized
Labor in Mexico, 6 7 .
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attempted to wrest control from Morones and emphasized agrarian
rather -urban problems in CROM.

Defeated in his abortive attempt

to unseat Morones, Soto y Gama withdrew to found a rival organiza
tion.
This seceding group plus other organizers not admitted to or
expelled from CROM, convened a number of workmen in Mexico City
on February 15? 1921 to form the Confederacion General de
Trabajadores.

The C.G.T. claimed loyalty to anarcho-syndicalist

and non-political ideas that had originally animated many CROM
leaders.

Rosendo Salazar, Jose Escobedo, and Luis Araiza led

this movement against politicalism and favored a returning to
the direct action policy of 1 9 2 1 . The C.G.T., which became
strongest in the textile factories in and near the Federal Dis
trict, never grew much beyond its original strength and its
importance was that it enabled CROM to clarify its goals and
adopt a more conservative outlook.

19

In January, 1923? the streetcar workers struck.

Obregon,

declaring that the government had to protect society, advised
immediate arbitration.

Morones knew this was the propitious

moment to destroy the C.G.T. because the majority of the tranviarios
(streetcar conductors) belonged to that organization.

Instead of

complying with Obregon’s wishes, the strikers went instead to their

19

CROM emerged from the turmoil of 1919~21 stronger economically
and politically plus opposed to the communists and syndicalists.
Lewis L. Lorwin, The International Labor Movement: History,
Policies, Outlook (New York, 1953), 293-29*+.
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headquarters and held a tumultuous meeting.

Some of Morones' scabs

drove a streetcar with troops of the Sixteenth Batallion to the
C.G.T. offices.

Results of the attack were U dead (3 tranviarios

and 1 soldier); 3 wounded soldiers and 5 wounded workers, and over
100 C.G.T. members arrested and sent to prison.

20

CROM RELATIONS WITH THE A.F.T.U.
CROM followed the example of the A.F.L. in refraining from
opening official relationships with European labor movements;
however, Morones kept CROM's position from being one of steadfast
aloofhess.

21

He went to Europe and participated in the Hague

Congress which the Amsterdam Federation of Trade Unions convened
in 1922 to protest militarism and war and suggested that the
Amsterdam executive bureau send leaders of the European labor
movement as CROM's guests to study Mexican conditions.

The

invitation was accepted and a date fixed for the committee's
departure, but it was twice postponed and the mission was finally
abandoned.

CROM probably would have joined the Amsterdam Inter

national had the A.F.L. favored such a policy.

To prove CROM-A.F.L.

20

La Prensa, February 21, 1938 ; Alessio Robles, Desfile
sangriento, 15-23; Records of Department of State Relating to the
Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929. Washington, 1959. Microfilm, 2^3 rolls. Summerlin to Secretary of State, February 2,
1923, 812.50U/451. Hereinafter cited as "Records Relating to the
Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929."

21

"Morones has always been a champion of close contact...with
all workers' organizations, national or international, irrespective
of their individual policies as long as they genuinely represent
the labour elements of their respective countries and work within
the general principles of labour organization." Retinger, Morones
of Mexico, 35.
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solidarity, leaders of both organizations met in the fall of 1923
in El Paso to announce the "Monroe Doctrine of Labor," a joint
declaration of hostility to any efforts on the part of European
labor in the Western Hemisphere.

22

THE DE IA HUERTA REBELLION
On December 6 , I9 2 3 , Adolfo de la Huerta began his rebellion
to topple Obregon.

De la Huerta wanted to be president, but

because of the "no re-election principle" was ineligible since he
had served as provisional president after Carranza's death.

Two

days after the revolt started, CROM secretary general Ricardo
Trevino appealed to Gompers for aid, requesting that Gompers use
his influence as head of the A.F.L. and P.A.F.L. to prevent
assistance from reaching de la Huerta from his followers in the
United States.

Morones made a similar appeal and immediately

sent Robert Haberman to the United States as his personal agent
and general representative of the Mexican government.

After con

ferring with Haberman, Gompers wrote Secretary of State Charles
Evans Hughes that he had been "reliably informed" that de la
Huerta was receiving arms illegally from the United States and
that Hughes should enforce the law against transporting weapons
to Mexico.

Gompers suggested in his communication that such

action violated the wishes of the United States government.

^^Bernard Mandel, Samuel Gompers;
Springs, 196 3 )> ^ 2 *

He

a Biography (Yellow
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intimated that the Secretary of State should support Obregon when
he said:

"I take it that all citizens of our country will wish not

only to observe International law in this case but will hope for
the triumph in Mexico of government based upon law and upon the
free suffrage of the people."

23

Although the December uprising was primarily military,
important civilian elements participated.

A large element of

labor had become disenchanted with the government, particularly
of Morones and Gasca.

2k

Morones' CROM, one of many pro-Obregon

organs, supported him with propaganda, political activities, and
armed battalions formed of workers serving in the field with
Obregon's regular troops.

Morones influenced policy during

Obregon's administration when he personally persuaded his close
friend, Samuel Gompers, to issue an official statement asking
American unions engaged in transportation at border ports to
assist in the detection of gun-running and smuggling of illegal
supplies destined for de la Huerta forces.

This boycott added

to the effectiveness of the embargo already established at the
Mexican border by President Calvin Coolidge, and aided Obregon

^Report of the Proceedings of the Fourth Congress of the
Pan-American Federation of Labor, 37-

2k
Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism: the Political Rise and
Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-19^-0 (Albuquerque, 1 9 6 8 ), 73-
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25
to suppress the attempted golpe de estado.

Juan Rico, president

of the sixth CROM convention, sent a telegram to President Coolidge
congratulating him for "the just and righteous attitude" he had
assumed during the rebellion and expressed hope for continued good
relations between the two countries.

26

THE F E U R E CARRILLO PUERTO MURDER
Another aspect of the de la Huerta rebellion was the Felipe
Carrillo Puerto assassination and its aftermath.

Carrillo Puerto,

OC
Jose Petricioli in El Excelsior, April 6 , 196 ^; Petricioli,
interview, Mexico City, June 25, I9 6 8 . Coolidge on January 7, 192U
placed an embargo on the shipment of arms or munitions of war from
the United States to Mexico, excepting "such exportations of arms
or munitions of war as are approved by the Government of the United
States for shipment to the Government of Mexico which has been
recognized by the Government of the United States, and such arms
and munitions for industrial or commercial uses as may from time
to time be exported with the consent of the Secretary of State."
Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States, 192b (Washington, 1925), II, 42#.
The telegram was as follows: "THE SIXTY (SIC) ANNUAL
CONVENTION OF THE MEXICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR CONFEDERACION
REGIONAL OBKERA MEXICANA REFLECTING THE SENTIMENTS OF THE WORKERS
OF MEXICO HAS UNANIMOUSLY RESOLVED TO EXPRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES WHOSE GOVERNMENT YOU SO NOBLY REPRESENT FOR THE JUST
AND RIGHTEOUS ATTITUDE YOU ASSUMED DURING THE RECENT MILITARY
TREACHERY HEADED BY ADOLFO DE LA HUERTA THUS HELPING THE WORKERS
AND GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO NOBLY REPRESENTED BY PRESIDENT OBREGON TO
DEFEND THE RULE OF DEMOCRACY AND U B E R T Y PRINCIPLES WHICH REORGANIZED
WORKERS OF MEXICO ARE SUSTAINING AND DEFENDING THE WORKERS OF
MEXICO FEEL AND HOPE THAT THE RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP EXISTING
AT PRESENT BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL ENDURE ETERNALLY TO
OUR MUTUAL HAPPINESS AND PROSPERITY." Department of State,
Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations
Between the United States and Mexico, 1910-1929 (Washington, 1959),
Microfilm. 29 rolls. November 22, 1924, 711.12/53^-. Hereinafter
cited as "U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929."
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a cromista and governor of Yucatan, was loyal to the government of
Alvaro Obregon.

P7

He and several others fled the de la huertistas,

but were captured after their small boat landed in Lerma.

Carrillo

Puerto, three of his brothers, and nine other civilians, were taken
to Merida where they were "judged," condemned to death by orders
of de la Huerta, and shot by Colonel Richardez Broca.

28

In an

excited meeting of the Chamber of Deputies on January 15, 192*+,
Deputy Morones threatened drastic action and "tremendous vengeance"
against cooperatista deputies.

29

He accused the deputies of direct

ing the execution of Carrillo Puerto, opposing labor at every
opportunity and threatened:
The Cooperatistas may rest assured the time is
coming with greater rapidity than they believe
when they will meet punishment for their crimes.
They are greatly mistaken in believing that
their immunity will be respected, because labor
takes no heed of it, not even if the Government
affords them protection.3^
Reprisals began that day; cooperatistas Juan Pastoriza and Mariano
Castello were fired upon on their way home.

P7

Alba, Historia del movimiento obrero en America Latina,
177j Jose Petricioli, interview, Mexico City, June 3 0 , 196 8 .

28

+

"Galeria de honor: el crimen cometido por Richardez Broca,
inmortalizo al lider yucateco," C.R.O.M., January 1, 1938, 3*
The A.F.L. headquarters sent a telegram to de la Huerta to protest
the executions.
2% e w York Times, January 17, 192 *+.

3 °Ibid.
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BUCAHELI CONFERENCES AND FIELD JURADO ASSASSINATION
An important aftereffect of the Carrillo Puerto murder was
tiie accord known as the Bucareli agreement.

This was occasioned

by the assassination of Senator Francisco Field Jurado, a de la
huertista leader.
On May 2, 1923 , President Harding appointed Charles Beecher
Warren, former Ambassador to Japan, and John Barton Payne, former
Secretary of Interior, as American commissioners to meet two
Mexican commissioners, Ramon Ross and Fernando Gongalez Roa.
Two unsettled issues to be considered were (l) the confiscation
of American-owned lands to provide e,jidos or communal lands for
villages, and (2) the dispute regarding possible nationalization
of the sub-soil deposits whereby rights possessed by American
property owners would be confiscated.

The preliminaries were

known as the Bucareli Conferences and named for its meeting
place, No. 85 Bucareli Street, in Mexico City.

Consultations

from May lU to August 13 > 1923 involved what was fundamentally
a "horse trade."

President Harding granted diplomatic recogni

tion and support of Obregon in return for a settlement of the
claims of American proprietors and a verbal understanding that
the Mexican Government would not apply the 1917 Constitution
retroactively against American-owned petroleum companies.
The Special Claims Convention, formulated at the Bucareli
discussions, was approved by the necessary two-thirds of the
Mexican Senate in December, 1923> shortly before the end of the
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regular legislative session.

It became necessary in January, 192b

to call a special session of tbe Senate to approve the General Claims
Convention.

Official action by tbe Senate on the General Claims

Convention required a two-thirds quorum, or the presence of thirtyeight senators.

Senator Field Jurado led the opposition against

approving the Bucareli agreements because they would be the price
for United States recognition of the Obregon regime, and the "key"
to open United States arsenals for the suppression of the de la
Huerta uprising.

Under Field Jurado’s direction,the de la huertista

senators boycotted the Senate so that no quorum could be obtained.
The majority demanded that substitute senators replace those who
absented themselves, but Field Jurado managed his men skilfully
and none of them avoided the ten consecutive sessions necessary
to permit their replacement.
In the Chamber of Deputies on January 14, 1 9 2 b , Morones
orating with his usual vigor, referred to the recent Carrillo
Puerto assassination and threatened cooperatistas in the legisla
ture.
silent.

The atmosphere was tense, everyone except Morones was
He gave a long vindictive speech in which he warned,

"For each one who falls like Carrillo Puerto, at least five
who serve the reaction will fall."

31

He threatened direct action

against the cooperatista deputies and senators supporting de la

31 E1 Universal, January 15, 192^; Dulles, Yesterday in
Mexico, 237; Alessio Robles, Desfile sangriento, 37-38.
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Huerta, unless the President ordered their immediate removal from
Mexico City. 32
One week later Morones addressed a workers’ meeting at the
Venecia Movie Theater, and was applauded deliriously when he
advocated revenge for the slain governor saying, "The war is
without quarter, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life

33
for a life."

In response to this menacing language, Field

Jurado sent Morones the following strongly-worded telegram the
next day:
Francisco Field Jurado, a Campeche senator,
has the pleasure of advising you that he has
learned of the ’enlightening’ speech which
you pronounced yesterday, Sunday, "before
your simpletons, and is at your disposition
in his home, No. 13^- Fourth Colima Street
in this capital, where he awaits you and
your agents with attentions which are
merited.
Also he advises that morning and after
noon he goes to the Senate to protect the
interests of the nation which traitors wish
to violate, and he will vote against the
antipatriotic conventions and he will not
leave this capital hut will await here the
triumph of the liberating army.
Your agent, Colonel Preve, has sent me
warnings... 3^

32Piario de los debates de la Camara de Diputados, January 14,
I 92 U; El Universal, January 15, 192k; El Democrata, January 2 b , 192 h;
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 102. Referring to the Yucatan
governor's death, Morones openly stated that the "Cooperatist
deputies are responsible, cowards, lade virility, and we must
punish them with vengence." Emilio Portes Gil, Autobiograf£a de la
Revolucion Mexicana: un tratado de interpretacion historica
(Mexico, D.F., 1964), 366 -3 6 7 .

33 E1_ Democrata, January 21, 1 9 2 4 ; Alfonso Romandia Ferreira
in El Universal, July t, 1 95 6 ; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 237*
3I4.
Alessio Robles, Desfile sangriento, 58-59; Dulles, Yesterday
in Mexico, 237 -2 3 8 .
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Morones intensified his efforts, and the senator's challenge
was answered two days later.

Leaving the Senate, Field Jurado was

followed by two men who were quickly joined by three others waiting
in a Dodge outside the Palacio Nacional.

The senator boarded a

streetcar, rode to the corner of Cordoba Street where he descended
at 3:30 P.M.

The unknown individuals awaiting him in the Dodge were

joined by others in a Ford.

When Field Jurado was on Tabasco Street,

the assailants began shooting at him from their automobiles.
bullets were fired into his soon lifeless body.

Eight

35

At approximately the same time that Field Jurado was gunned
down, cromistas, under orders from Morones, kidnapped Senators
Ildefonso Vazquez, Francisco Trejo, and Enrique del Castillo, who
were later released unharmed.

Senators Federico Gongalez, Garza,

Gerzayn Ugarte and other cooperatesbas had left the capital several
days earlier to avoid being victims of Morones 1 thugs. Others
hired bodyguards to protect them, and several armed encounters
occurred between the rival pistoleros.
Vito Alessio Robles arose in the Senate to declare that,
although he never belonged to the cooperatistas, he severely con
demned Morones' recent strong-arm tactics and crimes.

He accused

El Excelsior, January 2 b , l$ 2 b ; Miguel Gil in La Prensa,
March 11, 1938; El Democrata, January 2 b , l$ 2 b ; Dulles, Yesterday
in Mexico, 2 3 8 ; Mario Mena, Alvaro Obregon. historia militar y
politica, 1912-1929 (Mexico, D.F., i9 6 0 ), 6 9 .
■^Miguel Gil in La Prensa, March 15, 1938; Alfonso Romandia
Ferreira in El Universal, July 5 , 1 9 2 6 ; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico,
2 3 8 ; Parkes, A History of Mexico, 3 8 0 .
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Morones of “being the intellectual author of Field Jurado's assassina
tion, of kidnapping three senators, and proposed that all senators
•37

vote for Morones' arrest.

The resulting motion relating to the

arrest was toned down so that it was meaningless, and CROM renewed
its attacks on Alessio Robles, Morones' most consistent accuser of
the crime, reviving the old charge that Alessio sought to control
the Military Manufacturing Establishments.
Jose

Vasconcelos, Minister of Public Education, after being

informed that Morones had one of Field's murderers hiding in his
office, disgustedly wired his resignation to Obregon.

The President

who was in Celaya, quickly issued a statement that:
...if the labor organizations exercise reprisals
against political parties which have assassinated
their leaders like Carrillo Puerto and others,
this is an affair which I am not called upon to
resolve; but in my character as President I am
called upon to attempt to prevent such acts or
to consign their authors to the respective
authorities when such acts are committed; and
when such an act is attempted to give the
appearance of a defense of the Public Adminis
tration, that I shall neither accept nor
tolerate.38
Although Obregon did not mention Morones by name, this amounted to
a direct public accusation of CROM as the senator's murderer.

Miguel Gil in La Prensa, March 15, 1938; Dulles, Yesterday
in Mexico, 2 3 8 . As early as 1920 Alessio Robles accused Morones
of being the "omnipotent deceiver of the workers." Desfile
sangriento, 7 .
qQ

^ The President's message was given front page coverage in
El Universal, January 2 9 , 192^.
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After Obregon pointed an accusing finger, Morones was called to
testify about his possible role in the crime.

In a court appearance

on February 7 before the judge of the Superior Tribunal, Morones
went through the formality of explaining that he neither knew who
killed the senator, nor could explain the recent kidnappings.

Both

he and Colonel Jose Preve, an intimate friend and gunman of CROM,
pointed out that considering Field Jurado had supported union
activities it was illogical to blame the labor organization for
his assassination.

39

After Morones' preliminary explanation,

Obregon made no attempt to fasten guilt on CROM leaders.

Justice

proved ineffectual, the senator’s murder went unpunished.
Morones always publicly claimed his innocence of the crime.
According to him, CROM was disinterested in the Bucareli discussions
and Field Jurado represented no danger to labor.

He explained that

his threat of "direct action" meant strikes, boycotts, and other
recourses, not murder.

Morones alleged that the Campeche senator

had numerous enemies such as Sotel de Regil, a known political foe.

4o

Morones claims that Jose Vasconcelos launched the rumor that Morones
was the intellectual author of the homicide.
■Whether Morones was guilty or not, and circumstantial evidence
points that way, he tactlessly placed himself in a politically
indiscreet position.

His threats exposed him to these accusations,

39
Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 2k0.
1^0
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, August 27, 1956; Alessio
Robles, Desfile sangriento, 110.
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as did his noticeable lack of scruples concerning the matter; and
the candidacy of Jose Preve, Field Jurado's accused assassin, as
Laborista candidate for the governorship of Campeche, Field Jurado’s
former position.
In 1957 Morones was asked, "Could you tell me something about
the career and personality of Colonel Jose G. Preve"?

In Morones'

written reply to Professor J.W.F. Dulles, who had interviewed him
one week earlier in Morones' home, the 67 year old labor leader
briefly described Preve as:

"un elemento de valxa y que presto sus

servicios a la Revolucion en Tabasco, en el campo militar; que
abrazo la causa obrera en Campeche y que se distinguio por su

1|_1
actividad en ese terrano."

Morones omitted Preve's alleged

role in Field Jurado's assassination.
Carleton Beals, a free-lance correspondent whom Morones
"trusted for some reason," was an eye witness to some unusual
events concerning Field Jurado's murder.

1+2

Hired by the New York

Nation to write an article about the worker and peasant volunteers
the Mexican government was mobilizing in special battalions, Beals
visited Morones seeking this information.

During Beals' interview

with Morones, Morones' secretary handed the labor leader a message
from Field Jurado.

Morones said something to this person, and

"Ttorones to Dulles, February 16, 1957j photocopy, L.S.U.
Archives.
1*2Beals to Buford, February 1 9 , 1970, L.S.U. Archives.
Morones had "looked over" Beals' chapter "Labor and Reconstruction"
in that author's 1923 Mexico: an Interpretation and aided him to
secure data.
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shortly two of the "hardest boiled thugs" Beals bad ever seen, entered.
After showing the telegram to the American correspondent, Morones
asked the gunmen, "Do you know what to do?"

"Then do it," he

commanded.
Beals departed, called the Senate, and discovered that Field
Jurado had not yet arrived.

He then called the senator's home.

As

an anonymous caller, Beals spoke with a lady and warned her saying,
"His life is in grave danger.

If you value his life, do not permit

him to go to the Senate tomorrow.

If he does he will be shot down.

He may be killed anyway."
The American journalist had another appointment later that
day with Morones who had promised to give him full details,
photographs, and a pass to the training camps.

Once again the

secretary entered and whispered something to Morones.

Morones

gave Beals "a sharp glance," and ordered, "Send them in."

The

same gunmen came to Morones' side and the three calmly discussed
where the two should hide until "the matter blew over."
given money to go to Yucatan

via Tampico.

One was

Beals does not state

where the other accomplice went after Morones paid them for
assassinating Field Jurado.

k3

“Ibid.; Beals, Glass Houses, 195-197; interview, Baton Rouge,
April 1 3 , 1970* Both Morones' widow and son asserted Morones'
innocence when this writer interviewed them in Mexico City in 1968.
Alfonso Sanchez Madariaga, prominent official in the Confederacion
de Trabajadores de Mexico, stated Morones' guilt is hearsay and
cannot be proven, interview, Mexico City, August 2 6 , 1968. The
following are a few persons who have charged that Morones was guilty
of the political crime: Agustxn Zapata Casasola, interview, Mexico
City, July 1 6 , 1968; Emilio Portes Gil, Autobiografxa de la Revolucion
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During the de la Huerta rebellion in the early months of 19 2U,
Morones invited Beals and government and labor officials to a
barbecue given in an orchard near Mexico City.

Beals was amazed

at the display of nonchalance shown by almost everyone there.

The

de la huertista enemies were close to Mexico City, yet the
obregonistas calmly ate, drank, and played cards.

Beals reported

that Morones "was friendly to everybody, and they were nearly all
his close followers, but somehow never seemed quite to unbend.
He sat rigidly in a chair and scarcely circulated.

He did not take

)i )i

off his coat."
As Secretary of Public Education, Jose Vasconcelos expelled
several students for violating rules against defacing school walls.
Encouraged by Morones' agents, students violently rioted in the
streets.

Shots were fired; several students and a police leader

were killed.

Beals who was again an eye witness when Morones

dispatched his thugs, remembered that:

Mexicana, interview, Mexico City, July 26, 19 6 8 ; Miguel Gil in
La Prensa, February 5, 1938; General A m u l f o R. Gomez according to
his personal secretary Fernando Lopez Portillo in La Prensa,
February 5, 1938; Romandia Ferreira in El Universal, July 5, 1956;
Ernest Gruening, "The News from Mexico," Nation, CXXXVTI (September
5, 1 9 2 8 ), 223; Valente Quintana in El Universal, September 11, 1956;
K. Flores Sanchez^in El Universal, November 3j 1956; and Roberto
Blanco Moheno, Cronica de la Revolucion Mexicana (5a ed.; Mexico,
D.F., 1 9 6 6 ), III, 11. Liewin, not specifically mentioning Morones
by name, states, "The CROM...even assassinated opposition Senator
Francisco Field Jurado." Mexican Militarism, 60.
I4I1

Beals to Buford, February 1 9 , 1970; interview, Baton Rouge,
April li+, 1970.
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During a revolt -when the government was hardpressed and the rebels had taken nearby Puebla,
I was present when he ordered his strong-arm
gang to take over the patio of the Ministry of
Education to terrorize Minister Vasconselos (sic)
who had come out in favor of the r e b e l s .^5
Vasconcelos charged that Morones intended to win over the students
for the 192 U election in which Calles was a presidential candidate.
Vasconcelos, who disliked cromistas in general and Morones in
particular, told his Education employees not to pay the ten per
cent of their salaries Morones attempted to deduct to support
Calles' candidacy.

TWO HUNDRED BULLETS
The P.L.M. had disputes with President Obregon toward the
end of his term.

Obregon refused to appoint its members to such

important posts as labor attaches at Mexican embassies.

L6

When

during the last days of Obregon's administration an assassination
attempt was made on Morones ' life by a man who was one of the
president’s closest followers, CROM leaders considered it another
proof that Obregon was determined to destroy them.

!+7

The events

of November 12, I92 U, help illustrate the Spanish novelist Blasco
Ibanez's observation of Mexican mores at this time.

"Revolvers,"

k-5
Ibid.
h6
s
Vicent Fuentes Diaz, Los partidos politicos en Mexico, II,
23 in Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 278.
I4.7

Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 103; Mazy Margaret Harker,
"Organization of Labor in Mexico since 1910" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Southern California, 193?)>
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he said, "are as indispensable as neckties to a gentleman’s
wardrobe."

2+8

Insulting dehates in the Chamber of Deputies fre

quently resulted in shooting affrays where legislators engaged
in bitter controversies and their heated verbal attacks occasionally
led to personal encounters involving physical violence.

Gunfights

between politicians were so common in the twenties that newspapers
llQ

often had cartoons satirizing the incidents.
During a routine discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on
November 12, 1.92b, a vigorous argument arose between Deputy Pavon
Silva, a member of the majority group, and Deputy Manlio Fabio
Altamirano, a Labor!te.

Insults were exchanged and both men left

the Chamber, pistol in hand, and headed for the corridor.

Colleagues

followed, some with the purpose of keeping the disputants apart.
Cooler counsel prevailed and the two were dissuaded from fighting.
In this tense atmosphere General Jose Maria Sanchez, former
governor of Puebla, took the speaker's stand and unequivocally
demanded that Morones retract charges he had delivered against
Sanchez earlier in the Iris Theatre. The general violently
objected to Morones' having made these accusations "behind M s
back" rather than in a straightforward manner, and warned that

lj-8
~
Biasco Ibanez, Mexico in Revolution, 160.
i+g

El UMversal, on June 19, 192k, printed a cartoon of a robot.
The caption read, "Masculine Fashion-Model especially designed for
wear in the next session of the Chamber of Deputies." A similar
drawing showed a smoking cannon barrel mounted on four wheels as a
"1928 Model Roadster especially designed for deputies and politicians.
El UMversal, April 20, 1927.
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unless the charges were immediately withdrawn he would name seconds
to arrange a settlement "on the field of honor."

Deputy Morones, with

his machismo openly challenged, adamantly refused and touted, "I am
more of a man than you.

You are' a coward."

He yelled that the matter

between Sanchez and himself could be settled instantly.

In the con

fusion which followed, the presiding officer, quickly withdrew from
the panic-stricken scene; bis place was taken by Colonel Filiberto
Gomez, whose ringing of a small bell to quiet the pandemonium was
ineffective.

During the heated verbal exchange, some of Morones'

and Sanchez's foresighted adherents brandished their pistols and
rushed to the outside corridor.

While Morones and Sanchez were

screaming hostile and provocative words at each other, another
deputy, Jesus Ponce, started shooting.
immediately.

The Chamber adjourned

Deputies fled into the hall and street.

did angry words fly, but 200 bullets did also.

Not only

When the shooting

ended, an aged deputy, Leocadio Guerrero who had taken no part in
the wild affair lay dying, shot twice through the chest.

Morones

was shot through his left side, the bullet grazing his left lung.^
A sign placed in the Chamber of Deputies later that day said
that in view of the seriousness of Morones 1 wound, and the possibility
of complications, doctors had forbidden visits.^"

50
El
grafiea de
III, 1696;
in Mexico,

Universal, November 16, 192^; Gustavo Casasola, Historia
la Revolucion Mexicana, 1900-1960
vols.; Mexico, D.F.),
New York Times, November 1?, 14. 192^: Dulles, Yesterday
366; Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 47*+.

^Casasola, Historia grafiea de la Revolucion Mexicana, III,
1697.
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Laborites contended tliat it had been a premeditated attempt to
assassinate their leader.

52

In an inquiry conducted before Licenciado

Vazquez Santaella, agent of the Public Ministry on November 16,
Morones declared that the day of the attempted assassination his
servant received several anonymous telephone calls advising him
that his employer must not miss that day’s session which "would
deal with matters of great importance and require his presence."^
If these calls were placed, it does not necessarily prove that
obregonistas made them.

A cromista could have wished to inform

Morones of the importance of that session's agenda.

As was

expected, the prosecuting attorney decided it was impossible to
determine blame for Guerrero's death; the elderly politician had
been caught in the gunfire from both sides.

GOMPERS LAUDS MORONES

Because of his convalescence, Morones was unable to attend
the forty-fourth annual convention of the A.F.L., which coincided
with the sixth CROM meeting held in Ciudad Juarez November 17-26,
1924.

Gompers, the day following Morones' being wounded, telegramed

CROM offices.

The American referred to "the valiant, brilliant

leader and defender of the salaried and great mass of the Mexican

^^El Universal, November 16, 1924; El Democrata, November 16,
1924; New York Times, November 14, 1924; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico,
268; Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 4?4; Ernest Gruening,
"Emerging Mexico," Nation, CXXI (July 1, 1925), 28. One year earlier
Morones had challenged another opposition congressman to "enter the
street" with him. Diario de los debates de la C”™ r a de Diputados,
October 2 9 , 1923, 11.

53ei. Democrata, November 14, 16, 1924; El Universal, November
1 6 , 1924.
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nation," adding that "the working class of Mexico cannot he deprived

5I4.
of the great defender of its rights, liberties and interests."
Upon the Mexican delegation's arrival in El Paso, Gompers proclaimed,
"It is true that Morones is the genuine representative of laborism
in Mexico."

55

He told CROM representatives that the bullet "which

found lodgment in the body of that great Mexican labor leader,
Luis N. Morones, was a blow aimed at the democratic Republic of
Mexico."

His remark was also embodied in a formal public statement

issued at the A.F.L. headquarters in Washington.
On November 1 7 , 1 9 2 4 , both conventions were officially
inaugurated; CROM’s in Ciudad Juarez, and the A.F.L. 's in El Paso.
That afternoon delegates to the CROM conference led by a Mexican
army band playing martial music marched en masse across the bridge
to meet the American delegates.

Since Morones was unable to attend,

Eduardo Moneda, member of the CROM executive council, and Juan Rico,
Grupo Accion member and close personal advisor of Morones, headed
CROM representatives.

57

During the opening conference Gompers again

praised Morones when he said, "Obregon, Calles, Morones, and Trevino
are all perfectly united for the benefit and well-being of Mexico."

^ E1 Democrata, November 14, 1924.
^ I b i d ., November 1 7 , 1 9 2 4 .
56
New York Times, November 1 6 , 18 , 1 9 2 4 .
^ I b i d . , November 16, 1924.
crQ
El Universal, November 1 9 , 1 9 2 4 .
current CROM secretary general.

Ricardo Trevino was the
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His remarks, translated by C.N. Idar, were applauded enthusiastically.
Juan Rico read a salutation from Morones which expressed his regret
at missing the joint labor
his accomplishments.

59

meeting, and congratulated Gompers for

The congress terminated with the unanimous

election of Gompers, Morones, Wright, and Vargas as president, vicepresident, English-Language secretary and Spanish-Language secretary
respectively.

MEXICAN EMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
An important issue dealt with in the Second P.A.F.L. Congress
in 1919 was Mexican emigration to the United States for a given
number of years; Mexico was not excepted.

Morones, who was present

at this convocation as a fraternal delegate, believed that the
A.F.L. was making a serious mistake.

He broached the subject in

the Second P.A.F.L. Congress by introducing a resolution, -which
was adopted, requiring that the A.F.L. justify its action to the
congress.

Gompers, in a brief history of immigration into his

country, argued his nation's case.

Morones accepted his explana

tion and replied that he sought clarification primarily to set a
precedent by which any member union acting contrary to the spirit
of the founding conference's principles, must defend its action to
other P.A.F.L. members.

60

This second congress set the pattern

for later ones, and demonstrated a working alliance between Morones

5 ^E1 _Democrata, November 20, I 92 U.
60

Proceedings of the Second P.A.F.L. Congress, 36 in Snow,
"Samuel Gompers and the Pan-American Federation," 101.
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and Gompers which was strengthened in following years.
Gompers' views on immigration are well known.

His first

concern was the protection of American workers, and as a surplus
of labor tended to lower wages, he opposed any measure that would
augment the labor reservoir beyond that which was needed.

Although

he believed that persons had the right to live, work, and travel
anywhere they chose, he knew from practical experience that it was
better for the world's workers to strive for higher wages and
better conditions in their own country rather than emigrate to
do so.
Mexican labor problems were not new in the United States;
however, the influx did not reach alarming proportions before the
1920's.

This is not to say Mexicans were not causing racial,

economic, social and political difficulties before that decade.
During 1913-1^ when there was much unemployment in Los Angeles,
American laborers vented their wrath against the railroads for
using Mexican labor brought in from south of the border for con
struction projects.

When these projects were completed, the

Mexicans, having become accustomed to the United States, did not
return to Mexico,but migrated instead to -urban areas.

Unskilled

for the most part, they were the first to feel the impact of
unemployment and constituted the heaviest encumbrance on the relief
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rolls of charitable organizations.

The A.F.L.'s fears about the

effect of the Mexicans on the postwar labor situation appeared to be
confirmed during the Steel Strike of 1919 when large numbers of
Mexican strike-breakers were brought from the Southwest to operate
plants in the Chicago area.

Another A.F.L. criticism was that some

Mexican workers joined the I.W.W.

They either believed in the

principles and politics of that organization, or joined expecting
that this affiliation would better their wages and position.
Before the 1920's the A.F.L's attention was concentrated
primarily on Oriental and European immigrants.

Oriental immigra

tion was effectively diminished early in the century, and that from
Europe was curtailed by the promulgation of restrictive legislation,
beginning with a literacy test in 1917 and culminating with the
National Origins Act of I92 U.

At the time when it appeared that

the A.F.L. had closed the front door on cheap labor the back door
was wide open.

Approximately 9OO 3OOO Canadians crossed the northern

border, and half a million Mexicans were counted legally crossing
the southern border.
Agrarian, socio-political, and economic factors in the Mexican
background were the chief causes of emigration.

Better economic

Tiouis B. Perry and Richard S. Perry, A History of the Los
Angeles Labor Movement, 1911-19^-1 (Berkeley, 196 3 ), 11. Mexicans
being used to undermine American labor struck at one of Gompers'
basic fears. In 1916, some employers either brought in Mexican
strikebreakers or threatened to do so. "There must be understand
ing and cooperation between the workers of Mexico and the U.S.,"
Gompers wrote, "in order that neither may permit themselves to be
used for the undoing of all." American Federationist, July, 1916,
575.
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conditions in the United States attracted Mexican workers, as did
the postwar "boom in the United States in 1919 and 1920.

Moreover,

disturbed political and social conditions in Mexico encouraged the
exodus of workers.

Males of military age who refused to enlist

in the revolutionary armies found it advantageous to leave Mexico.
In Mexico in 1920 when the presidential succession occasioned
political disorders, in 1923, during the de la Huerta rebellion,
and in 1926 when the political uprising had religious overtones,
the number of Mexican emigrants to the United States increased
considerably over pre -1919 figures.

A majority of those departing

in 1926 originated in the regions where religious insurrections
had developed, namely:

*

Guanajuato, Michoacan, and Jalisco.

62

The fact that most A.F.L. unions were international with
substantial membership in Canada complicated restricting immigration
from that region.

Immigration from Mexico, however, was different,

and throughout the 1920's the A.F.L. attempted to limit it.

After

Gompers failed to include Mexico among the countries subject to
the National Origins Act of 192 U, William Green, Gompers' successor
as president, tried another procedure.
Realizing that Mexican immigration into the United States was
stimulated by the selective immigration law which exempted native-born

Mexicans flowed into the American Southwest mainly living
in California, New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, and Colorado. They worked
where employment was available for non-skilled and semi-skilled
laborers — railroad construction, repair, and maintenance; agriculture,
and other related activities.
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Mexicans from quota restrictions, Green proposed that CROM participate
in a joint conference on immigration.

CROM accepted the proposal,

the meeting was set for July 23, 1925, but Morones became ill, and
the conference was postponed until August 27, 1925*
Morones, Eduardo Moneda, and Robert Haberman constituted the
Mexican delegation; Green and Matthew Woll headed the A.F.L. repre
sentatives.

In dealing with the problem Morones recommended that

the participants be tactful, practical, and consider two guidelines:
first, the development of those principles upon which immigration
should take place; and second, how to regulate immigration in accord
with these precepts.

Morones concurred with Green that the labor

movement of one country should not seek to settle the issue through
a special advantage to itself over the other country.

6k

The conference revealed that the Mexicans were concerned about
the questions created by Mexican immigration into the United States,
but for different reasons than those that disturbed the A.F.L.
Cromistas were worried about the economic and social plight of the
Mexican emigrants, and the discrimination they encountered in the
United States, often at the hands of A.F.L. unions.

Morones and

his delegates were intent upon securing guarantees from the A.F.L.
that Mexicans in the United States would receive the same treatment
from A.F.L. unions that native-born Americans received.

Morones sug

gested two ways the labor organizations could end this discrimination:

Library of Congress. William Green Letterbooks. Microfilm.
Green to Moneda, June 12, 15, 1925.
6k
American Federationist, September, 1925, 921.
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first, they could establish a system of international union cards
■which would guarantee a union member full rights in the counterpart
to his union if he moved across the border; second, they could mate
an effort to organize emigrating workers before they left their
native lands.^
Green and the A.F.L. delegates, on the other hand, were
determined to cut off Mexican immigration at its source.
proposed the acceptance of voluntary restraint.

They

In effect, this

meant that CROM would pressure the Mexican government into cur
tailing emigration to the United States.

It was believed that

Morones, being President Calles' "right-hand man" would be able
to affect emigration; thus it would be easier for the Mexicans
to prevent departures more easily than the United States could
restrict arrivals.
The conference ended with a compromise declaration.

The

A.F.L. succeeded in having the final declaration call for the
two organizations to press their respective government for the
"adoption and enforcement of this new principle of voluntary selfrestraint."

To satisfy CROM, a statement affirming that immigrants

should be guaranteed equal opportunity to join unions and equal

C.R.O.M., October 1, 1925, 1. The following enumeration
of Mexican immigrants legally entering the United States in the
1 9 2 0 's reveals the increase which prompted attempts at voluntary
restraint: 1920, 52 ,3 6 1 ; 1921, 30,758; 192 2 , 19,551; 1923, 6 3 ,7 6 8 ;
192U, 89,336; 1925, 32,96^; 192 6 , *6,316; 192 7 , 67,721; 1 928 , 5 9 ,0 1 6 ;
and 1929, ^0,15^. United States, Bureau of the Census, Historical
Statistics of the.United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington,
i9 6 0 ), 5 8 .
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status within them was written into the terminal agreement.

However,

there was no compact to establish the most important means of
facilitating this —

the international union card.

66 The conference

also recommended the creation of a joint committee consisting of
two members from each organization, said committee to work through
the P.A.F.L. for the continuous study of immigration and emigration
and the problems arising therefrom.
Upon his return to Mexico, Morones emphasized that he in no
way interpreted the agreement to mean diminished Mexican emigration.
He construed the section dealing with equal rights for alien workers
to apply to Americans working in Mexico, and announced that this
meant that they should not be entitled to higher wages and better
working conditions than their Latin counterparts.

Concerning

voluntary self-restraint, Morones asserted that CROM had always
advised Mexican laborers not to leave Mexico and would continue to
do so.

Those who chose to migrate, however, would be instructed

not to depress wage levels in the United States, an empty, meaningless gesture.

67

The policy of self-restraint did not succeed and its failure
resulted in an attempt to arrange a second plan urging the same

C.R.O.M., October 1, 1925, 1.
67
Ibid., U-7- Morones made declarations to the Mexican press
in which he showed himself extremely pleased with the results
reached in that meeting. Among other things, Morones said that one
of the resolutions adopted was that Mexican workers would have the
same rights in the American Union as nationals of that country.
El Excelsior, October 13, 1925*
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concept.

Green convinced cromista leaders that the joint committee

should meet in Washington concurrently with the fifth congress of
the nearly defunct P.A.F.L.

Morones, Moneda, Yudico, Canuto Vargas,

and Robert Haberman represented CROM in the 1927 meeting.

68

The

A.F.L. promised not to press for inclusion of Mexico under the
official American quota and CROM agreed to pressure the Mexican
government to enact emigration legislation, to dissuade workers
from emigrating to the United States and Canada, and to encourage
Mexicans who emigrated to join the relevant unions.

69

Despite attacks by delegates from the Southwest and the
Pacific coast, the agreement was ratified in the Los Angeles
A.F.L. convention later that year.

Green, convinced that Morones

was sincerely trying to restrict immigration to the United States,
tried to maintain his goodwill.

68

*

"Los delegados de la C.R.O.M. a la convencion Pan-Americana,"
C.R.O.M., July 15, 1927, 35.

69
CROM and A.F.L. were actively engaged in promoting the
organization of Mexican workers in the United States. Bulletin of
the Pan American Union, September, 1926, 938. A.F.L. leaders
believed Morones able to influence Calles' labor policy. Comment
ing on CROM's position in October, 1927, Green stated: "Some have
said there is an inseparable relationship between the Mexican
Federation of Labor and the Calles government; some have said that
the Mexican Federation of Labor dictates the policies of the
Mexican government. Wo man can go to Mexico without coming from there
with a deep impression that the Mexican Federation of Labor exercises
a tremendous influence in the legislative and governmental affairs
of Mexico." A.F.L. Proceedings, 1927, 95-98 in Harvey Levenstein,
"The AFL and Mexican Immigration in the 1920s: an Experiment in
Labor Diplomacy," Hispanic American Historical Review (May, 1968 ),
217.
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After American organized labor made an unsuccessful attempt
to urge Mexico to restrain her nationals from emigrating to the
United States, this small yet powerful section of the general public
actively joined in demanding legislation to limit it.

The 1928

A.F.L. New Orleans convention reversed the decision of the previous
year, voted to abandon the policy of self-restraint, and to bring
Mexico under the quota provisions of the immigration law.

Thus,

the organization finally removed its influence from opposing
restrictions on Mexican labor and instructed its lobby in the
United States Congress to demand that it curtail such entries.
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CHAPTER V

HEIGHT OF POWER, 192^-28

In evaluating Morones* role in Mexico and in trying to determine
to -what extent he was a part of the ruling sector, a number of factors
should be considered:

(l) the changing pattern of CROM both while it

was outside the political system and later when it operated from
within that system; (2) the influence of CROM ideologies, (have CROM
ideologies served as an aggregating factor or have they disrupted
the unity of the labor movement?); (3) and the position of Morones*
CROM in the political structure; that is, the significance of
cromistas and their quantitative weight in influencing national
decisions.

This will require a look at the position taken by CROM

in times of crises and in times of relative prosperity when social
tensions may have augmented or relaxed.

The Calles administration,

1921 -2 8 , offers an excellent case study for this appraisal.

CALLES-CROM PACT
Calles appeared as the rising political personage on the
Mexican scene and Morones and his political party switched their
support from Obregon to him.

In September, 1923> Morones resigned

as the head of the government military factories to take charge of
Calles* presidential campaign.

The following month, Morones was

one of the leaders in a "radical" Calles parade which resulted in
a series of clashes and five deaths, but from which Morones emerged
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unhurt.'*'

Not unexpectedly, Obregon's marked preference for agrarian

interests during 1923 diverted Labor Party support into the welcome
arms of Calles who needed the party as a prop for his future admin
istration.

Having seen labor emerge as a stabilizing force after

a decade of revolution, its strength in helping to crush the de la
Huerta rebellion, and Morones' valuable friendship with the A.F.L.,
Calles was convinced of the Labor Party's importance.
At a labor meeting in the Iris Theatre, Calles boasted:

"I

am frankly a Laborite and an ardent defender of the rights guaranteed
to labor by Article 123 of the Constitution of 1917.

I have never

2
made a secret of this."

In April, 1921+ when asked by reporters

"■What is your opinion of your partisans in the Labor Party?"

Calles

responded:
The action of the men who direct the Labor Party,
like that of all the leaders who are affiliated
with the Calles cause, has demonstrated that they
possess a proper conception of their duty and
that they are conscientiously moved more by the
necessities of the Republic than by their own
persoral or group ambitions.3
Subsequent events during Calles' administration revealed the falsity
of his statement.
Realizing that he could not capture agrarian support from any
Obregon candidate, and that labor was more conservative than the
agraristas who had already committed excesses attempting to gain a

~*~New York Times, November 13, 192k.
2E1_ Democrata, September 20, 1 9 2 3 .
^Plutarco Elias Calles in El Democrata, April 18, 192k .
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more rapid land division, Calles entered into a written agreement
with Morones.

The secret pact stipulated that Calles would grant

funds and facilities to help sustain CROM, and that he would gradually
dissolve the Mexican Army beginning within one year after becoming
president.

Replacement of army with workers' batallions, if it

was actually considered, did not happen.

One explanation why Calles

failed to dissolve the military is that the English seized the arms
he had bought as contraband in Germany, a mission carried out by
his intimate friend, General Francisco Serrano.^
Following Calles' election, Morones, addressing the Mexican
Chamber of Deputies, asserted that "the cause triumphed rather than
the man."

During Calles' visit to Washington before assuming the

presidency, Gompers referred to him as "Mexico's Man of Destiny."

Ij.
+
/
. /
Fernando Medina Ruiz, Calles, un destino melancolico (Mexico,
D.F., i 9 6 0 ), 95-96; Aquiles P. Moctezuma, El conflicto religioso de
1926: sus origenes, su desarrollo, su solucion (2da ed.; Mexico,
D.F., 196 O), II, 307-308; Joaquin Marquez Monti el, La doctrina
social de la iglesia y la legislacion obrera mexicana (2 da ed.;
Mexico., D.F., 1956), 89; Johnson, Heroic Mexico, 3&7T Supreme
Council,Knights of Columbus, Mexico, Bolshevism the Menace, ll+-l8
in Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico, 1&57-1929 (Stanford,
193l)» 3 ^ - Naturally CROM denied the pact claiming the "revolution
ary army has always held our respect, defended the ideals of the
workers, and moreover is formed of elements originated from the
proletarian class." "Una compana de ignominia pura," C.R.O.M.,
January 15 > 1936, 12.
'Moctezuma, El conflicto religioso de 1926, H , 3 0 8 . According
to the American Consul in Mexico City, the military watched Morones
closely, and feared that his agricultural farm-labor units might be
a step toward disbanding the army which they "would bitterly oppose
by violence." Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico,
1910-1929, Weddell to Secretary of State, May 5, 1925, 812.504/63^.

6

Diario de los debates de la Camara de Diputados, September 27,
1924 , 1 3 .
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His observation was partly correct; two men would determine the
future of Mexico, Calles and Morones.

Calles was the general;

Morones, the civilian general.

CALLES’ INAUGURATION
For Calles' inauguration two special trains provided by the
Mexican government conveyed CROM and A.F.L. delegates from their
conventions and joint meetings in El Paso to Mexico City.

7

Soldiers

rode in the cars; an attempt to assassinate Morones had recently
been made and it was feared that subversives might attack, the
train conveying the labor leaders from the two countries.
Calles was inaugurated November 30? 1924 amidst colorful
ceremonies in which 5 0 ,0 0 0 persons, among -whom were many industrial
workers, peasants, and sandaled or barefoot Indians transported at
public expense from various sections of Mexico.
the air.

Confetti filled

Balloons were released and airplanes circled overhead.

In a brief ceremony Calles took the oath of office from Colonel
Filiberto Gomez, President of the Mexican Congress.

Thereupon

hundreds of doves were released and this graceful gesture was
followed by singing, shouting, cheering, bands playing, and cannons
firing.

During the ceremonies, cabinet appointments were handed out

by Romeo Ortega, and later the appointees, including Ministry of

American Federation!st, December, 1924, 9 8 5 . Gompers in
November, 1923 opined that the CROM was backing Calles, the exponent
of "the principles of freedom, democracy, and human progress." A.F.L.
news release to the New York Times, November 8 , 19 2 3 . The elderly
labor leader died too early to see the harsh realities of Calles'
iron rule.
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Courtesy Archivo Casasola
PRESIDENT CALLES AND HIS CABINET

Seated: General Joaquin Amaro (War and Navy), Dr. J. M. Puig
Casauranc (Public Education), Ing. Luis L. Leon (Agriculture and
Development), General and Lie. Aaron Saenz (Foreign Affairs),
President Plutarco Elias Calles, Ing. Alberto J. Pani (Finance
and Public Credit), Sr. Luis N. Morones ^Industry, Commerce,
and Labor), Lie. Romeo Ortega (Gobernacion).

814-

Industry, Commerce, and Labor, Luis N. Morones, paraded from the
stadium to the National Palace in ornate horse-drawn open carriages.
Morones had kept labor satisfied with Calles during the presidential
election, and Calles’ obligation to CROM forces led to the labor
czar's appointment to the cabinet position.

DEATH OF SAMUEL GOMPERS
Gompers, before leaving El Paso for Mexico City, was examined
by a physician who warned him not to take the trip because his
heart would be unable to stand it.

On December 2, Gompers and

other A.F.L. delegates were taken to the Floating Gardens of
Xochimilco for a luncheon attended by Obregon, Calles, Morones,
and other Mexican officials.

The following day Gompers called

to order the Fourth Congress of the P.A.F.L. meeting in Mexico
City.

He was re-elected president by acclamation.

Morones was

elected to the new honorary office of vice-president; Matthew Woll,
treasurer; and Chester Wright and Canuto Vargas, English and
Spanish secretaries.

The following Wednesday Morones and Calles,

accompanied by government and labor officials, bid farewell to
Gompers at the Mexico City train station.

Three days later

Samuel Gompers, veteran labor leader, great admirer of Morones
and CROM's staunchest American supporter died in San Antonio,
Texas.

President Calles and Morones immediately sent messages

of condolence to the deceased's widow, and CROM suspended activities
December 13 as a token of mourning.
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No pro-vision had been made in the P .A.F.L. constitution for
succession in case of death, so although Morones was vice-president,
he could not claim the presidency.

Instead the A.F.L. executive

council offered the office to William Green, the new president of
the A.F.L.

Morones sent him a congratulatory telegram in December,

1924 . 8

ZENITH OF P.L.M.
Calles announced that he had made no campaign promise to any
party; he had only "accepted the support" of those organizations
whose platforms coincided with his political principles when he
claimed his presidency,

9

but with Calles in the presidential chair,

the Labor Party reached the apex of its power.

Morones was not the

only CROM leader to receive a high government post.

Eduardo Moneda,

CROM secretary general took over the Government Printing Shops,
Jose Lopez Cortes became head of the Mexico City Council, and
Celestino Gasca continued as Governor of the Federal District.
Calles also named Laborites to embassies:

Carlos Gracidas,

Argentina; Juan Fonseca, France; Eulalio Martinez, Hungary; and
Ezequiel Salcedo, Germany.

With the president's "decisive aid,"

de la Pena and Vicente Lombardo Toledano became interim governors

g
R. Lee Guard to Morones, William Green Letterbooks, December 24,
1924; Green to Morones, William Green Letterbooks, January 9, 1925On the first anniversary of Gompers' death, Morones praised Gompers'
part in getting Pershing's troops withdrawn, and added, "Gompers'
death was the motive of mourning, not only for North American
workers but for all wage earners of the world." "El primer
aniversario de la muerte de Samuel Gompers," C.R.O.M., January 1,
1926 , 59*
9
New York Times, November 30, 1924.
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governors in Queretaro and Puebla.
One of the aspects of the CROM's multiple action program was
its success in elections.

Cromistas were elected to the 31st

Legislature and served from December, 1924 to July, 192 8 .^®

Morones

had earlier served as Federal Deputy from Tacubaya, but did little
noteworthy.
The P.L.M. and cromistas were thoroughly entrenched in the
federal administration, and the zenith of their power came in 1927
when they had 1 of the 7 cabinet members, 11 of the 48 senators,
40 of the 272 deputies in the national chambers, 2 of the 29 state
governors, and controlled the municipal government of Mexico City
and a number of surrounding towns in the State of Mexico.^

Of the

three constitutional governors "who were out-and-out cromistas,
Rodriguez of Hidalgo was an excellent governor, Fernando Rodarte of
Zacatecas was above average, and Elizalde of Aguascalientes was
below par.
The strength of the P.L.M. was in its control of the City
and State of Mexico, which were not only the political and strategic
center of the country but contained a large part of its urban popu
lation.

Another advantage was the division of CROM opponents —

parties, blocs, and political conglomerations dissolved and reformed

^Trevino, El movimiento obrero en Mexico, 22; Trevino, El
espionage comunista, 1 6 6 .
^Stuart Chase and Marian Tyler, Mexico: a study of two
Americas (New York, 1935) , 24-3; Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage,
3 ^
^^Frank Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution: an Interpretation of
Mexico (New York, 1933), 24-7; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 273~
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from year to year so that no other single party had CROM's continuity,
discipline, or cohesiveness.

In addition, Laborites resorted to

election trickery typical of Mexico; ballots were stuffed, voters
bribed or intimidated, and decisions often decided before the polls
opened.

MORONES' POWER
During the duumvirate period, 1924-28, CROM was strongly
entrenched in the federal administration, and organized labor
supported Calles with votes, political pressure, and manpower for
police and military operations whenever necessary; the government
furnished CROM with buildings, money, and favorable treatment.
Morones served as head of CROM, Minister of Industry,
Commerce, and Labor, the cabinet minister closest to Calles, the
president's confidential advisor, and P.A.F.L. vice-president.
One historian says that Morones enjoyed:

"absolute liberty to

determine the worker policy of the government, and always counted
on the unlimited aid of Calles, and Calles knew that in case of
national emergency he could count on the organized force of the
CROM."

13

Buttressed by the courts, army, and the police, Morones

became the virtually unchecked master of Mexican Labor.

A ruthless

^George S. Wise, El Mexico de Aleman (Mexico, D.F., 1952), 39*
Hudson Strode opines that Morones was the chief dynamo in the labor
movement for sixteen years. Timeless Mexico (New York, 1944), 2 8 7 .
If one applies Strode:s statement to the years, 1918 -3 5 , (the CROM's
founding to the eve of the creation of the Confederacion de
Trabajadores de Mexico), there is some validity in his assertion.
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man, Morones augmented his power through threats, coercion, and
strong-arm methods.
history:

According to one American student of Latin-Americ&n

"Any businessman, shop manager, or factory owner who chal

lenged his power was promptly subjected to a strike, the closing of
his plant, interminable delays before official boards of arbitration,
and bankruptcy —

lU
unless he reached understanding with Morones,". ■

Another comment on Morones’ was allegedly given by Alberto Pafii,
Minister of Finance and Public Credit.

The dialogue was supplied

to Ambassador James Sheffield and the American Embassy in Mexico City
by one of the Ambassador's often-mentioned "secret reliable informants."
According to this dubious source, Pani, walking with an "unnamed
friend" confided:
me in any way.

"I am entirely alone in the Cabinet.

No one aids

There is a Mafia of Tejeda, Morones, Leon, against

me and everything I do or advise."1^

Speaking of revoking the

Tramways Company's permit to lower fares, Pani continued:

"I and

Communications were for it, and the matter was settled, but Morones
interfered and the agreement was cancelled."
Pani, a hold-over from the Obregon administration, served ably
in his office until he was forced out of Calles' cabinet as a result
of mounting rivalry with Morones.

He had never been sympathetic to

lU
Herring, A History of Latin America. 353^ U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929. Sheffield to
Kellogg, January 5, 1927, 711.12/65^. Colonel Adalberto Tejeda was
Minister of Communications and Public Works; Luis Leon, Minister
of Agriculture and Development.
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the activities of organized labor, least of all that element connected
■with Morones.

According to Pani, Calles wished to keep him in his

cabinet, but Pani refused to continue because Morones formed the
pillar of the government and Pani was powerless.

Morones almost

had a free hand and the withdrawal of two cabinet ministers, Pani
and Valenzuela, was due in part to Morones' hostility.
An incident in 1925» while resulting in no permanent benefits
for labor, illustrates the Mexican president's support of Morones.
Workers in the various phases of the petroleum industry had remained
fairly free of government and union control.

This was partly due

to the political power of that industry and partly to the companies'
ability to hire their own private militia.

Calles sought to assist

Morones in his effort to control oil field labor, a turbulent
element, and at the same time to assert the government's power over
this industry.

On this occasion he sent federal troops to close

bordels, saloons, and gambling houses which flourished in Veracruz
because of the lucrative petroleum industry.

17

MORONES' STRIKE POLICY
It was a source of pride to CROM that strikes during Morones'
tenure as Minister of Labor diminished both in intensity and number
from 125 in 192i+ to 15 in 1927.

A key factor in understanding this

decrease is that Article 123 of the 1917 Constitution specified that
differences or disputes between capital and labor must be submitted

17
El Universal, February 15, 1925.
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to boards of conciliation or arbitration.

Tbe boards based their

decisions upon definitions of "lawfulness" as set forth in sections
18 and 19 of Article 123.

According to Article 123, a strike was

legal unless the strikers had broken a contract or committed wanton
violence.

Here one notices a great difference between the ideal of

the law and the reality of practice.

CROM strikes were announced

legal and employers were forced to compensate striking cromistas.
Morones branded strikes called by independent or rival federations
illegal; CROM strikebreakers would then take possession of the
factory and display the red and black CROM banner; government troops
would protect them from scabbing.

l8

By 192^ the Supreme Court, no doubt influenced by the storm
of protest emanating from labor sources, reversed its decision and
gave the boards much power at a time when such a condition was
especially favorable to the working classes.

There is little doubt

that Morones1 influence was behind the move to bring about such a
change.
To declare a strike legal was tantamount to granting the
laborers their demands; to declare the strike illegal meant the
workingmen lost their contract if they persisted in the strike.

18

Parkes, A History of Mexico, 375. Retinger's 1926 statement:
"The C.R.O.M. is bound b y its statutes and its now eight years of
tradition to go deeply into labour trouble and advise impartially
on the individual case, in questions of strikes and labour struggles,"
is more propaganda meant to acquaint an English-reading audience
with Morones and his labor movement than it is concrete fact.
Morones was not "impartial" in his decisions. Morones of Mexico, 28.
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Tlaese hoards consisted of equal numbers of ■workmen and employers
pins a government representative;
in all important conflicts,

but the deciding vote, especially

belonged to this latter person.

Morones,

who was this emissary, thus had the key ballot and held unlimited
sway.
Morones was eager to control railway workers who antedated
CROM and were jealous of their own autonomy.

Several big strikes,

especially on the railways, were called without governmental
authority.

In the early part of 1925, Calles began to intervene

when all efforts at settling the difficulties failed.

He federalized

the railroad service, declared illegal a strike called by the Tampico
Federation of Labor Unions because it arose out of differences
between the unions themselves, and prevented a general strike.
In 192 6 , when a strike occurred in southern Mexico

on the

small Isthmus Railway, it appeared that the opportunity Morones had
been waiting for, had come.

This strike had been declared primarily

to bring about the discharge of an employee who belonged to CROM
which had little strength in that district.

Morones immediately

declared the strike illegal and ruthlessly crushed it, because it
was directed at CROM unions and not at the railway company.

The

strikers declared, however, that their action became inter-union,
and subject to Secretary Morones' intervention only when CROM fur
nished strikebreakers.

In a public statement printed on the front

page of a large capital daily newspaper, Morones gave this explana
tion of his decision:
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Four principles guide the Minister of Industry,
Commerce and Labor in reacting his decisions: to
sustain liberty of association, so that any worker
might join or leave a union at will; to avoid
anything that weakens labor organizations, whether
they are friends or enemies; to ensure that labor
contracts, although made by the majority, covered
the minority as well; and to make certain that a
few so-called leaders did not impose their own
will on the remainder of their fellow-workers.-*-9
One of the bitterest contests that had been waged until that
time between organized labor and capital in Mexico developed in
May, 1925s when the Union of Bank Clerks endeavored through the
solicited aid of CROM to secure demands that had been made in all
Mexican banks.

A crisis in the dispute was reached on May 15,

when the union requested CROM support in its light for demands
which, if accepted, would have transferred control of the banks
from the owners to the union.

Morones, however, refused to support

the bank employees on the ground that the granting of their demands
would precipitate the closing of the banks, which in turn would
cause a business collapse.

As a result of Morones' failure to

endorse the measure, the Union of Bank Clerks was compelled to
retract its demands.^
In a speech in Mexico City on September 26, 1925, Morones

El Universal, July 21, 1 9 2 6 . The American Charge d*
Affaires in Mexico City recognized that the situation was due to
Morones' ceaseless efforts to bring all the unions into one strong
organization under his control. Records Relating to the Internal
Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, Weddell to Kellogg, March 3 , 1925,
312.504/610; Weddell to Kellogg, April 1, 1925 , 8l2.504/6l6.

20

Charles W. Hackett, "Mexico and Central America," Current
History, XXII (July, 19 2 6 ), 63 6 .
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announced his ministry's philosophy which was "hased on the
cooperation of all those who loyally are interested in the evolu
tion of our country."

Mexican labor, he declared, was organized

both for the improvement of the Mexican worker and for the develop
ment of the country; therefore, cooperation between labor and
capital was highly desirable.

He continued, stating that if

foreign capital adopted "appropriate" attitudes toward Mexico,
it would have no need to fear organized labor.

With reference to

the alleged apprehension of foreign capital because of numerous
Mexican strikes, the Minister vaguely answered:
If foreign capital comes to Mexico with a spirit
of cooperation and in harmony with the needs of
the laboring classes here, such capital need
not fear that organized labor in Mexico will
place any obstacles before it.^b

MORONES AND THE JUDICIARY
Morones' CROM at times mobilized its strength against the
judiciary and caused the removal of magistrates whose attitudes ‘it
disliked.

The reality that the executive rather than the judiciary

or legislative branches was pre-eminent often led to direct inter
vention by the federal government in the affairs of the judiciary.

“ Cbid-s "Labor Disputes and Agrarian Excesses in Mexico,"
XXIII (November, 1925), 2 5 8 . See Morones' June 19, 1925 address
to the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City for a similar
statement. American Federation!st, August, 1925, 636 -6 3 7 .
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According to Laborites, Judge Ricardo Couto was granting amparos

22

to employers against the labor boards until his anti-labor bias
became scandalous.

CROM organized a protest against tbie official,

threatening a general strike unless he were removed, and he was
✓ po
removed to Michoacan.
and Morones' pressure.

The Supreme Court yielded to CROM's power
The fact that with such attention focused

on the jurist he was merely transferred instead of impeached may
prove his innocence of the allegations.
The employment of similar duress compelled the resignation
of Judge Miguel Mendoza Lopez y Schwertfeger, Federal Judge of
Tuxpan, Veracruz.

On May 20, 1927, he presented his resignation

to the Supreme Court, charging constant and intolerable pressures
against him by Minister Morones.

These charges were printed in

the Tampico El Mundo but did not appear in the capitoline press
because of CROM censorship.

Lopez's protests involved the Minister's

relations with oil concessionaires, and the judge's issuing writs

22

A recurso de amparo xs a writ calling for a stay of govern
ment action. It combines the characteristics of habeas corpus,
mandamus, and certiorari and provides judicial protection against
damage to individual interests or violation of constitutional
guarantees. Amparo, an interesting innovation in Hispanic law,
is broader than habeas corpus since it protects men not only against
illegal arrest but against violation of any human rights. See
Carlos Sanchez Mejorada, "The Writ of Amparo: Mexican Procedure
to Protect Human Rights," Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, vol. 2h3 fJanuary, 19^6). 107-111
for a concise explanation by a Mexican corporation lawyer and
one-time president of the Mexican Bar Association.
23

Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 510-511.
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of amparo to protect claimants against Morones.
Morones was not omnipotent.

The conflict that occurred in

Tamaulipas between Governor Emilio Portes Gil and Morones, and in
Jalisco between Governor Jose Zuno and Morones when these two admin
istrators struggled against Morones' ambition to control labor groups
in their states, exemplify the situations that prevailed during the
period Morones’ CROM exerted its maximum power.

25

In certain states

the political party in control, often hostile to CROM, created an
independent federation of workers, who, in return for administrative
and judicial backing, were expected to back, i t .

This situation pre

vailed in Jalisco from 1923 to 1926 under the governorship of Zuno,
a leader who knew how to resist Morones' assault.

Moronistas in

his state were weak and Zuno's candidates were popular in their
districts.

Zuno refused to be coerced, openly rejected Morones'

fiat of authority, and threw moronistas out of a building for which
they had paid no rent for a year.

26

This strong-minded governor

spent much time delivering anti-CROM and anti-Morones speeches to
laborers and agrarians.
Pit

On its front page El Mundo (Tampico), June 9> 1927, stated
that the resignation of the magistrate, who had served an eight month
tenure, "has been profoundly lamented by all social classes." Gruening
a contemporary observer, describes Lopez as "notable for his probity,
his intellectual honesty, and his long devoted record in the revolu
tionary ranks." Mexico and its Heritage, 511.
pc
Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution. 2^9; Alfonso Romandia
Ferreira in El Universal, September 21, 1956.

26

'

,

Jose Guadalupe Zuno, Remiscencias de una vida (Guadalajara,
1956), 1^9- In 1957, Morones defended Calles' memory against Zuno's
attacks. Morones emphasized the fact that Zuno took advantage of
Calles because the ex-president, who had died in California in October
19^5, could no longer defend himself. Morones erroneously claimed
that "Calles has a solid prestige, even in death that can quiet his
distractors." Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October U, 1 9 5 6 .
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TEXTILE CONVENTION OF 1925-26

The record of labor legislation and progress -under the CallesMorones regime deserves examination in detail.

Perhaps Morones* most

constructive act as Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Labor was his
calling of a textile convention in October, 1925 . This particular
industry suffered from almost continuous industrial -unrest and labor
strife.

It was to be the first of such conferences which the govern

ment intended to convoke in the interest of industrial peace.

In

this convention employers and employees entered into a collective
contract or agreement concerning the textile industry.

Textiles,

the nation's leading industry, at this time was a depressed industry,
characterized by overproduction, outworn and outmoded machinery,
unemployment, ruinous competition, and unstable prices.

The length

of the working day and labor contracts, and the respective responsi
bility of employers and employees were the first subjects discussed
by the mixed committees.

Other subjects on the agenda were workers'

education, compensation for lost time, health, social welfare,
industrial accidents, lockouts, and strikes.

27

Before the convention ended in December, 1926 , the textile
agreement of 1912 was revised, quotas of production and prices were
adjusted, hours, wages and working conditions were agreed to as well
as were reduced working schedules, unions were given representatives
in the management of the industry, obligations of the two parties

07
Bulletin of the Pan American Union, January, 1926 , 93"9^-
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were defined and penalties instituted for their breach, wages were
set at 1 .6 5 pesos to 2 pesos a day for unskilled labor, and 2 to
2.20 pesos for slightly skilled labor.

The Minister of Industry,

Commerce, and Labor took upon himself the enforcement of this
contract.

28

While this was only a partial solution of the textile

problem, conditions were better than those which previously pre
vailed, and for the first time a reasonable degree of order was
introduced.

CRCM GROWTH
The position of political influence gained by CROM caused
that body to become autocratic and arbitrary in its attitude
toward labor organizations not affiliated with it.

Special induce

ments, such as wage increases and better working conditions, were
offered to those unions willing to join CROM.

If their leadership

refused, gangster tactics forced the reluctant to reconsider.

A

less publicized, but much dreaded CROM organ was the palanca,
"lever" or "crowbar."

This branch was composed of Morones'

specially selected goons who worked over unpurchasable competitors
or persistent foes such as Senator Francisco Field Jurado.

As a

result, when it became apparent to unions unaffiliated with CROM

28

El Universal, September 10, 1927; March 30, 1 9 2 9 . An
executive resolution of March 15, 1927, required that all disputes
arising between employers and employees in the textile industry
be submitted to Morones* Ministry. It was an effort to prevent
local authorities mediating in disputes from which confusion would
result.
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that they were courting disaster, many unwillingly entered as a
realistic means of self-preservation.
Coercion and CROM’s deliberate overestimates of its membership
explain the organization’s phenomenal growth during the Calles
period.

Just as it is impossible to obtain accurate figures on

CROM membership under Obregon, the same meaningless maze of numbers
characterizes Calles' regime.
2,000,000 in 1 9 2 6 . ^
1,862,870.^ 0

CROM claimed 1,500,000 in 1925 and

A CROM document gives the 1927 membership as

Figures given by CROM sources for 1 9 2 8 -3 0 and 1932

C.R.C.M. Memoria, I 92 U-I9 2 6 , 19-21; Poblete Troncoso, El
movimlento obrero latinoamericano, also cites 1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0 for 1 9 2 5 .
The American Labor Yearbook, 1926, p. 37 cites 800,000 for 1925.
Gruening's Mexico and its Heritage, without citing a specific
source except "The C.R.O.M. declares its growth to be," gives
2,000,000 for 1 9 2 6 . The August 2, 1926 New York Times stated
CROM claimed 1,500,000 members in 1 9 2 6 . Thomas McEnelly, American
Consul at Chihuahua, described one example of Morones' palanca.
On November 25, 19255 two individuals named Lazaro Canales and
Eduardo Moreno appeared at the office of the Confederacion de
Obreros y Campesinos and informed the secretary of that organization
they had been commissioned by CROM "to receive the furniture and
archives." They were told by the secretary that his organization
had no connection with CROM and would not comply with their demand.
The two called twelve men to their assistance who promptly threw
the secretary into the street, took possession of the archives,
and locked the building's doors. Records Relating to the Internal
Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929a McEnelly to Secretary of State,
December 5 5 1925} 8 1 2 .504 / 74-6 .
^ C R O M expediente 0/lhl(000)/8 cited in Clark, Organized Labor
in Mexico, 6 5 ; a United States diplomatic dispatch also gives member
ship as 1,800,000. U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929>
January 13, 1927? 711.12/855* Samuel Yudico, speaking at the Trades
Union Congress in Edinburgh, Scotland, claimed 2,000,000. The
Times (London), September 8 , 1927. The Bulletin of the Pan American
Union stated "over 2,000,000," November, 1927, 1151. Alfonso Lopez
Aparecio, El movimiento obrero de Mexico, gives the figure as
2,250,000; cited in Albert Louis Michaels, "Mexican Politics and
Nationalism from Calles to Cardenas" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, 1 9 6 6 ), 2 3 .
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are the following:

1 9 2 8 , 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 00;31 192 9 , 1 ,8 0 0 ,0 0 0 ;32 19 3 0 ,

1 ,500 ,0 0 0 ;33 and 1 9 3 2 , 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .3l+
Every group which could organize did so and CROM assumed a
motley appearance.

Under the guidance of Morones, mining, petroleum,

textile, tobacco, fiber, steel, shoe manufacturing, and brewing
industries were organized, to name only a few.

Soft

drink

workers,

writers, actors, gravediggers, bullfighters, domestic servants,
fruit vendors, government employees, department-store workers,
newsboys, lottery ticket sellers, and Mexico City prostitutes
constituted some of the federation’s organized unions.

Despite

this last named union, which was patterned after a similar one in
Puebla that petitioned for CROM membership, the number of female
cromista affiliates was minima.1 and insignificant.

In Sonora,a

Union and League of Resistance of Fiancees was formed to encourage
matrimony and prevent "superficial affairs" among its members.
unique organization was rejected by CROM.

This

35

Ironically, CROM never had much strength among the electricians,
despite the fact that this had been Morones' earlier trade.

In 1916

they almost severed relations with Morones when he, while acting as

31
Statement by unnamed CROM officials in Clark, Organized
Labor in Mexico, 6 5 .
32 C.R.O.M., September 1, 1929*
33Ibid., August 1, 1930*
3l
Statement by unspecified CROM leaders in Clark, Organized
Labor in Mexico, 6 5 .
35 rbid., 1 0 8 .
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manager of the Mexican Telephone Company, aligned against them.

After

Morones* use of federal troops to prevent one of their strikes in
Veracruz, the electricians considered him a traitor to their cause
and organization, "but did not break relations with him since they
feared his power.

CROM’S AGRARIAN PROGRAM
The difference between country and city created a divergence
between rural and urban labor making it difficult to unite them
for purposes of political action or governmental regulation, yet
CROM had a large agricultural membership.

CROM regarded peasants

as agricultural laborers, a branch of the labor movement, rather
than as small landowners and attempted to unionize the agrarian
elements as the following data of the 1926 composition of CROM
unions illustrates:

regional and state federations of agricultural

communities and laborers, 50 j regional and state federations of city
workers, 35; workers' organizations in the Federal District, 108;
city -unions in entire Mexico, 1 ,3 2 8 ; and agrarian communities and
•3 *7

laborers* unions, 2 ,0 6 3 .
The CROM constitution declared that the economic problem,
where it concerns the campesino, could not be solved until a

See Mark Elliot Thompson, "The Development of Unionism
Among Mexican Electrical Workers" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Cornell University, 1 9 6 6 ), for a detailed monograph on one aspect
of organized Mexican labor.
37
Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution (New York,
1 9 2 9 ), Ul2 .
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"decentralization" in the ownership of the soil and a more equitable
distribution of the same were achieved.

While demanding the con

tinuation of the division of hacendados* land among the peasantry
as provided by the Mexican Constitution so that campesinos may be
largely self-employed, Morones insisted that tools, farm animals,
and agricultural knowledge were as significant as land, and essen
tial accompaniments to land distribution if agrarian reform were
to succeed.

These land distributions, CROM leadership believed,

would prove wasteful and ineffective among a population of untrained
and pauperized ex-serfs.
To this end, the Banco Cooperative Agrxcola was founded in
May, 1926, to extend credits to help cover the cost of seeds,
fertilizers, pesticides, machinery, livestock, and farm buildings.
Operations began with a deposit of 10,000 pesos made by the CROM
central committee; and a federal government five-year loan of
100,000 pesos.

CROM sold shares to cooperative agricultural

societies as quickly as they could organize.

39

In addition to

forming workers' cooperatives and the Agrarian Bank, CROM attempted
to upgrade campesinos by establishing sanitary commissions and
rural schools.

William English Walling, The Mexican Question: Mexico and
American-Mexican Relations under Calles and Obregon (New York, 1927),
S I!

OQ
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October 10, 1956; Mildred
Maroney, "Organized Labor in Mexico: a History and Delineation,"
(unpublished Master’s thesis, The American University, 1928 ),

8 6 5 8 7 .
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Morones also prompted the traditional manual occupations among
Mexicans who had access to other sources of employment.
vocations were:

Among these

pottery making, basket making, vegetable-fiber

products, such as hats and sacks, footwear and clothing; furniture;
lace and needle-work; sarapes and rebozos, and similar commodities
to promote handicrafts.

CROM'S EDUCATIONAL POLICY
The Calles administration made considerable progress in
education because of the public school system which Jose Vasconcelos
founded during Obregon's term.

At the third CROM convention in

Orizaba in 1921, Vicente Lombardo Toldedano became president of
CROM's committee of education, a task which Morones considered a
mere diversion that would keep the workers emotionally satisfied
while Grupo Accion leaders proceeded to use their positions to
amass their personal fortunes.

Lombardo, however, took his task

as educator and legal advisor seriously making hundreds of speeches
throughout Mexico to help supplement Calles' education program.
Lombardo's duties were to give legal advice to members in conflicts
with employers and to educate workers in labor law, union rights,
labor history, Mexican and world history, science, culture; in
short, "anything that would increase the general knowledge and
class consciousness of the workers."^

Robert Paul Millon, Vicente Lombardo Toledano: Mexican
Marxist (Chapel Hill, 1966 ), 15-16 . He became a university professor
specializing in labor law. From the university he entered politics
and succeeded in becoming governor of Puebla, and then congressman
and senator.
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At the request of the 1923 CROM convention in Guadalajara, the
committee of education submitted a set of conclusions to the 1924
CROM national convention meeting in Ciudad Juarez.
a summary of the salient points:

The following is

1 . civilization cannot spread in

Mexico as long as the language is not uniform, 2. the Indian must
be civilized and at the same time his admirable innate qualities
must be developed, 3 - teachers must be trained in the principles,
views of life, and traditions wbich prevail in Mexico, 4. speciali
zation in the teaching profession is desirable, 5 * the type of
education most immediately needed in Mexico is technical training,

6 . higher education must cease to be monopolized by one class.

ll

At this convention CROM adopted a platform urging the spread of
education, particularly vocational and technical training.
Not only did CROM construct schools for workers' children
and supply them with books, libraries, instructors and medical
examiners, but passed numerous resolutions designed to improve
the social, educational, and moral conditions of the Mexican
^
42
laboring class at its 1926 and 1927 annual congresses.

The

'"*"See the bilingual pamphlet (English-Spanish) publication:
Confederaeion Regional Obrera Mexicana, Comite de Educacion, El
problema de la educacion en Mexico. Puntos de vista y proposiciones
del Comite de Educacion de la C.R.O.M., presentados por el Presidente
del Comite Vicente Lombardo ante la 6 a. Convencion de la Confederacipn
Regional Obrera Mexicana, celebrada en Ciudad Juarez, CH-nh., en el
mes de noviembre de 1924 (Mexico, D.F., 1924), passim.

hp
“T n April, 1925, CROM opened a school whose courses were those
of the official schools at the primary, grammar, and higher grade
levels; 248 pupils enrolled in the six primary grades.
Tetin of
the Pan American Union, July, 1925* 744.
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central committee voted to organize a Mexican Labor College (l) for
the "further instruction and training of members of labor unions who
have distinguished themselves by their zeal in the labor cause,"
and (2) to promote vocational training.

The central committee

also called a national teachers' congress in 19 2 6 , and this resulted
in the formation of the National Federation of Teachers.

MORONES AND GRAFT
Deeply rooted in Mexican as -well as Latin American conscious
ness is the idea that the government is legitimate prey to those
fortunate enough to have the opportunity to be in office.

At first,

CROM leaders espoused a program of practical trade unionism combined
with what they termed "revolutionary socialism."

Though Morones

called himself a socialist and made speeches proclaiming his comrade
ship with the Chicago Haymarket Square victims, he began to demonstrate
that the principles of socialism were compatible with a policy of
cooperation between workers and capitalists.

He built up an extensive

patronage and bribery machine which collected huge sums of money.
The taking of a percentage of government employees' salaries, payment
of union dues, contributions to the Labor Party chest, blackmail
extorted from capitalists to avoid strikes, and funds obtained from

^Ibid. , July, 1926, 729; November, 1927j 1151; American Labor
Yearbook, 1927, 221.
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labor disputes amounted to millions of pesos.

Morones, Gasca, and

Moneda are popularly credited with, having amassed huge fortunes,
while other Grupo Accion members are supposed to have fared well, but
less spectacularly.
Alfonso Roman&ia Ferreira, one of Morones' persistent critics,
tried to find out what had happened to the money collected in 1928
I15

by CROM leaders for an airplane flight around the world.

The CROM

central committee had agreed to organize a transatlantic flight to
better relations between the Mexican, European, American, and ]>,+■•?n
American proletariats.

By July 1, 1 9 2 8 , Morones had donated 2,500

A quota of two centavos per week was supposed to be paid by
each member of the CROM, but this did not work in practice. 'When
CROM claimed a membership of lg million, approximately 13,000 paid
union dues. The Grupo Accion, which had no official status in the
CROM constitution, paid the lion's share of the total income.
Figures for 192h and 1925 show that this select group paid 50$-75$:
of 92,000 pesos collected in the former year the Grupo Accion paid
78,000; it paid hO,000 pesos of 7^,000 in 1925- These figures are
cited in Walling, The Mexican Question, 100, who gives no source for
his data. Since many Grupo members were either government officials
or Labor Party members of the Senate or Chamber of Deputies, their
large donations to CROM's treasury became one of the chief bases of
the accusations that graft was rife in the Grupo; the national
treasury was available. Jose Petricioli denied that all government
employees were forced to contribute to CROM during Calles' adminis
tration; "Nor is it true thau the CROM received any direct grant
from the government of the time. It did not need it. And in fact,
it has_never received such a grant." Robert J. Alexander interview
of Jose Petricioli, Mexico City, August 27, 19^8, photocopy, L.S.U.
Archives.
Licenciado Eomandaa also questions what happened to the
funds to start a CROM bank. .El Universal, September 22, 1956.
Morones' answer to this antagonist was that CROM treasurer Fernando
Rodarte informed the tenth CROM convention that the transatlantic
flight had been cancelled because only 8000 pesos had been collected.
He failed, however, to mention what happened to that sum or funds
for the bank. Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October 9, 1956.
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pesos; more than anyone else listed in the organizational committee
report.

The itinerary of the airplane "C.R.O.M." was to he Mexico

City to Europe via Washington, B.C.

The grandiose scheme called for

stops in Africa, Central America, South America, and the United States,
hut the trip never materialized and the donations disappeared.
Instead of aiding the laboring masses more, the members of Grupo
Accion dominated the union for their own ends and used the organization as a means to fulfill tneir ambitions and enrich themselves.

U6

They built country houses and travelled in expensive automobiles,
but the shiniest and most costly car of all was the bullet-proof
Cadillac belonging to Morones.

With the wealth he pilfered, he

brought estates, apartment houses, hotels, and blatantly exhibited
his newly-acquired diamond rings, tie-pins, and stylish clothing.

bl

Morones openly insulted the misery of the national proletariat
with the flamboyance and ostentation of his costly diamonds.

This

display had the psychological effect of revealing his lack of a
paternalistic concern for the lean-bellied men who came from dirtfloor shacks to march barefooted in his demonstrations.

Beals

^Miguel Gil in La Prensa, January 28, 29, 1938; Emilio Portes
Gil, interview, Mexico City, July 26, 196 8 ; Agustin Zapata Casasola,
interview, Mexico City, July 16, 1 9 6 8 ; Lieuwin, Mexican Militarism,
92; Lesley Byrd Simpson, Many Mexicos (^th ed. rev.; Berkeley, 1967),
309-311; Alfonso Romamdia Ferreira in El Universal, September 22,
1 9 5 6 ; Millon, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 15; Parkes, A History of
Mexico, 383; Stokes, Latin American Politics, 240.

hi

Morones' Mancera Hotel was one of Mexico City’s finest during
this period. His real estate alone was estimated at 1,300,000 pesos.
Many of these properties were not held in his own name; to avoid sus
picion he had friends register as the owners. See El Universal,
December 1 9 , 1935 for an enumeration of Morones' alleged real estate.
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described Morones as "a big, pig-like man, lie was always meticulously
dressed and perfumed, bis bands glittering witb diamonds."

bQ

Morones

exclaimed tbat be wore diamonds "to show tbose bastard bourgeois that

I4.Q

we can wear diamonds too." 7

One evidence of Morones* corruption and graft was bis bacienda
in Tlalpan, and tbe many drinking and gambling parties be beld there.
This retreat included a steel-girded fronton court, swimming pool.
bowling alley, tennis court, gardens, orchards, fountains, turkish
steam baths witb massage rooms, and three dwellings for the retinue
of fifty servants and chaffeurs.

50

Miguel Gil accused Morones of

taking money for bis Tlalpan estate from tbe municipal treasury and

Beals, Glass Houses, 58 . Describing Morones* penchant for
perfume, one observer commented tbat tbe labor leader "took bis
baths, reportedly and as far as could be judged superficially, in
eau de cologne." Frank L. Kluckbobn, Tbe Mexican Challenge (New
York, 1939)j 230.
b-9

Strode, Timeless Mexico, 288. Morones explained to critics
that he was keeping the diamonds as a reserve fund which tbe working
class could use in time of need. Parkes, A History of Mexico, 383For additional comments on Morones* display of diamonds see tbe
following; El Popular. April 6 , I96 U; Rosendo Salazar, Historia de
las luchas proletarias de Mexico, 1923 a 1936 (2 vols.; Mexico,
D.F., 193 8 ), I, 36-37, 8 9 ; Araiza, Historia del movimiento obrero
mexicano, IV, 115; Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, 390 > Clark,
Organized Labor in Mexico. 1^5; Padgett, Tbe Mexican Political System,
30.
^°Migu.el Gil in La Prensa, January 31 9 February 1, 1938.
Rafael Lopez Malo even alleges that Morones held bullfights there.
El Popular, July 21, 19^5* Although tbe idea is not impossible, it
seems farfetched. Statements such as these must be taken carefully —
Carleton Beals, a visitor to Morones' flnca, stated Morones was very
discreet about bis mistresses, and tbat be remembered neither fronton
courts nor turkish baths on Morones* estate. Interview, Baton Rouge,
April 12, 13, 1970.
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of using trucks and machines from the Department of Public Works to
build roads there.

When asked about the lavishly decorated and

ornate home, Luis Enrique Morones Pena responded that land was
cheap in the 1 9 2 0 's and that his father had bought the estate
"little by little in order to have a few friends over for some
CT7
drinks." J‘ One observer said this "pleasure pit" was a Sodom and
Gomorra" where guests could release their inhibitions.

52

Another

said that chastity was not the most conspicious of Morones’ moral
virtues, and that the rake ruled Tlalpan with the abandon of a

50
"latter-day Nero."

This "cesspool of vice and corruption"

attracted groups of Morones' thrill-seeking friends.

Miguel Gil

writes that Morones brought numerous politicians, military men,
and others of less importance there to attend his orgies with
attractive prostitutes.

5k

Concerning Morones' moral behavior during this period, his
secretary Petricioli remarked that Morones "was a man of great
virtue."

In explaining Morones’ alleged corruption to an American

scholar, Petricioli injected part of his own philosophy of life
when he said:

^Interview, Mexico City, August 2 k , 1 9 6 8 .
52
Araiza, Historia del movimiento obrero mexicano, IV, 1 3 8 .
53
J. H. Plenn, Mexico Marches (Indianapolis, 1939)* 2 6 7 .

5k

They "took all the badness and vices from Morones who pros
tituted men, women, and the ideal of the C.R.O.M." Miguel Gil in
La Prensa, January 29 , 1938° Gruening asserts Morones indulged in
the 1orgies of an Oriental satrap." Gruening, "Emerging Mexico,"
2 8 -3 2 .
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And Morones naturally liked the women, liked
good food and liked a good drink. Indeed,
without fine women, good food and a good drink,
life would not really be worth living, would
it? And so thought Morones, and it is undoubtedly
true that he had his share of all of these.
However, his enemies liked to exaggerate all of
this, and to make it much worse than it was,
and to say that Morones was thus wasting the
money of the workers. The last is not true,
he never exploited the workers for his own
good. There were terrifically great oppor
tunities available in those days, and he would
have been a saint had he not taken advantage
of some of them. And if he stole a bit to give
it to the labor movement, was that so bad?55

~

Thus with a "wine, women, and song" attitude, Petricioli rationalized
and dismissed his boss's actions.
false.

Petricioli's last statement is

Morones took from the rich, but did not share with the poor.
Corruption and graft in Mexican politics neither began nor

ended with Morones.
notion

in

He carried to an extreme a long-entertained

Latin-American political life: the possession of poli

tical power is a concession and the concessionaire manages as large
a return or "honest graft" as possible.

There are too many charges

of Morones' graft for them to be lightly dismissed.

He had an

unprecedented opportunity to enrich himself and had more to con
fiscate than did his detractors; not that they necessarily would
have refrained from enriching themselves had they had the chance.
Morones was the head of a syndicate and political party receiving
hundreds of thousands of pesos during an era when there was little

55
*
Robert J. Alexander interview of Jose Petricioli, Mexico
City, August 27, 19^8, photocopy, L.S.U. Archives.
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or no bookkeeping.

It was a temptation and he and other succumbed.

56

It is interesting to note that in May and June, 196 ^ -when
some of Morones' possessions were auctioned, a journalist commented
that "its almost like opening Pandora's box."
mainly of his historical value" were sold:

57

In May, 196 ^, items

these included rifles,

desks, ceramics and various other commodities, many of ■which sold
for more than IC00 pesos each.

On June 5s 10^ paintings of the

European Academy School of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
were auctioned in the Morones family home in Tacubaya, "La Madona y
el Nino" brought 5s500 pesos, a small part of the 200,000 pesos

Cjg
received for the paintings alone.'
A contemporary pun in the 1920's stated that the initials
"C.R.O.M.," instead of meaning Confederacion Regional Obrera
Mexicana, meant "Como Roba Oro Morones" (How Morones Steals Money.
When Jose Petricioli was asked about the veracity of the numerous
claims of Morones' corruption, he nonchalantly offered a slightly
different version of the "saint theory" he had given Professor
Robert J. Alexander twenty years earlier:

"What do you expect?

56
According to Morones' widow, her spouse did not pilfer
CROM's treasury. When queried about his enormous income, she
stated he "earned a lot" as chief of the telephone company and
Military Manufacturing Establishments, but failed to specify any
exact amount. Interview, Mexico City, August 3 s 1 9 6 8 .
^ E 1 Excelsior, May 17? I96 U.

58Ibid., June 5, 7, I 96 U.
^ J o h n Gunther, Inside Latin America (New York, I9 LI), 8 9 .
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After all labor -unions in Mexico are not founded by monks and
saints."^0

60
Author’s interview, Mexico City, June 25? 1 9 6 8 . Naturally
Morones denied the charges of graft and claimed "the capital I
have is mine and not because I have stolen it." "La comision de la
C.R.O.M. que encabeza el companero Luis N. Morones llego a la
Ciudad de Mexico, despues de un resonado triunfo," C.R.O.M.,
September 15? 1932? b'J. In the winter of 195^? Morones wrote the
following statement for the introduction of Petricioli’s El
companero Morones: "Aseguro enfaticamente contra todo lo dicho
que no la he defraudado ni la defraudare." Morones was not the
only cabinet member to amass a fortune. General Joaquin Amaro?
Minister of War, had palatial residences in the capital, landed
estates in the countryside, and the finest stable of polo ponies
in Mexico.
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CHAPTER V I

THE PETROLEUM CONTROVERSY

The Mexican oil question (1925 -2 8 ), although constituting
one phase of Morones' influence, was in itself an important matter
prominently in the foreground for several years.

There followed

vigorous note-writing between the United States and Mexican
governments during which the bitterness and intransgency of both
parties made the situation more tense.

This voluminous corres

pondence and the subsequent proceedings are an excellent source
for Morones' key role in the controversy.
During the colonial period, the deposits of precious metals
in the Spanish Empire belonged exclusively to the Castilian monarch.
Charles Ill's mining code for New Spain, Reales Ordinanzas of 1783 >
remained in force until 188^4- when the Mexican Congress passed the
first mining code which gave up the nation's heritage from Spain;
that is, Mexico's subsoil wealth.

These regulations declared

deposits of mineral fuels and bitumins, including petroleum, to be
exclusive property of owners of the surface.

Such grants were in

perpetuity, subject only to the payment of a tax or rental.

The

law exemplified a guiding principle of the Diaz era, namely
development by means of foreign capital.
The statute of 188^ with some amendments remained in force
until 1892 , when the Mexican Congress promulgated a second general
mining code.

It reaffirmed that the owner of the surface could

freely exploit the petroleum below his land.

This legislation was

112
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in turn superseded in 1909 when an enactment again declared petroleum
deposits to he the exclusive property of the surface owner.
The code of 1909a with some modification, principally revolu
tionary decrees, was still on the statute hooks when the Constitution
of 1917 appeared.

Article 27 of this new constitution declared the

absolute and full ownership of ail sub-soil deposits to he vested in
the nation.

It redefined private property by placing limitations

not recognized in Anglo-American common law:

"social utility" and

"national benefit" rather than timeless, contractual principles were
enumerated.

PETROLEUM LAW OF 1925
Three months after assuming his ministry Morones argued that
American oil companies located within 50 kilometers of the Mexican
coast were "contrary" to the 1917 Constitution.

Stating that the

Constitution did not specify how foreigners were to he forced to
give up rights previously acquired, not did it authorize the
executive to seize these properties, Morones announced that these
foreigners' rights should he defined by legislative power.'*'
Morones took a hard line in June, 1925> when at a luncheon
given by the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City, he
declared:
Mexico has a duty to protect all foreign interests,
but she has rights as well, and if necessary, in

iew York Times, February 1, 1925•
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defense of those rights Mexico is prepared to
fight to the last ditch and dig her own grave
defending those rights. 2
He invited foreigners to invest, but specified that they must come
with "clean hands," and not with the purpose of exploiting the poor
masses.

He disguised his "get tough" policy by ashing their con

fidence in the Mexican government, and by promising that his
government would cooperate with foreigners whose capital and
energy Mexico needed.

3

In 1925, a commission composed of Congressman Jesus Solorzano,
Senator Ignacio Rodarte, Engineer Joaquin Santaella of the Department
of Finance, and Licenciado Manuel de la Pena of the Department of
Industry, Commerce, and Labor crafted a petroleum law.

1+

It limited

the possession of oil properties acquired before 1917 to a period
of fifty years, and foreign owners of oil properties had until
January 1, 1927 to renew their concessions under penalty of for
feiture.

This law contradicted promises of "perpetual ownership"

extracted from Obregon in the Bucareli Agreements which the United
States maintained resembled a treaty.

The Mexicans contended

these had been gentlemens' agreements signed by Alvaro Obregon,
and as such were not binding on Calles' administration.

^Ibid., June 20, 1925.
O
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, February 17, 195^*

b

Jesus Silva Herzog, Historia de la expropiacion de los
empresos petroleros (Mexico, D.F., 1964), 51.
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The oil companies contested the new law for two reasons:
first, it recognized no petroleum rights which, although acquired
prior to May 1, 1917, were not before that date dedicated to
extraction by the performance of certain "positive acts"; second,
petroleum rights including those recognized by the decisions of
the Mexican Supreme Court, must be surrendered in exchange for
concessions emanating from the government.
Morones gave an exclusive statement to the Associated Press
in January, 1926 after he had conferred with representatives of
the oil industry.

He said that the indications were favorable for

a mutually agreeable decision between the oil men and the government,
and he welcomed the cooperation of all companies involved.

'When

asked by correspondents if the government would make the new law
retroactive he vaguely answered, "The Mexican Government will do
nothing more than comply and enforce compliance with the laws which
are enacted."

He continued:

The study of the regulations of the petroleum
law has hardly commended. This study will afford
opportunity to the Mexican Government to show
clearly its broad judgment and its purpose of
proceeding with absolute fairness within the
principles which the law provides.5
An example of this "absolute fairness" came within one week.
On January 21,promulgation of the so-called Alien Land Law increased
ill-feeling between the Mexican and United States governments.

This

legislation said foreigners could not acquire real estate within

^New York Times, January 17, 1 9 2 6 .
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certain prohibited zones —

100 kilometers in width along each of

Mexico's borders, and 50 kilometers in width along each of the
seacoasts; and it required that every foreigner, before acquiring
any real estate or mineral concessions in Mexico, waive his rights
by agreeing not to invoke the protection of his government with
respect to such properties.
On April 8 , 1926, the petroleum legislation of December,

1925 was embodied in a series of regulations which empowered the
Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Labor to interpret and act.
Morones, therefore, became one of the central figures in the oil
negotiations.

The cabinet, however, was divided on the issue.

Fani and Saenz defended the American companies and wanted to avoid
a crash at all costs with the oil interests.

Morones, on the

other hand, escalated the controversy, and refused to reach an
agreement along lines which American companies considered
"reasonable."
Although some smaller American companies and landowners
complied with the provisions of the legislation, the more important
ones refused to do so, appealing instead for United States governmental
protection.

Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, backed by President

Collidge, was inclined to support them; therefore, Morones declared

6

*

Luis N. Morones in El Excelsior, September 5, 19535 Luis N.
Morones in Las Novedades, September 5, 1953; Luis N. Morones in
El Universal, October 8 , 1956.
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that the petroleum conflict "began because of the disobedience of
7

high officials in the oil companies.

THE TANNENBAUM LUNCHEON
Luis Leon, Calles' Minister of Agriculture, asserts that
Ambassador Sheffield was "a cloaked agent of the oil companies"
■who intrigued from Mexico and misinformed his superiors insulting
g
and disgracing the Mexican government.
Morones always considered
Q

Sheffield a stubborn enemy of Mexico.
Sheffield found the Mexicans unattractive, and allowed his
feelings to influence his diplomacy.

His correspondence abounded

■with invidious comments and remarks about the people to whom he
was accredited, and his dispatches prejudiced the State Department.
His opinions of Calles and his cabinet members were colored by
their morals and "irregular living habits."

Sheffield's initial

inability to gain the friendship and confidence of Mexican
governmental officials, including Morones, was largely due to
certain qualities in Sheffield's personality, character, and
background.
An excellent example of Sheffield's incapacity to evaluate
all persons judiciously occurred at a February, 1926 luncheon.

"^Luis N. Morones in El Universal, December 17, 20, 1956.
Morones declared that the Calles government had violated no agree
ments and said that since former president Obregon "wholeheartedly"
supported Calles' policy, it demonstrated that the regime was ful
filling all commitments legally begun by Obregon. New York Times,
January 17, 1 9 2 6 .

8

*

Louis L. Leon, "El Presidente Calles," Historia Mexicana,
(octubre-diciembre, i9 6 0 ), 327.
9Luis N. Morones in El Universal, March 6 , 1956.
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Frank Tannenbaum had "been in Mexico for six months conducting a
study of Mexican agricultural conditions to be published by the
Brookings Institute.

Upon first meeting Sheffield, Tannenbaum,

■whose sympathy with the Mexican Revolution and with the Mexican
people pervades his written works, observed:

"It became very

clear to me during our first interview, that the Ambassador was
surprisingly, almost painfully isolated from contact with the
Mexican government."1^

On Friday, February 11 Sheffield, Counselor

of the Embassy and interpreter Arthur Schoenfeld, Morones, Secretary
of Education Puig Casauranc, and Luis Leon attended a luncheon
arranged by Tannenbaum at San Angel about eight miles from Mexico
City.
Sheffield broke the ice by drinking to "Viva Mexico" and
the Mexicans replied with "Viva Los Estados Unidos."

As soon as

they were seated, and without wasting much time in preliminaries,
Sheffield took the lead by initiating the discussion.

Sheffield

expressed his desire to help Mexico, his deep interest in the
peon 1s problems, and his sympathy with them.

He presented the

view that the peon had been greatly aided in his scale of living
and educational advantages wherever foreign companies built schools
and hospitals for the laborers, housed them under hygenic conditions,
and raised wages from "the starvation point" of twenty-five centavos
a day to two to four pesos daily; and that for the benefit of these

1 QU.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929, Tannenbaum to
Kellogg, March 5; 1926, 711.12/752.
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very people which, the Mexican government was pledged to help, it
should welcome and protect foreign capital.
Morones disagreed with Sheffield’s viewpoint that the masses
had received abundant benefits from foreign capital.

Sheffield

wrote in his official dispatch that Morones replied in length giving
from his point of view the history of foreign capital in Mexico, and
charging that under the Daaz regime foreign capital depleted the
wealth of the country, encouraged corruption, and insisted on
privileges without recognizing its obligations.

Morones asserted

that the Madero and following revolutions were in part a protest
against the abuses of capital, and that the Constitution of. 1917
embodied the sentiment of the Mexican people concerning the
aggression and wrongdoing of foreign capital.

Morones bypassed

Sheffield's point regarding the benefits to the masses wherever
foreign capital was invested and, according to Sheffield,
took the radical view that capital practically
had no privileges and only such rights as the
Constitution of 1917 and laws might grant. It
had come into the country to exploit its wealth
and must abide by such laws as the Mexican
people chose to enact.H
Morones stated that Mexico did not oppose foreign capital, that
the restrictions placed upon capital's freedom were irksome only
because they were new, and that Mexican legislation seemed more
radical because it had not had a slow, accumulative growth as in

■*“Tbid., Sheffield to Kellogg, February 16, 1926, 711*12/685;
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, March 6 , 1957.
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other countries.

"After all," he said, "it -was its suddeness rather

than its nature that was responsible for the had reputation of the
Mexican legislation."

12

After the luncheon Sheffield sent an important dispatch to
the State Department.

One particular passage is worth quoting at

some length since it contains a perceptive appraisal of Morones:
It was evident.. .that Morones is the directing
force behind the present Government and in my
opinion the strongest man in the Cabinet; that
he is politically ambitious and expects to be,
what he now, in effect, is, the head of the
Government; that he is able, strong and without
conscience, and while he is not seeking the
support of the United States, he is hopeful
that by a show of willingness to treat with
business interests on the one hand and to
modify the extreme radical views of the chief
labor organization on the other, he may prevent
active opposition on the part of the United
States to his ambitions and his plans.
Sheffield continued by analyzing the Minister of Education as neither
politically nor otherwise strong and therefore followed Morones;
the sheepish Minister of Agriculture, he described, as incapable
of intelligent initiative and "much afraid of Morones."
Sheffield was harsh in his condemnation of Frank Tannenbaum.
The young scholar had said little at the dinner, but "had been in
entire agreement" with Minister Morones:
He is far more Mexican in sympathy than he
is American, a dangerous man for American

1 2 U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929, Tannenbaum to
Kellogg, March 5, 1926, 711-12/752.
13 Ibid., Sheffield to Kellogg, February 16, 1926, 711.12/685.
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interests, apparently a believed in the personal
destiny of Morones. He is a graduate of Columbia,
a Phi Beta Kappa man, with a distorted view of
society and government.^
The following month Sheffield wrote Kellogg that Tannenbaum was in
the service of the Mexican government, though his employment was
both less continuous and less remunerative than that of Ernest
Gruening.^

The ambassador, refuting Tannenbaum's account regard

ing his aloofness and isolation from members of the Mexican
government, wrote:

"I need hardly point out that from the time

of my first arrival here I made all proper advances to members of
the Government."

The key hinges on Sheffield's interpretation

of all "proper advances."
At the Tannenbaum luncheon, Schoenfeld explained how the
Americans after their revolution redeemed their bonds and
established their credit in spite of the fact that the redemption
led to a number of speculative abuses.

Morones replied that the

comparison did not hold for Mexico, that the international debt
situation was one of the most important confronting the world,
that in the adjustments of international debts the ability to pay
was a more or less recognized and accepted consideration, that
Mexico was anxious to pay its debts, and that its greatest day of
national happiness would be the day when it could pay its debts.

li...
Ibid.

15 Ibid., March 26, 1 9 2 6 , 711.12/732.
16

.
Ibid.
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However, Morones pointed out:
.. .you cannot do the impossible and the Mexican
people are so poor, they live so close to the
margin of mere existence that it is simply out
of the question to make any attempt to get the
money from them for the payment of the debt
when, as a matter of fact, they are barely
succeeding in living from day to day on a
little c o m and beans; that with patience
and cooperation, Mexico will discharge all
its debts.^
In Sheffield's opinion, Morones considered several possibilities
to counterbalance North American pressure exerted because of the
petroleum controversy.

These would include support from Europe,

Latin America, and the A.F.L.

Sheffield urged stern measures to

"teach the Mexicans," who looked upon the A.F.L. relationship as
assuring a policy of United States non-action towards Mexico, and
upon a steadily maintained propaganda to assure a free hand for the
"further despoliation of American citizens."

18

Morones, interviewed

by a New York Times staff correspondent, described CROM's relation
with the A.F.L. as being a reciprocal influence in exchanging
information and data.

He mentioned Green, Woll, and Morrison, all

A.F.L. national officials, as being among "the numerous leaders who
have evidenced their approval of the new land and oil laws."

19

17Ibid., March 5, 1926 , 711.12/752.
TO
Ibid., February 16 , 1926, 711.12/685.
^ N e w York Times, January 17, 1926 .
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AMBIGUOUS PROWOUUCEMEWTS
In December, 1926, the Association of Producers of Petroleum
in Mexico telegraphed Morones complaining that the Mexican government
"has not demonstrated to such of the companies as are foreign cor
porations how any valid confirmatory concession, whatever its form,
nan be issued to them."

Moreover, the companies maintained that

they were "justly entitled" to an ample opportunity to consider the
form and the definite terms of any proposed confirmatory concessions
■which the government expected them to accept as constituting a
valid recognition and affirmation of their existing definite and
legal leasehold rights.

20

Morones responded that Mexico would not extend the December 31
deadline, and denied that El Corona, El Aguila, Atlantic, The

2

:

Richmond Oil Company, and the Transcontinental were alien companies.

According to their articles of registration, Morones contended, they
were Mexican companies; and the shareholders were regarded as being
Mexicans because they had renounced any right to appeal to their own
governments from the rulings of the Mexican courts.

He denied that

the delay in granting concessions was attributable to his office,
but instead to the "inopportune presentation of legal documents by
the interested companies."

Morones pointed out that the companies

had had sufficient opportunity to familiarize themselves with the

on

Ibid., December 15, 1 9 2 6 .
ZLThe Times (London), December 1 8 , 1 9 2 6 .

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

12k

rules which the Ministry had explained at various conferences.
Therefore, he concluded, the government "had again shown its good
faith in guaranteeing the interests of foreigners in the oil
- ^ j. «22
industry.
Oil men were confused by Morones* reply, and observers were
perplexed by his apparent ambiguities and inconsistencies; traits
which he followed throughout the petroleum controversy.

Declaring

that failure to comply with the law by December 21, 1926 meant
renouncement of rights, Morones at the same time asserted that
the law did not establish "forfeiture" for violations.

Concerning

the regulations governing oil concessions that were to go into
effect on January 1, Morones' ordered his department to issue the
equivocal pronouncement that only "through malice and bad faith
can the law be considered retroactive."

2Q

Foreign oil officials often disagreed with Morones* data.
George Davison, President of Mexican Gulf Oil Company, refuted
several of Morones’ charges that had been been printed a few
days earlier in the New York Times. Davison denied that his company
had drilled its Salinas wells without a permit.

He alleged that

these offset wells were drilled to prevent drainage of their lease
through large wells brought in on adjacent railroad rights-of-way
by the so-called "Control," the board through which the Mexican
government availed itself of oil rights retained by the railroads.

Tfew York Times, December 17 , 1926.

23 Ibid., December 20, 1 9 2 6 .
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Under private title antedating May 1, 1917, the effective date of the
Mexican Constitution, Davison's company held the oil rights in lands
contigious to the railroad.

Mexican Gulf Oil Company refused to

surrender such rights by applying before December 31? 1926 for a
governmental concession of limited term, the form and conditions
of ■which had not teen prescribed by the Mexican government when
the time for applying had expired.

Davison's company, however, had

applied for drilling permits months before the "Control" brought
in producing wells.

While Morones' Department did not expressly

refuse to grant the permits, it did the equivalent by simply
"sitting on the requests" and delaying to rule on their applications.
Davison successfully sought injunctions from the proper judge, and
his company drilled two wells.

He disagreed with Morones and wrote,

"that the wells were 'unscientifically' drilled, or deliberately
drilled into salt water, which would, primarily, have injured our
own property, are (charges...that refute themselves.

2k

UNITED STATES "IWASION" OF MEXICO
During the initial decade of the Mexican Revolution, there
were occasions when American troops were mobilized along the border
and when war vessels were dispatched to patrol the Gulf coast.

In

two instances, the 191^ Veracruz occupation and the 1916 Pershing
punitive expedition, American military personnel invaded Mexico.
Mexican thinking, then, an

2k

To

impending invasion in 192 6 , the purpose

New York Times, George S. Davison, editorial, May 23, 1 9 2 7 .
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of •which was to possess forcefully the disputed petroleum zones, was
both plausible and expected.

25

According to Calles, an American employee in the United States
Embassy in Mexico City sold the Mexican government photocopies of
pilfered documents for 700,000 pesos.

26

This evidence revealed the

proposed American invasion route of Mexico, with maps drawn by
Military Attache Lt. Colonel George Russell and "incriminating"
private correspondence of Ambassador Sheffield and Secretary of
State Kellogg.

27

"Plan Green" would dispatch between 150,000 and

500,000 American troops to dissect Mexico.

In addition, Tampico

and Veracruz were to be invaded by the U. S. Atlantic fleet, and
Manzanillo by the Pacific squadron.

28

Other troops were to attack

25
Luis N. Morones in El Excelsior, September 3> 1953*

26
+
Armando Borrego G. in El Excelsior, September 2 b , 1953•
Emilio Portes Gil stated he did net know the exact amount of the
bribe. Interview, Mexico City, July 25, 19 6 8 . Luis Leon alleges
that Calles set up a counter-espionage system and photocopied 600
pieces of private correspondence from the U.S. Embassy. Leon,
"El Presidente Calles," 327. Stanley Ross writes, "The Mexicans
are convinced that armed intervention was a real possibility during
1926-27 and was forestalled only by Calles' adroit use of purloined
documents." "The Preferred Revolution," in Joseph Maier and Richard
W. Weatherhead, eds. Politics of Change in Latin America (New York,
196 M , 147-148.
27
juas N. Morones in El Universal, February 7, 1957; Armando
Borrego G. in El Excelsior, September 24, 1953.

28
Armando Borrego G. in El Excelsior, September 2 k , 1953*
Morones states that "Plan Green" was formulated in 1924, and in
June, 1926 Lt. Colonel Edward Davis, U.S. Military Attache, urged
its execution. Luis N. Morones in El Universal.. March 6 , 1957.
Thirty years after the "invasion," Morones played upon his readers'
emotions. Appealing to Mexican nationalism, he asserted that
patriotism would have prevented the invasion's success, because
Mexicans, "are accustomed to every type of holocaust and sacrifice
in defense of national sovereignty." He remarked that whoever
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through Ciudad Juarez and capture Monterrey to protect the United
States border.

Ultimately the invaders would converge on Mexico

City via Queretaro and Veracruz.
Emilio Portes Gil, one of Morones' bitterest enemies, alleges
that Calles defended Mexico's integrity and sent copies of documents
relative to the proposed invasion sites and an ultimatum to
President Coolidge threatening that Calles "would publish these
photocopies in the world's leading newspapers to show how the
mighty United States would attack Mexico, a weak nation.

29

Portes

Gil acknowledged that "it was one of the most brilliant episodes of
our diplomacy," and that Morones "collaborated with Calles and lent

formulated the plan must not have thought of the I8 L7 sacrifice at
Chapultepec. Morones failed to mention, however, that the Mexicans
lost that war. Luis N. Morones in El Universal, February 8, 1957*
^Cline, The United States and Mexico, 210. Emilio Portes
Gil, interview, Mexico City, July 26, I968 T According to The
Times there was said to be 30^- documents, "surreptitiously photo
graphed" in the American Embassy, most, if not all were letters
exchanged between Kellogg and Sheffield. Those of Sheffield were
understood to be so full of distrust and dislike of Calles that
there was no hope of sympathy or understanding from the U.S.
government. Naturally, Kellogg stated that they were forgeries.
The Times (London), May 7, 1927- Nevertheless, Morones claims
that as a result of threats to use the documents, Coolidge
recalled Sheffield and the warships from Cayo Hue so. Luis N.
Morones in El Excelsior. September 5> 19535 Luis N. Morones in
El Universal, December 17, 1957; El Excelsior, April 6, 19^3 5
Jose Petricioli in El Excelsior, April 6, 196 ^5 Jose Petricioli,
interview, Mexico City, June 30, 1968 .
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extraordinary ability and service •which someday ought to be known in
all of its details."^
The "phantom fleet" never arrived.

Morones and Calles may have

fabricated the invasion which seemed very real to Mexicans, but as
Howard Cline comments:
Tampico and Veracruz.

"Again battleships might hover ominously off
But the smell of Teapot Dome was too strong."

31

Carleton Beals offers some interesting observations on Morones
and the questionable diplomatic dispatches:
On one May day celebration, when Morones and
the President reviewed the parading workers,
the American Ambassador,.. .defied the order
that no taxicabs or private autos could cir
culate except with an order from the CROM,
and persisted in driving the embassy car
angrily back and forth through the paraders.
A few days later Morones showed me the
secret confidential letters, marked Top
Secret, and "Confidential to the Secretary

Emilio Portes Gil, "Como se conjuro en 1927, una intervencion
armada en Mexico," Manana, August 2 9 , 1953? 2U. The ex-president
also repeats this thesis in his Autobiografia de la Revolucion
Mexicana, 3 9 7 , and on July 26, 1968 when interviewed by this writer.
Araiza confirms this judgment when he says: "Morones, who heroically
stopped the North American invasion fleet navigating close to
Mexican coasts, used a diplomacy of great proportions." Historia
del movimiento obrero mexicano, IV, 202.
31
Cline, The United States and Mexico, 210. Standard Oil,
which had bought 283>000 acres from Edward Doheny a year earlier,
exerted the strongest pressure on the Coolidge administration to
sever relations with Mexico on January 1, 1927, the date the legis
lation was to be enforced. The fact that this dispute coincided
with a local hearing against Doheny of the National Association for
the Protection of American Rights in Mexico, and Albert Fall,
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations
Committee, dissuaded Coolidge from vigorous championship of the
oil companies and intervention in Mexico on behalf of United States
petroleum interests. The Times, (London), December 10, 12, 192 6 .
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of State,"...One of them detailed 'his'
harrassment on Labor Day and stated that
Morones was a Bolshevik, so was the President
of Mexico. He hated the Mexican government.
How he got such documents, Morones would not
tell me. Much later I happened to discover
how they were extracted, with the connivance
of one of the secretaries of the Embassy.
This, however, was long after Morones was
out, and Morrow was ambassador. Morrow
never acknowledge (sic) my memorandum about
the leak. Likely he could not afford to
admit in any way that there was a traitorous
leak in the Ambassy (sic). The secretary
however, left the service and avoided going
back to the United States.32
In March, 1970, Beals described the clandestine operations more
specifically:
I discovered this leak quite by accindent (sic)
by overhearing a heated quarrel in an adjoining
booth in a little restaurant, between the
secretary and an Italian janitor, who took
the documents out of the files when quitting
work, had them photostated, then restored
them in the morning before other employees
arrived. The quarrel was over how the
money received was to be divided.
Though I cannot pin-point it by any
particular documents, there is little doubt
that an invasion in 1926 was being planned
and was imminent. That it did not occur is

32Beals to Buford, February 1 9 , 1970, L.S.U. Archives.
Morones permitted no cars to circulate between 9 A.M. and 3 P»M.
on May Bay without the identity card issued to diplomatic repre
sentatives, "C.R.O.M., Auto Oficial, Puede Transitar Libremente."
According to Sheffield, "This is only one of the many indications
of the strength of organized labor in this country and the
inability of the central authorities to successfully cope with the
labor situation." Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of
Mexico, 1910-1929* Sheffield to Kellogg, May 6 , 1925} §12.504/630.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

130

perhaps due to differences in the oil industry
and between the unsavory oil-owners in Mexico
and the financial establishment.33

REVERSAL OF POLICY
During the summer of 1927 several petroleum companies decided
to reverse their original intention of drilling wells on pre
constitutional properties without the permits which they sought,
but which the Mexican government had refused to issue.

The initial

step of this program was taken by the Huasteca Petroleum Company
as a result of a visit to New York of one of its Mexican counsels
who argued that the decision to drill without permits amounted to
conspiracy against the Mexican government.

Morones had also

informed a representative of the Huasteca company that the govern
ment intended, "come •what may," to prevent, by force of arms if
necessary, the drilling of wells on preconstitutional lands which
had not been the subject of petitions for confirmation of rights.
In view of these facts, and that the onset of the rainy season,

33

Beals to Buford, March 6 , 1970, L.S.U. Archives. The
janitor and secretary were conversing in English since they figured
no one in the "lousy little restaurant" understood this language.
Interview, Baton Rouge, April 13, 1970. Morones seldom arrived at
his ministry office before 7:00 P.M. Then he had various officials
report on routine matters he had delegated them. Beals says that
Morones: "rarely worked except at night, a midnight appointment
with him was no rarity. He began his night's work in a barber's
chair, with a very beautiful girl doing his nails, and frequently
had appointments while he was being shaved. I was present once
when the head of the petroleum industry was reporting to him, first
from once (sic) side of the chair then the other. The final step in
the process was to have drops of murine put in his eyes." Beals
to Buford, March 6 , 1970, L.S.U. Archives.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

131

which made drilling operations more difficult than usual, the
companies decided to defer continuing with their plan to drill
without permits.

The decision was also facilitated by petroleum

overproduction elsewhere than in Mexico; this eased the pressure
upon various companies to continue maximum production.

3 I).

To ease the immediate difficulties, Coolidge withdrew
Sheffield from the Embassy and named Dwight Morrow, a former
Amherst classmate, as his new ambassador to Mexico.

Morrow was

a partner in the banking house of J. P. Morgan and Company and a
man of wide legal and financial experience.

As a partner in the

Morgan firm, Morrow had easy access to factual data on Mexico's
domestic and foreign problems, and was remarkably well-informed
on that country's situation.

Carefully, and not unsympathetically,

he studied the interesting, experimental program of the Mexican
labor movement, and CROM's theories and actions.

35

After assuming

his ambassadorial position, Morrow maintained informal relations
with Calles, Morones, and other cabinet members, and, realizing
that they were not bolsheviks, Morrow reversed Sheffield's policy
of hostility.
In dispelling tenseness and suspicion and in stimulating
confidence, Morrow invited the popular American humorist Will Rogers
to visit him, meet President Calles, and be his unofficial assistant.

3I1

Schoenfeld to Kellogg, August 8, 1927? 812.6363 /2 3 3 9>
Foreign Relations, 1927. Ill, 185 -1 8 6 .
Off
Harold Nicolson, Dwight Morrow (New York, 1935)? 336.
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Rogers and Calles. toured northern Mexico for a week in the presidential
train.

Later Rogers was given an ambassadorial dinner in the University

Club, where the speeches of good fellowship were so prolonged that
"the fellows were ready to fly at each other's throats."
Morrow was also aided by the psychological effect of the visit
of the American aviation idol, Charles Lindbergh.

Following the

world enthusiasm resulting from his famous trans-Atlantic flight,
Lindbergh arrived December 1^ by a non-stop flight from Washington,
D.C.

The young pilot flew to Mexico in the capacity of a private

citizen (with State Department consent) as the guest of the Mexican
government, and in response to an invitation extended by President
Calles.

37

Upon landing, Lindbergh was met by Calles who gave him

"un faerte abrazo" (a warm bearhug).
The aviator-idol was officially welcomed and feted throughout
his sojourn.

The Chamber of Deputies received him in full session

formally declaring him to be "an Ambassador of Good-Will to the
Mexican People."

On December 17, Calles called for Ambassador

Morrow and Colonel Lindbergh at the American Embassy and escorted
them to a fete at the National Stadium.

Later, 80,000 Mexicans

including the presidential party of Calles, Morones, cabinet
members, and other functionaries attended the reception held to

^ I b i d ., 312; Homer Croy, Our Will Rogers (New York, 1953),
223-22^; Charles W. Hackett, "Success of Lindbergh's Good-Will
Mission to Mexico," Current History. XXVII (February, 1928),
727-729.
^ N e w York Times, December 3 ,
5, 6., 8, 1927; Hackett,
"Success of Lindbergh's Good-Will Mission," 727.
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Og
honor the American pilot.

The following morning Lindbergh stood

with Morones, Morrow and other government officials on the balcony
of the National Palace where 180,000 paraded in Lindbergh's honor.^
Another factor forcing Morones to an amicable settlement of
the oil dispute was the fear of "external pressure."

As Vicente

Lombardo Toledano explained in a speech delivered February 22, 1938
to the First General Ordinary Congress of the Confederacion de
Trabajadores Mexicanos:
One day — I shall never forget it as long
as I live — the then President of the Supreme
Court was called to the Ministry of Industry,
Commerce, and Labor, and Morones transmitted to
him the order of General Calles:
'Mr. President
of the Court, the Government is in danger, and
before external pressure obliges us to submit,
it is necessary that the Supreme Court declare
the Petroleum Law unconstitutional and decide
in favor of the oil companies.
The incident illustrates the legal inconsistencies to which the
Supreme Court was prone.

Freedom and equality in this tribunal

were a legal fiction; the judiciary, like the legislature, was
subordinate to the executive.
In the landmark case of the Mexican Petroleum Company, an
appeal was made from a lower court in Veracruz.

The Supreme Court

granted an injunction on November 17, 1927 restraining Morones
from enforcing Articles lU and 15 of the Petroleum Law, and from
cancelling the drilling permits granted to the company in Panuco.

38"e i heroe maximo del siglo XX," C.R.O.M., supplement to
January 1, 1928, 53- After receiving a parchment, Lindbergh posed
for photographs with Morones and other leading cromistas.
39rbid., 5 3 , 6 2 .
Uo
Weyl, The Reconquest of Mexico, 292.
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The decision did not hold that the entire petroleum law was unconsti
tutional, or even that the two articles in question were, except in
the specific case under review.

Nevertheless, foreign oil producers

construed the decision to mean that it would be followed by other
decisions which would eliminate the worst features of the law, since
no Act of the Mexican Congress could be finally declared outside the
Constitution until the Supreme Court rendered five decisions on the
same legal questions.
Following this reversal, Calles on December 26, after many
informal conferences with Morrow, submitted proposed amendments to
the Mexican Congress designed to bring the laws into accord with
the Supreme Court ruling.
at its first reading.

A bill to this effect passed unanimously

It was given executive approval by Calles

on January 3 j 1928, and eight days later the amendments went into
force when they were published in the Mexican'’Gazette.

4l

The new legislation provided for confirmatory concessions
(without cost and without limit to time) of certain rights derived
from lands on which petroleum exploitation had begun prior to
May 1, 1917, of rights derived from contracts before the same date
with surface owners for the purpose of oil exploitation, and of
rights of operators of pipe lines and refineries under concessions
or authorizations from the Department of Industry, Commerce, and Labor.

^ New York Times, December 27, 28, 30, 1928; The Times (London),
January 13, 1 9 2 8 . Newspapers attributed this revision of governmental
policies concerning oil regulations to Morones' having offered his
resignation. New York Times, December U, 1927- Once again, Morones
faked a resignation. In this way he could appear to be a disappointed,
but staunch patriot.
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Early in February, 1928, a committee of American and foreign
oil companies submitted a draft of proposed amendments from the
Petroleum Regulations Conferences to Morones' ministry..
refused to accept them.

Morones

As soon as this fact was learned, informal

conferences were held between Morones, Morrow, and their representa
tives to frame amendments to the Petroleum Regulations which would
place them in harmony with the recently amended law.

Several weeks

of negotiations followed "which were characterized by the utmost
friendliness on both sides."

lf.2

A new draft was prepared by Morrow

and J. Reuben Clark which was tactfully based, not upon what the
petroleum companies wanted, but upon various statements made at
different periods by Mexican ministers.

This was eventually

accepted by the companies and by Morones.
On March 27, on behalf of Morrow, the American Embassy issued
a press release that virtually recognized the termination of the
more than a decade long petroleum controversy.

The release said:

President Calles, on the advice of Minister Morones,
has now issued new Regulations modifying the old
Regulations in accordance with the decision of the
Supreme Court and the new act of Congress. These
new Regulations make clear what Minister Morones
had already made clear in his letter, that those
who take confirmatory concessions under the
amended law get a confirmation of their old
rights rather than a new grant of rights. The

k2

J. Reuben Clark, Jr., "The Oil Settlement with Mexico,"
Foreign Affairs, VI (July, 1 9 2 8 ), 612. Morones did not attend all
the conferences on the topic. This was done by a Mr. Paredes, his
representative.
*^Morrow to Kellogg, March 6 , 19 2 8 , 8 1 2 .6363 /252 U, Foreign
Relations, 1928, III, 2 9 8 .
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form of confirmatory concession as set out in
the new Regulations expressly declares that
it is 'to operate as recognition of acquired
rights which continue in force'....In the
informal conversations which have taken place,
Minister Morones and his official staff have
approached the whole matter with a disposition
to frame the Regulations in such a way as to
meet such essential points as are susceptible
of adjustment of general provisions.^"
That same day the Department of Industry distributed to the
press copies of the executive decree signed by Calles.

These

contained the amendments in question, together with the form to
be used in issuing confirmatory concessions on petroleum lands
acquired prior to May 1, 1917-

These amended regulations, which

Calles signed on March 27, were promulgated the next day and
"ended" the oil controversy between the United States and Mexico.
The contentions of the State Department were accepted on all
essential points in dispute.

American business interests had

scored another significant victory abroad.
Concerning Calles' motivation in precipitating the quarrel
with the foreign petroleum companies and their governments, several
interpretations may be taken into consideration.

One of the

president's 1926 speeches delivered to a labor convention sheds
some light on his reasoning:

W+
Ibid., Statement Handed to the Press on Behalf of Ambassador
Morrow, March 27, 1928, 306 -3 0 7 . Morrow discreetly complimented
Morones when he said: "I can not allow to pass this opportunity of
telling you of my sincere appreciation of the spirit of fairness
which has characterized the attitude of yourself and of the members
of your staff in the informal discussions which have taken place
regarding the amended regulations." Ibid., Morrow to Morones,
March 27, 1928, 300.
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I have endeavored to demonstrate that Mexico
can, with its own resources alone, be
developed and win its economic freedom....
My object has been to achieve the economic
independence of. our country, because
without economic independence political
independence is impossible... .You may be
absolutely assured that this we will do — l ,Mexieo, economically, shall be independent.
According to this discourse, the policy of his administration was
the achievement of political independence through economic indepen
dence.

Of course Mexico lacked sufficient drilling equipment,

trained personnel, and finances required to obtain them.

In a

confidential note that Morrow sent to Kellogg, Calles assured
Morrow that the 1925 law resulted from the necessity to satisfy
the wishes of the radical wing of the revolutionary group.

]+6

Morones, wishing to augment his explanations following
Portes Gil’s 1953 statements in Siempre about "Morones saving
Mexico from invasion," and Licenciado Isidro Fabela's 1956 series
"La politica intemacional del Presidente Cardenas" published in
El Excelsior, in which Fabela alleged the same and urged Morones
to reveal the details, published his almost daily "Calles obligo
a las companias petroleras a cumplir las leyes."

A rambling,

biased defense published in El Universal from December, 1956 to
March, 1957j this article constitutes Morones' major writing, and

1|C

Frederick F. Barker, "New Laws and Nationalism in Mexico,"
Foreign Affairs, V (July, 1927) 5 591 ^^Morrow to Kellogg, November 8 , 1927, 812 .6363 in Lorenzo
Mejrer, Mexico y Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero, 1917-19^-2
(Mexico, D . F . , 19 6 8 ), 160.
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partly explains M s role in the petroleum controversy.

Taken from

Morones1 personal archives and written in what he terms "an impartial
approach," Morones' major thesis is that the "rebellious petroleum
companies" refused to obey Mexican laws and made an international
issue "out of a purely domestic problem."

1+7

According to cromistas,

Morones 1 role was to issue the December, 1925 regulations which
"combatted the imperialist penetration and served as antecedents
1+8

for the oil expropiation in 1 9 3 8 ."

1+7

.,

Luis N. Morones in El Universal, December 17, 20, 195°;
New York Times, February 2, 1927.
1+8
Rogelio de la Selva in El Excelsior, April 7, I96 I+;
"Morones, el decano de los lfaeres, "Siempre, April 15, 19^1+, 9;
Jose Petricioli, interview, Mexico City, June 3 0 , 1 9 6 8 . Meyer
refers to Morones as the "artifice" of the December, 1925 regula
tions . Mexico y Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero, 1917-191+2.

161.
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CHAPTER V I I

MORONES AND THE CHURCH

CATHOLIC LABOR GROUPS
Although the church tried to counterbalance the labor movement
with Catholic Labor Circles, party organization, and various programs
of social action, Catholic unions were negligible.

By 1925,the

national organization called the National Catholic Workers' Confedera
tion falsely claimed 2 2 ,0 0 0 members and close to 1+00 unions; but
most organized workers, though considering themselves Catholic, were
affiliated with CROM despite the fact that in opposition to Morones
the "priests declared from the pulpits that membership in CROM
constituted a mortal sin."‘L

CRISTERO REBELLION
Calles' greatest struggles with the Church began in 1926 when
he enforced Article 3 of the 1917 Constitution which required that
primary education be secular, and Article 130 which severely limited
the number of priests in Mexico.

Beginning in February, Calles

deported foreign priests and nuns, confiscated clerical residences,
church schools and seminaries; required all Mexican priests to
register with the civil authorities, accused the hierarchy of treason,
and prohibited criticism of the government by the clergy and clerical
newspapers.

The crisis deepened when the Mexican hierarchy supported

^Alba, The Mexicans, 159* Morones alleged that the National
Catholic Workers' Confederation was "not national, possibly not
Catholic, and not a confederation." New York Times, August 23, 1 9 2 6 .
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by Rome, refused to accept Calles' regulations.

On August 1,

Mexican bishops retaliated by suspending church services throughout
the country.

As a result, six members of the upper clergy were

expelled by the government for "seditious activities."

Atrocities

on both sides, as well as propaganda issued by the Church and ■
Mexican governmental sources, kept emotions high.
Morones exerted significant influence in the formation and
execution of administration policies even in the enforcement of
the anticlerical articles of the Constitution.

2

He was no friend

of the organized Church, and helped to create social tensions when
he personally advised Calles to execute constitutional provisions
and establish a Mexican Catholic Church which would be independent
3

of the Vatican.

Calles' and Morones' actions helped provoke a

chaotic three-year armed insurrection, 1926 -2 9 , known as the
Cristero Rebellion, during which CROM supported him throughout
the ruthless, sanguinary crisis.

k

Morones directed terrorist operations from Mexico City giving
orders through intermediaries mafia-style.

His CROM furnished shock

Eugene Maur Braderman, A Study of Political Parties in Mexico
since 1890 (Urbana, 193 8 ), 2 1 1 .
^Medina Ruiz, Calles, un destino melancolico, 96-97.
1+

J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America; a History
of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations (Rev, ed.; Chapel Hill. 1966),
3 9 8 . Cristeros, self-style warriors for "Christ the King," operated
mainly in Jalisco and west-central states where they roamed the
countryside burning public schools, killing teachers, and dynamiting
trains. Miguel Gil, without specifying any reasons, writes that
Morones "provoked" the religious conflict. See his vehement
"Morones al desnudo" series in La Prensa, February 7, 19 3 8 .
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troops, political assassinations, demonstrations, and mob actions.
On August 1, 1926 , Morones staged a parade of over 50,000 men and
women to support Calles' religious policy.

Among these were 10,000

employees of the government departments who had been warned to
attend on threat of losing their jobs.

Other CROM members, the

majority of them Catholics, were also compelled to participate
under warnings of dismissal, reduction of salary, and the difficulty
of obtaining future work.

Through the silent and almost deserted

Mexico City streets CROM members, government employees, and several
thousand farmers from nearby districts carried banners acclaiming
Calles* position and denouncing the Catholic clergy.
placards announced:

Numerous

"Immoral Priests Pervert Society," "The Clergy

are Rich, the People Poor,"

"Sensible People Applaud Calles," and

"Calles is a Disciple of Juarez."

Rumors of possible violence help

explain the remarkable absence of spectators.

The column took more

than two and a half hours to pass the reviewing stand in the
Cathedral Plaza, where Calles stood surrounded by high military
officials and all the cabinet except Finance Minister Pani who
disapproved of the religious laws.

Morones and Puig Casauranc, who

addressed the marchers, assailed the Catholic Church which they
charged started the uprising against the Mexican president.^

^The Times (London), August 3> 1926; New York Times, August 2,
1926. Morones accused the foreign oil companies and the high clergy
of combining to provoke and launch the Cristero Rebellion. Luis N.
Morones in Las Novedades, September 5> 19535 Luis N. Morones in E l .
Excelsior, September 5, 19535 Luis N. Morones in El Universal,
August 13, 1956.
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On August 6 , 1 9 2 6 , Morones concluded his public debate with
Luis Mier y Teran, a Catholic student in the Esperanza Iris Theater.
Luring the course of their heated discussion, Morones and his opponent
almost "came to blows."

Morones' speech was violent, and gave further

indications that the government had no intentions of affecting a
compromise.

He accused the American Knights of Columbus at their

convention held the previous week in Philadelphia of adopting a
resolution seeking to precipitate immediate intervention by the
United States government.

"Catholics," he shouted, "have resorted

to the old expedient of providing an international conflict."
Menacingly, he warned:
before the Vatican.

"The Government of Mexico will not tremble

The Roman Pontiff does not govern Mexico and,

if he did, we would have gone tack 100 years."^

Mier y Teran, he

asserted, was delegated by the Catholics to represent the Church
because their officials sought to deceive everyone by making it
appear that Mexican youth supported the Church.

Morones made a

distinction between the deity and organized religion when he said:
"The youth are in the revolutionary ranks.
men who preserve their belief.

They are with the free

You believe in God.

We all do.

The campaign is not against God, but it is against the pharisees."

6„
nos mismos que vienen a hablamos de patriotismo tracionan
a su patria, provccando conflictcs internacionales," C.R.O.M.,
1 9 2 6 , h8-51; New York Times, August 11, 1 9 2 6 . For a brief account
of^the debate, see Antonio Uroz, La cuestion religiosa en Mexico,
(Mexico, E.F., 1926), 2 ^6 -2 6 5 .
7
New York Times, August 11, 1926 .
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Morones also opined that "The Church has always been the enemy of the
proletariat and this especially is illustrated in Mexico."

Replying,

Mier charged that Morones had challenged Catholics to take up arms

0
in defense of the religious cause.

A.F.L. REACTION
William Green and Matthew Woll continued the Gompers tradition
of defending CROM and the Mexican government against attacks in the
United States.

At the Detroit A.F.L. convention in 1926, CROM was

attacked on the grounds that it was not a real trade union, hut part
of the Mexican governmental machinery because it was lending its
support to President Calles against the Church.

Matthew Woll,

A.F.L. vice-president and a friend of Morones, issued a statement
on April k , 1926 reiterating that the friendship of American and
Mexican labor would continue unchanged because American labor would
not be trapped into any endorsement or condemnation of Mexican
religious policies.

Woll said:

We believe in our institutions and we should
like to see them extended. But we do not
propose to countenance the use of any force
to carry our ideas among people, either
military, economic, diplomatic, political
or even moral force.9
American capital, Woll asserted, was trying to take advantage of
Mexico's backwardness and of "our moral mission to Mexico," to
deceive the American people into helping it swallow the country.

8Ibid., Salazar, Historia de la luchas proletarias en Mexico,
*

VI, 2 3 7 .
% e w York Times, April

1926.
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American, labor -would never allow itself to become the accomplice
of such an "atrocious international blunder."

The A.F.L., Woll

concluded, hoped that the Mexican government would do all possible
to improve the situation, if for no other reason than because the
Church "is being exploited by American jingoes, Imperialists, moneygrubbers, and other enemies of the Mexican people...Anomalies or
evils in the Mexican Constitution afford no ground whatever for
intervention or for any diplomatic or Congressional hostility to

»Mexico.
/r •
it10
MORONES' CREDO
Compelled by his mother to be an altar boy during his youth,
Morones later opposed the Roman Catholic hierarchical organization,
not the Roman Catholic religion.

Morones stated that there existed

two Christs, "el Cristo de oro de los ricos y el Cristo de los
pobres"j11 but this appears to be more of a propaganda appeal than
a statement of creed.
"godless."

Contrary to Morones1 detractors, he was not

He believed in God, "a something big," but believed

that there were good and bad clerics just as there were good and
bad lawyers and doctors.
Morones resented the church hierarchy and enjoyed mocking
their traditions.

In September, 1923> for example, a wedding occurred

which was given a large amount of publicity; this was the theatrical

~*~^The Times (London), April 6, 1926.
11Petricioli, et al., Estudios proletarios, I, 239-

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

145
"First socialist matrimony celebrated in Mexico."

12

Before a crowd

exceeding 3,000 gathered in the Institute of Social Sciences, Eduardo
Moneda, CROM secretary general, married Jose Heredia and Concepcion
Moreno, two workers.

Morones acted as the best man.

On explanation

for this event, written by a person who was best man in several of
these weddings, is the following:
Morones decreed that all CROM members, who got
married bad to be married by CROM officials,
and he presided over several marriage cermonies.
(sic) This was a blow at the Church, but most
couples went through three marriages, the
official marriage which alone was legal, then 1
a Church ceremony, then a Labor Party marriage.
Another confrontation between Morones and church leadership
occurred in October, 1924, when the National Eucharistie Congress
met in the capital’s Olimpia Theatre.

The congress wished to

present "El divino Narciso," a one act religious drama written
by Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz.

Morones forbad cromistas from

participating in the function, and the play was cancelled.

12

+

*

Casasola, Historia grafica de la Revolucion

14

Mexieana, -III. 1628.

^Beals to Buford, February 1 9 , 1970, L.S.U. Archives; Beals,
interview, Baton Rouge, April 12, 1970.
14
Moetezuma, El conflicto religioso de 1926, I, 296 -29 8 ; Rius
Facius, De Don Porfirio a Plutarco: historia de A.C.J.M., (Mejico,
D.F., 19^6), 302; Stokes, Latin American Politics, 240-241.
Licenciado Alfonso Romandia Ferreira blames Morones for ordering
the assault on Soledad Church, the bombing of the Basilica de
Guadalupe, and placing the red-black CROM banner on Mexico City
cathedral's flagpole. Luis N. Morones in El Universal, August 30,
November 13, 1956. The flag incident occurred May 1, 1921 during
a CROM parade celebrating "El Dia del Trabajo." Records Relating
to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, Hanna to Secretary
of State, May 2, 1921,815.504/311.
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Morones advocated restricting the Church to its strictly
religious sphere because he regarded it as an obstacle to modern
progress.^

Morones, when he wrote the introduction to the five

volume set of La industrial el comercio y el traba.jp en Mexico
durante le gestion administrativa del Senor Gral.

Plutarco Elfas

Calles in 1928, quoted from and agreed with a segment of Pablo
Macedo’s La evolucion mercantil, a strong indictment of the clerical
position:
Ejercio el Clero notario influencia en todas las
clases socialies. <• Que hizo de ella? Usarla en
beneficio propio, y absorber las mejores tierras
y las mejores fincas urbanas, sin devolver a la
colectividad ni en educacion, ni en instruccion,
ni siquiera en ejemplo de moralidad y cultura,
las fuerzas que extraxa el organismo social.
Por el contrario, las comunidades religiosas
llegaron a ser foco de escandolo corruptor, y
contra ellas ni prelados podian nada, porque
estaban sustraxdos a su jurisdiccion.-*-°
Morones wrote that he had "outlined here in a few sentences the
typical action of the influence of a corrupt and ambitious church."
In his opinion,the three most serious obstacles to Mexican economic
development were, "the numerous restrictions on the free exercise of
commerce, the lack of stimulation and protection of industry, and

117

failure to liquidate the great interests of the church."

^Luis Enrique Morones Pena, interview, Mexico City, August 2h ,
1 9 6 8 ; Berta Pena Viuda de Morones, interview, Mexico City, August 3*
1968.
■^Volume I, 11.

17 Ibid., 2 1 .
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In later life, the fire-eater mellowed and was not as outspoken
in his criticism of the church.

He appreciated its beauty and art,

and enjoyed visiting different churches.

Despite his earlier vehement

anticlerical feeling, his coffin was placed between four candles
and under a crucifix during his capilla ardiente (*wake).

19

tO

Picture in photograph archive of La Prensa.
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CHAPTER V H I

FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1928 TO THE CROM SPITS OF 1932

CALLES CHANGES HIS MIND

Until 1927 when there were disagreements between Calles and
CROM leadership, Calles toyed with the notion of having Morones
succeed him.

The high-living labor leader, Calles had believed,

was sufficiently experienced in government and identified with
the working class, which, during Calles' administration, had become
a more important part of the electorate than ever before.
By 1927, Calles no longer found it profitable to be known as
the "labor" or "bolshevik" president; his government was depending
more and more upon the support of the right; and Morones had become
unacceptable to Obregon, the agrarista bloc of deputies and senators
and, to the military.

Not only did the generals feel strongly that

civilians had no right to the presidency,

but opposed Morones

because they feared he might organize labor militias which would
ultimately challenge the army's preponderance.'*' Morones' CROM had
formed military units which held maneuvers in Veracruz.

The threat

of an armed proletariat as a counterbalance to the regular army

1Summerlin to Kellogg, July 30, 1925, ADS, 812.00/27579 in
Lieuwin, Mexican Militarism, 95* Morones* widow offers an entirely
different version:
Calles offered him the presidency several
times, but Luis did not believe himself capable." Interview,
Mexico City, August 3, 19&8. Little credence can be given to
her's or to the following opinion: "...he always declined his
friend's desire that he be president." La Prensa, April 6, 1956.
The choice was not Morones* to make in 1 9 2 8 .

ll+8
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deepened the army’s distrust.

Red labor hatallions fought for

Carranza's cause in 1917, and during the de la Huerta rebellion
armed agrarians and workers had proved invaluable aids to the
government against military rebels.
Calles added up the power factors.

Outside of the presidency

Obregon continued to wield a great deal of political influence
because of his close ties with the army and agrarian interests,
an influence that Cables could not counteract by favoring his labor
collaborators who, with their discipline and loyalty, were not
numerous enough.

Cables realized that if he failed to support

Obregon, a repetition of the Agua Prieta movement would occur and
be backed by a majority of the military.

In the face of over

whelming opposition from the divisionarios (division general,
highest rank in the Mexican army), he abandoned his idea of having
Morones succeed him.

Realizing that Obregon was the only

presidenciable (one eligible to be seriously considered as a
presidential candidate), Calles cooperated with Obregon in
procuring an amendment to the Constitution allowing the election
of an ex-president provided his terms were not consecutive.

MYTH OF "SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO, HO REEEECCION"

CROM leadership opposed this "violation of Article 83 of the
1917 Constitution," not so much on principle, as because they
wanted Morones to become president.

The corpulent leader resented

Obregon's manipulation of the Constitution because it "cheated"
him of the top office in the land.

Morones' appetite for power
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became insatiable; be wanted to take the big step upward.

If one

conceives tbat the principal function of a national political party
organization is to elect a president, Morones' P.L.M. failed in the

1928 election.
Morones' public announcements concerning tbe election were
Early in 1927 be promised tbat CROM would

often contradictory.

remain aloof from tbe agitation over tbe presidential candidates.
His sentences were guised in lofty idealism:

"For tbe Labor Party,

tbe principal issue is not re-election, but how to conserve tbe
revolutionary ideals."

If this involved Obregon's re-election,

labor would support him, even though this would entail a change
in its principles.

He urged calmness, and suggested tbat since

Calles' term bad not ended, "revolutionists" should forget future
politics and support Calles.

During tbe crucial days of tbe

Cristero Rebellion and petroleum controversy, Morones warned:
"The common enemy, reaction, continues its efforts to divide the
revolution, with tbe hope of again coming into power."

If labor

"were forced to be re-electionist by tbe necessities of tbe moment
to save revolutionary unity," then CROM would do so.

2

Thirty years

later Morones still insisted this was tbe reason P.L.M. chiefs
backed Obregon:
En el espxritu de mis companeros estaba
firmemente cimentado el principio de no
reeleccion, y cuando nos dimos cuenta de
que no apoyarlo las fuerzas revolucionarias

^New York Times, May 30, 1927; Roberto Quiros Martinez,
Alvaro Obregon: su vida y su obra (n.p., 1928 ), 33 O.
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podrran sufrir un quebranto en su uni dad,
decidimos cooperar para su reeleccion.3
■When the P.L.M. held its convention in September, 1927, it
had not yet endorsed anyone for the presidency.

The delegates

considered the possibility of Morones, Gasca, Obregon, and General
Francisco Serrano; but eliminated the first two because they still
held government posts.

Some delegates believed re-election en

croached on the Constitution; others sought to prolong Calles’
administration by proposing that the presidential term be lengthened
to six years.

The convention finally endorsed Obregon as the "labor

candidate," but empowered the directive committee to withdraw its
support if it so deemed.

By including this stipulation, CROM

leaders hoped to be able to bargain with Obregon.

OPPOSITION OF GENERALS GOMEZ AND SERRANO
Upon its being known that Obregon would again run for
president, political groups of the antireeleccionista persuasion
began to form around Generals Araulfo Gomez and Francisco Serrano,
the latter had once been Obregon's friend and subordinate.

1927 campaign was bitter, especially on the gomistas' part.

The
Gomez

was outspoken in his views and offered his enemies "una parcela de
tierra de dos metros para estar bajo de ella."

k

Gomez spent the

early part of Calles' administration officially studying military

^Morones to Dulles, February 16, 1957, photocopy, L.S.U.
Archives.
Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October 7 5 1956.
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methods in the United States and Europe.

After compiling a lengthy

report on his findings he was appointed Chief of Military Operations
of the important Veracruz zone.

John Wood, American Consul at

Veracruz, described Gomez as "calm and deliberate of speech and
nonchalent when conversing in English."

Gomez informed Wood:

"that he has saved the life of Minister Morones and that they were
fri ends -as friendship goes in Mexico-but that Morones was a
' s o n ----- ch.'"^

His fiery personality, up-turned mustachios, and

more than a touch of vanity made Gomez a picturesque candidate.
Serrano was different.

A short, large-headed man with a

thin face and bright eyes, he gave an impression of solid strength
and capacity.

Unlike Gomez, he was a doer, not a talker.

Obregon

had earlier considered Serrano, his former War Minister, as Calles'
successor to the presidency.

However, Obregon had been concerned

about Serrano's whoring, drinking, gambling and addiction to night
life.

He sent him on a study tour in Europe hoping to mature him

and improve his loose morals.

Upon Serrano's return to Mexico,

Obregon noticed no change, so eliminated the general from any
further consideration.
^

/

Both Serrano and Gomez avowed their opposition to Obregon on
the ground that he had violated the spirit of the Revolution by
seeking to establish a permanent dictatorship.
with the other, but why did one not withdraw?

Each cooperated
The answer lies in

^U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929, April 5, 1927,
7 1 1 .12/1042.
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the reality that individuals or -personalismo, not the alleged issue
of no re-election, were of primary importance in the campaign.
Neither of the two, even had he wished, could have delivered his
adherents to the other.

True to Gomez's reputation of being out

spoken, his words made unpleasant hearing and reading for obregonistas.
Most impolitic of all, Gomez spoke openly of the inevitable appeal to
arms.

On October 3, Serrano and thirteen others were captured, court-

martialled, and shot in Cuernavaca.

Gomez unsuccessfully took to the

field, was captured, and executed on November 4 near Coatepec,
Veracruz.

WANING OF MORONES1 POWER
From l$ 2 b to 1928 labor was the most important influence in
Mexico and Morones, next to Calles, was the most important member
of the government.

The events of 1928 (the presidential election

and subsequent assassination of Obregon), were major turning points
for Morones; as Morones discovered, he was not so much the controlling
element as he was the controlled.

Morones, whoa Obregon had earlier

rescued after Carranza had sentenced him to death, now openly opposed
his savior's nomination.

Campaigning for re-election, Obregon made

it evident that if elected he would be anti-labor .-(specifically antiMorones and his corrupt associates).

Morones also made his position

unequivocally clear and verbally attacked Obregon during a nocturnal
meeting held in the Hidalgo Theatre on April 30.

However, by that

time Obregon had gained sufficient support to enable him to snub
CROM.

Furthermore, CROM leaders engaged in personal strife which
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weakened their organization.

Lombardo Toledano lea a group in the

1928 P.L.K. convention which suggested that the party ^aould be
dissolved because ”it had confused its high mission with that of
g
grasping political parties."
This notion was primarily directed
at the Grupo Accion of which Lombardo had never been a member.
His influence in 1928 was insufficient to force the party's dis
solution.
Obregon answered Morones’ attacks and accepted his challenge
declaring the Labor Party was free to withdraw its backing whenever
it pleased, and announced that he could still count among his
supporters enough elements to fill all government posts.

With

evidence of the ensuing rift and Obregon's public statement,
withdrawal notices began to arrive at CBOM headquarters; some were
politely worded but definite in their decision.

Among the most

important groups to separate immediately was the state federation
of Coahuila which, in a long communication dated June 8 , informed
CROM that it could no longer continue its affiliation, since all
its elements were "identified with the politics of General Alvaro
Obregon because we consider him one of the strongest supporters of
the principles of the emancipation of the workers."

The Confedera-

cion de Sindicatos Obreros y Campesinos of the State of Durango sent
CROM the following message, "Your directors are traitors to the

g
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 135*

7Ibid., 1 3 1 .
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organized movement and lackeys of yanqui imperialism so we disown
g

C.R.O.M."

As subsequent events were to prove, this was the

"beginning of Morones' and of CROM's decline; they had bucked
Calles' machine which ordered Obregon restored to the presidency.
The effective elimination of his two most serious rivals left
Obregon with only the farce of "election" for the presidency.
However, with Morones' attitude, militant Catholic unrest,
resentment of the followers of those who had perished in the
October and November phases of the campaign, and the breaking down
of the Revolutionary principle of "No Re-election," uneasiness and
tension hung in the air.
of Deputies.
headquarters.

On May 23, bombs exploded in the Chamber

One week later a bomb went off at Obregon's election
Although Obregon was the only presidential candidate

and the election result was a foregone conclusion, the government
took elaborate precautions to preserve order.

In anticipation of

possible violence, troops were confined to barracks in readiness
for riot calls; and licensed premises were closed for three days
during the election.

OBREGON'S ASSASSINATION AND ITS EFFECTS
Following his election,Obregon attended a luncheon in La
Bombilla, a restaurant in the fashionable resort of San Angel,
several miles south of Mexico City.

The band played a lively air.

Obregon was seated between Aaron Saenz, Foreign Minister in both

g

Alfonso Romandia Ferreira in El Universal, September 10,
1956; Quiros Martinez, Alvaro Obregon, 615.
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bis cabinet and tbat of Calles* and Colonel Bicardo Topete, bis
campaign manager* and was chatting with friends when a thin youth
diffidently approached the table.

Showing Saenz some caricatures

he had made during the banquet, he asked permission to sketch
Obregon.

Saenz touched Obregon's

shoulder and as the latter turned

inquiringly, the youth fired five shots from a revolver which was
concealed by the hat held in his right hand.

All the bullets struck

the president-elect in the chest; he fell forward in agony before
dying.
Antonio Soto y Gama, a federal deputy and leader of the
agrarian section of the Obregon bloc, demanded "absolute and radical
justice."

He insisted upon the complete elimination of the Labor

Party from public power, and openly blamed Morones for the assasination;
We consider the head of the Labor Party and
the directors of his group as the psychological
authors of the crime for, with the greatest
treachery they prepared the fanatic for the
murder. They armed his hand.9
Authorities were especially concerned with Soto's declarations that
"Morones must go or there will be actual war."

Although P.L.M.

leaders denied any connection with the crime, the National Agrarian
Party remained unconvinced of their innocence, blamed Morones for
his oratorical onslaughts on Obregon which had, they alleged,
"heated the assassin's weak brain to the point of madness."
Morones was: "psychologically responsible by causing an anti-Obregon

% e w York Times, July 22, 1928.
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atmosphere -which influenced Jose de Leon Toral, a religious fanatic,
to kill him."
On Friday night July 20, Soto and Aurelio Manrique, another
agrarian leader, paraded with 1500 obregonistas carrying the Mexican
flag draped with black crepe.
against Morones and CROM.

Their march was a demonstration

The situation was so tense that Morones

was forced to utilize armed guards.

Carleton Beals found him

sitting in the Labor Ministry surrounded by machine guns mounted
on tripods.
Without waiting for any legal investigation, and without
producing any proof to support his statement, Calles accused the
whole Mexican church of the crime.

Spokesmen of the clergy dis

claimed all responsibility.

MORONES' RESIGNATION
The Union of Revolutionary Parties passed a resolution demand
ing that Calles eliminate all Labor Party members from the executive
branch of government, and called upon the Federal Congress to expel
Labor deputies and senators.

The situation was crucial for Calles,

his support in large measure was derived from Labor.

In order to

appease the U.R.P. and stave off drastic methods, Calles reluctantly
gave way and accepted the resignations of Morones, Minister of
Industry, Commerce, and Labor; Eduardo Moneda, director of the
government printing shops; Celestino Gasca, Governor of the Federal
District, and Jose Lopez Cortes of the Mexico City municipal council.
Instead of admitting that the true reason for his resignation was
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duress, Morones claimed it was, "To assist in maintaining the unity
of the revolutionary family and to facilitate the investigation of
the cause of General Obregon's murder." 10
following his resignation.
abouts.

Morones disappeared

Rumors were rife, regarding his where

These included that he was hi fling in Mexico City, had flown

to the United States, had sailed for Havana, had fled to Guatemala,
and had boohed passage for Europe from Veracruz.
Calles announced that the legal inquiry he had ordered
instigated against Obregon's assassin demonstrated the lack of
truth that Morones was the intellectual author of the president
elect's murder.

This investigation was conducted by several of

Obregon's most intimate and loyal friends; Aaron Saenz, Arturo Orcx,
and Emilio Portes Gil.

Portes Gil informed Calles that he personally

thought that neither Morones nor other cromistas were guilty, but
that public opinion pointed to them . 11

Arturo Orel disagreed.

He

never believed that the assassination lay only in religious problems

Ibid., July 23, 1 9 2 8 . Another version Morones offered was
to say that he and the others resigned to redeem a pledge they had
made to relinquish their government posts if their positions ever
showed signs of interfering with CROM effectiveness. El Excelsior,
August 23, 1 9 2 8 .
^Portes Gil, Autobiografia de la Revolucion Mexicana, U09 -U1 O.
In his interview by journalist Zoe Beckley of the Hew York World,
Calles answered her question about Morones' guilt, "the legal
investigations against the criminal who assassinated Obregon and his
accomplices demonstrate the rumor's lack of truth." The president
blamed the clergy for the death. "La prensa extranjera comenta elogiosamente las declaraciones del c. General Calles," C.R.O.M.,
August 15, 1928, 2; "El Senor General Calles habla de los problemas
n a c i o n a l e s C.R.O.M., 2 4 , 31 j El Excelsior, August 3> 1928;
Fernando Lopez Portillo in El Universal, Hovember 1, 1956.
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but purely in political origins, in short, among persons who enjoyed
great privileges and feared losing them —
m

..

Morones and his Grupo

12

Accion.

MORONES CLAIMS HIS INNOCENCE
Endeavoring to clear himself of complicity in Obregon’s death,
Morones pointed out that he had no personal quarrel with the
president-elect.

He claimed that earlier he had a most "satisfactory"

interview with frtm at which time CROM had been assured that its
leaders would again enjoy a position of responsibility in the
Obregon government.

Morones' veracity may be doubted in this

instance, Obregon did not need Morones.
without him.

He had enough support

Rumors persisted about Morones’ guilt.

Even if

Morones were innocent, his impolitic moves and vehement anti-Obregon
threats voiced during the 1928 campaign and some of his earlier
strong-arm methods, such as being accused of being the intellectual
author of Field Jurado's murder only four years before, cast doubt
upon his innocence.

Naturally Morones claimed he was innocent, and

sought scapegoats in the personages of the higher clergy.

lh

Morones

1P

Arturo H. Orcx in El Universal, September 3, 1936.

13 C.R.O.M. Memoria, 1938-19^2, hi-6 3 .
^L u i s N. Morones in El Universal, September 27, 1956;
"Discurso pronunciado por el Sr. Luis N. Morones en la velada por
el Partido L'aborista Mexicano la noche de' 21 de diciembre de 1931,
para conmemorar el XII aniversario de su fiindacion," C.R.O.M.,
January 1, 1932, 32. "The most important Catholic implicated in
Obregon's murder was Miguel de la Mora, Bishop of San Luis." Luis
N. Morones in El Universal, October 16, 1956. Until his death,
Morones claimed he was innocent of the murder. During the author's
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and CROM had "become an embarrassment to the government and had to be
eliminated.

It appears that the Obregon assassination was a useful

fiction to break the controversial Morones who had fallen from grace
partially because he had bucked Calles1 machine which ordered Obregon
restored to the presidency.
On August 8 , 1928, Morones wired Santiago Iglesias to come to
Mexico.

After receiving permission from William Green to make the

trip, Iglesias departed New York and arrived in Mexico City on
August 31-

Accompanied by Ricardo Trevino, CROM secretary general,

Iglesias proceeded to Morones' finca in Tlalpan where he found
numerous CROM leaders assembled.

Morones explained the object of

the accusations was to create a great mass emotional upsurge which
could be utilized to justify attacks upon and possible assassination
of CROM leaders and destruction of the Labor Party.

Morones asked

that Iglesias conduct a thorough investigation upon which to base
a report to William Green which, through the P.A.F.L., could be
publicized throughout the world.

Morones also gave him numerous

interviews with Morones' friends and relatives, this topic was one
of several touchy themes. Others claiming Morones innocence are
the following: Sra. Berta Pena "Viuda de Morones, interview,
Mexico City, August 3, 1 9 6 8 ; Luis Enrique Morones Pena, interview,
Mexico City, August 2h, 1 9 6 8 ; Jose Petricioli, interview, Mexico
City, June 25, 1 9 6 8 , and Carleton Beals. According to the latter:
"He was accused of having abetted the Obregon Assassination. This
was false he was loyal to his friends. It was rumored that he had
fled from the city. I found him carrying on his work as usual at
the Ministry, a bank of machine guns in the upstairs corridor."
Beals to Buford, February 1 9 , 1970, L.S.U. Archives. Among those
asserting that there exists insufficient proof to blame Morones
are: Emilio Portes Gil, interview, Mexico City, July 26, 1968 ,
and Agustin Zapata Casasola, interview, Mexico City, July 16, 1 9 6 8 .
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documents supporting the innocence of Laborites in the assassination.
Among this data was a copy of the hitherto secret agreement of 1919
made between Obregon and the Labor Party.

For a week Iglesias

questioned laborers, government officials, military leaders, antireelectionists, agraristas, obregonistas, and others about the current
crisis.

His inquiries convinced him that neither the Church nor the

15
labor movement was responsible for Obregon's murder.

ASSASSIN'S TRIAL AND TESTIMONY
Was Morones psychologically and intellectually responsible for
the crime?

This question was debated by many with more emotion than

objectivity.

Toral's comments and his trial provided important

insight in attempting to solve this problem.

The assassin declared

on July 30 that "Morones had nothing whatever to do with it."

He

continued,
If I were not telling the truth, I could easily
take advantage by dragging some intellectual
author into the affair. Morones is against our
religion. I prefer to tell the truth. I did
it alone.
Before the fifty persons —

police and government officials, news

paper reporters, foreign correspondents, and photographers —

who,

during the long recitation, relaxed on divans and in big comfortable
chairs, Toral read his confession at police headquarters:
will be saved.

So will Obregon's,

"My soul

because I offered my life in

^Iglesias to Green, October b , 1928 in Snow, "Samuel Gompers
and the Pan-American Federation," 220.

~L&
New York Times, July 31> 1928.
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atonement for him."

Toral looked quite unperturbed during the

questioning period -when he repeated, "I did it alone."

17

His confession diverted attention from an earlier suspect,
the Mother Superior of the Espiritu Santo Convent, Concepcion Acevedo
y de Llata or "La Madre Conchita."

Several days before Toral's

confession, Madre Conchita also had been interrogated.

She was in

high spirits and laughed merrily -when reminded of various allegations
concerning her insanity.

She asserted that she had neither attended

meetings of conspirators, encouraged the manufacture of bombs, nor
provided poison for the alleged plot of Maria Elena Manzano.

Asked

if she could elucidate the part played by dissatisfied labor leaders,
she exclaimed:

"I have no Labor leaders concealed behind my skirts."

She maintained her complete innocence, and at the end of the inter
view revealed part of her philosophy:
a martyr.

"It is my ideal of life to be

In order to be a martyr one must be punished for a crime

•which one has not committed.

Therefore I welcome any punishment or

suffering that may come my way."

l8

Toral's arraignment began a few days after his confession and
was held before Alonzo Mendoza, Judge of the Court of First Instance,
in the municipal building of San Angel within a hundred yards of the
restaurant which had been the scene of the crime.

The most significant

admission made by the assassin came in answer to the judge’s question

17
The Times (London), August 1, 1 9 2 8 .
1Q
Ibid., July 27, 1928.
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about who had advised him to commit the crime, to •which Toral replied,
"Directly no one; indirectly, La Madre Conchita."

He testified that

she told him that religious persecution in Mexico would he prolonged
unless Obregon, Calles, and Patriarch Perez of the schismatic
Mexican church were murdered.

Toral and Conchita were committed by

the Court of First Instance.
Bishop Miguel de la Mora, on behalf of the Episcopal Sub
committee, promptly issued a statement repudiating the charge that
the Mexican clergy was responsible for Obregon’s murder.

In de la

Mora’s denial of responsibility, he asserted, "...it is common
knowledge that the nun is mentally deranged, several cases of
insanity having been reported in her family, and that the com
plicity of one nun and a priest should not fasten guilt upon the
whole clerical body."

19

.*

For Obregon's

of course, accept moral responsibility.

assassination no one would,
But how could the Mexican

hierarchy tolerate a person whose mental abnormality has been
"common knowledge" as the responsible head of a convent?
The trial, which Morones did not attend, was melodramatic.
A large portrait of Obregon hung above the fudge's bench and facing
the space set aside for the accused.

Mother Concepcion asked the

prosecuting attorney to do his utmost to have her sent to prison,
because "it would enable her to do spiritual work among the women
convicts."

20

During the process which was broadcast to the whole

^Ibid., August 7, 1928.
20
Ibid., November 3, 1928.
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nation by radio, Deputy Gonzalo Santos, president of the National
Agrarian Party, invaded the court room at the head of other armed
deputies.

They threatened to shoot not only the prisoners but also

the judge and jurors, and especially the attorney defending Toral,
if a judgment of guilty were not rapidly rendered.

During -this

commotion one of the men attempted to shoot the accused assassin,
but missed.

Court had to be adjourned for the day.

21

The last day of the trial was equally exciting.

Toral

testified that some time before he became acquainted with Conchita
he had convinced himself that he was the "chosen instrument" to
remove Obregon and had never divulged to her his resolution to kill
the president-elect.

He admitted, however, that her remark that

the Catholic situation in Mexico could be alleviated by the deaths
of Cailes and Obregon was a deciding factor in what he termed his
"already well-established intention."

There was a tense moment when

the nun's counsel put this question to Toral:
As a man possibly on the verge of the tomb and
in the interests of the peace of your country,
what responsibility has Mother Concepcion in
the murder of General Obregon on which the
prosecutor can rest the charge that she is
guilty of being the intellectual author of
*f*V> c

WUVtf

«■*

OiU U •

Toral turned dramatically towards Conchita, paused for emphasis and,
with this hand on his heart, said "None whatever."

22

21

Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 133*

22The Times (London), November 6 , 1928.
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On November 8 , Toral and Conchita were found guilty of murder.
The jury voted by eight to one to sustain all the counts in the
indictment.

Toral was sentenced to be shot, and Conchita because

Mexican law forbad the execution of a female, to serve twenty years
in prison.

Neither had sympathizers inside the court room, and when

their counsel in his last pleas for Toral referred to the youth’s
belief that by killing Obregon he would gain the "martyr's palm,"
those present jeered, hissed, and laughed uproariously.

The spec

tators cheered the announcement of the verdict, and officers in
court saluted the jury with their swords.
The palid Toral met his death shouting "Viva Cristo Hey" in
front of the Penitenciarxa del Distrito Federal with a large crowd
of spectators looking on.

In July, 193^» Madre Conchita was trans

ferred to the penal colony of Las Islas Marias where freed from her
vows she married Carlos Castro Baida who was serving six years for
having placed dynamite explosives in the washrooms of the Chamber

OO

of Deputies in 19 2 8 .

The ex-nun wrote her memoirs insisting that

she never knew Toral was going to assassinate Obregon.

Neither she

nor Toral ever suggested that Morones played a part, even indirectly,
in the assassination.

2k

Despite their testimony, many questions surround Toral’s and
Conchita's statements.

Toral admitted that Manuel Trejo,

Jose Bravo Ugarte, Mexico independiente (Barcelona, 1959)*

hoo-toL.
2k

Concepcion Acevedo y de Llata, Memoria de la Madre Conchita
(2da ed.; Mexico, D.F., 1 9 6 2 )* passim.
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a labor leader, furnished him with the murder weapon.

25 One is

suspicious of Mateo Podan's statement that Toral was an active
cromista, hut Jose Petricioli candidly admitted that Toral "was a
member of the CRGM of long standing, though at that time he was
inactive."

Another perplexing problem is Morones' relationship

with Madre Conchita.

H. Flores Sanchez has tried to show that her

activities were financed by Morones and his group.

He tells about

the Recamier sisters, Amanda, Margarita, and Adela or "Llaya.'''
Llaya, he alleges, was Morones' "third or fourth wife," and adds
that she and Amanda "were well known" at the wild parties Morones
held at Tlalpan.

According to Sanchez, these three girls were

the daughters of a sister of Madre Conchita, whom Llaya introduced
to Morones.

27

If true, and there is sufficient room for doubt,

this would make the nun Morones' mother-in-law's sister, or his
"txa polxtica."

Morones, on the other hand, alleges he did not

know Conchita until 1939 and then "only at sight."

28

Several persons claim that Maria Elena Manzano once saw a
fat man speaking with Madre Conchita in her home.

This individual

25

Charles W. Hackett and J. Lloyd Mecham, "The Assassination
of President-Elect Obregon," Current History (September, 1 9 2 8 ), 1026.

26

Mateo Podan in La Prensa, December 11, 1936; Robert J.
Alexander interview of Jose Petricioli, Mexico City, August 27 9
19 ^-8 , photocopy, L.S.U. Archives.
27

+

H. Flores Sanchez in El Universal, November 3? 1956; Pablo
Meneses V. in El Universal, November 3, 5, 1956; Dulles, Yesterday
in Mexico, 377.

28

Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October 16, 1956 .
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was "identified" as Samuel Yudico, one of the principal CROM leaders
and "right arm" of Morones.

29

^
Yudico died suspiciously three months

before Obregonfs death and rumors circulated that Morones had poisoned
30
him .

Moronistas denied foul play and alleged that the thirty-eight

year-old Grupo Accion member died of a mysterious "painful, tormenting,
on
distressing illness."
To divert suspicion, Morones led Yudico's
funeral march.
It is highly possible that Toral murdered Obregon without
Morones being the intellectual author.

Despite Alfonso Romandia

Ferreira's statement that "numerous Catholics and high clergy knew

*■

that Obregon had decided to terminate the religious problem,"

32

:.it

is probable that Toral and others disbelieved this propaganda.
Furthermore, it is obvious that Obregon's speeches did not reveal
this course of action.

Four months before his death, the presidential

candidate indicated in a campaign speech in Guanajuato that he pro
posed prohibition for Mexico.

Liquor, gambling, and "wicked Roman

Catholics," he said were the three enemies of the country:

29
Pablo Meneses V. in El Universal, November 3j 5? 1956; Valente
Quintana in El Universal, September 11, 1956; Alfonso Romandxa
Ferreira in El Universal, September 17s 20, 1956. Morones denied
that Yudico was his 'right arm," asserting that all members of the
Grupo Accion were equal. Luis N. Morones in El Universal, October 6 ,

:

1956

30
Valente Quintana in El Universal, September 11, 1956; Pablo
Meneses V. in El Universal, November 3> 5> 1956; Dulles, Yesterday in
Mexico, 378.
^■"Galerxa de honor," C.R.O.M., October 15, 1937> 5-6; Luis N.
Morones in El Universal, October 17, 1956; "Otro gran batallador cae
para no levantarse mas,"" C.R.O.M., supplement to May 1, 1928, 1 0 9 .
op

Alfonso Romandfa Ferreira in El Universal, September 18,
1956.
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It may be necessary to spill a little more
blood in order to eliminate tbe last small
nuclei of these evil ones — these false
Catholics ■who would make of their religion
a banner for fratricidal strife.
He was speaking of the Roman Catholics, who, he asserted, used
their religion to propagate anti-governmental activities.

38

Furthermore, Obregon had been the attempted victim of an attack
by bomb-throwing elements of the League of Religious Defense on
November 13, 1927 in Chapultepec Park.

After the two assailants

who threw dynamite at the car in which he was riding confessed,
Father Miguel Agustin Pro-Juarez, the accused intellectual author
of the crime, was executed by a firing squad.
If CROM leaders could have foreseen that Obregon would never
live to become president, it is possible that Morones would have
never entered into open conflict with him.

Furthermore the Morones-

Obregon antagonism differed from that which impelled Toral to
assassinate the president-elect, "so Christ could be wholly King
of Mexico."

Morones' verbal attacks were dictated from a Laborite

angle; they implied not errors of commission on Obregon's part, but
that from Morones* Revolutionist view point Obregon had not gone
far enough.

Such attacks, if they were noted by Toral at all,

would have been deemed by him favorable to Obregon, rather than
condemnatory.

^ The Times (London), March 28, 1928.
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CONTINUISMO
With. Obregon's murder, Calles* term expiring, and the amended
Constitution requiring a full term lapse before a president could
return to office, Calles faced a dilemma*
resort as eontinuismo —

He viewed his only

to impose a weaker politician in the

presidency while Calles remained in power behind his puppet.

To

satisfy the disappointed obregonistas, Calles chose one of their
number, Emilio Portes Gil, civilian political boss from Tamaulipas.
Portes Gil was "selected and duly elected" provisional president of
Mexico by unanimous vote of the national congress.

Calles managed

to surmount a major obstacle by convincing military leaders that
the balance of power was so evenly distributed among them that any
attempt to choose an army candidate would result in deadlock and

civil
war.3^
A few days before leaving the presidency Calles, in an effort
to achieve peace between CROM leaders and the president-elect, called
a meeting at the home of Puig Casauranc, the new Minister of Industry,
Commerce, and Labor.
Ricardo Trevino,
by his absence.

Portes Gil attended as did Eduardo Moneda and

two prominent cromistas. Morones was conspicious
After an interval of complaints from each side —

particularly regarding the conflicts in Tamaulipas —

CROM and the

incoming governmental head "agreed" to peace and cooperation. J

3^
Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition, (Urbana,
1959), 1 2 1 .
vc:
-'''Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 410.
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One can argue that CROM and Portes Gil could have accomplished
a reproachement except for one factor.

Probably there vas no more

determined enemy of Morones in all Mexico than Portes Gil, and enmity
toward Morones meant hostility toward CROM and the P.L.M.

As governor

of Tamaulipas (1925-28), Portes Gil substituted other labor organiza
tions for CROM unions, and through a series of conflicts between the
two groups, he upheld his own unions.

CROM combined a maximum of

trouble with a minimum of result; it emerged "on the short end" in
its clashes with the strong-willed, anti-Morones governor.

FOUNDING OF TEE P.N.R.
With the split between CROM leadership and Calles, the
organization’s functional ability broke down and the Labor Party's
role declined.

Calles organized a new party, the Partido Nacional

Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party), as the basis for his
control.

P.N.R. was a relatively simple coalition of local political

machines, farm organizations, and labor organizations bound together
by Calles’ personal!smo and power.

The party brought together the

Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and Aaron Saenz groups, and Calles
hoped to play one off against the other and thus remain in power
behind the scenes.

With the aid of plenty of government money for

mordidas (bribes), Calles managed to split the Agrarian Party, buy
off or purge opponents of his P.N.R. such as Soto y Gama, and to add
the agraristas to his coalition.
It is not difficult to determine why Morones vacillated on
joining the P.N.R.

Partly because of his hatred of Portes Gil,

personal ambition, suspicions of Calles1 motives, lack of encouragement
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Courtesy Emilio Portes Gil

PRESIDENT EMILIO PORTES GIL
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from Calles, public opinion connecting cromistas with Obregon's
murder, and reasons best known to himself, Morones and his CROM
remained recalcitrant and aloof from the P.N.R.
If Morones made a bad choice when he failed to support Obregon,
he showed equally poor judgment when he rejected Calles and his new
political party.

With such disadvantageous political thinking and

illogical reasoning what followed was bitter evidence of Morones'
miscalculations and error in failing to enter the party.

The

decision was of crucial importance since the future of CROM lay
in a reproachement with Calles and Portes Gil.
possible reconciliation.

Morones blocked any

Without foreseeing the consequences,

Morones blundered and adopted a policy, the results of which were
disastrous.

Mexico had no traditionally defined place for a "loyal

opposition" in her politics.

The initial reaction was to suspect

the opposition of disloyalty to the regime.

The wisest plan would

have been to foster the friendship of those in political positions
of power in order to carry forward, or at least maintain, the gains
already accomplished.

MORONES VS. PORTES GIL
With relations far from being harmonious, the open breach and
direct confrontation between CROM and the recently installed Portes
Gil government came in December, 1 9 2 8 . When the ninth annual CROM
convention met in Mexico City on December b two plays were running
there in Roberto Soto's Lxrico Theatre,Desmoronamiento and Segun tu
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Portes Gil.

Soto, a noted actor, presented severe criticism in the

form of a caricature of Morones on his finea at Tlalpan presiding
over great bacchanales. One scene portrayed the labor gangster half
nude, surrounded by prostitutes and high officials of the former
government with Morones lifting a bottle to shout, "Long live the
proletariat."

CROM passed a resolution demanding that President

Portes Gil end the performance because it might "excite the political
passions of the moment, cause a dangerous disorder, and give origin
to conflicts that should be avoided."

Portes Gil refused, and

since CROM had warned it would take the "necessary steps" if the
President refused, Portes Gil arranged for protection by 150
policemen.

CROM then voted to abandon the Lxrico Theatre where

it had held some of its meetings since they now considered it
government property.

They also voted that all CROM members holding

positions of responsibility in the government should resign at once
(an almost empty gesture because cromistas held few positions since
the resignations of July).

CROM retaliation also included withdrawing

"Dissolution," a pun of Morones’ name and "According to you,
Portes Gil."
Blanco Moheno, Cronica de la Revolucion Mexicana, III, 72,
115; Portes Gil, Autobiografia de la Revolucion Mexicana, ^90.
^^El Universal, December 1 9 , 1 9 2 8 ; Emilio Portes Gil, interview
Mexico City, July 26, 1 9 6 8 . In his message of refusal sent to CROM,
Portes Gil denied that cromistas were being persecuted and that he
used his presidential power to create hostilities against any
organization. In rejecting their request to cancel the productions,
he reiterated a statement made in his inaugural address that the
right of criticism would be respected and protected by his adminis
tration. Charles W. Hackett, "Labor Opposition to Portes Gil
Government," Current History, XXIX (February, 1 9 2 9 )j 850.
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its delegates from the labor-employer conventions called by Portes
39
Gil to formulate a federal labor law. ^

While CROM made these

protests, Morones was being verbally attacked in the Chamber of
Deputies and Senate.

Senator Antonio Valdez Ramirez referred to

Morones, Trevino, and Lombardo Toledano as enemies of Obregon who
pretended to support and aid the workers and campesinos for
political ends.

Senator Lauro G. Caloca, among others, termed

Morones "The Pig of the Revolution," and a slavemaster for whom
the workers lost a day of their .inonthly salaries to finance
Morones' cars and bacchanales.
Portes Gil opined that Morones has become his most bitter
enemy and that the labor leader began an "unjustified fight."

1^0

The verbal warfare began the weekend after Portes Gil assumed the
presidency when CROM met for its ninth annual convention.

Morones

was elected CROM president on December 4 and a committee was
formed to invite former president Calles to address the group and
become CROM's honorary president.

Calles attended the convention

and sat next to Morones uninformed that the latter would attack
Portes Gil,

4l

Upon being advised that a group of disturbers had

threatened to invade the meeting, Morones militantly announced to
his organization that if there were any violence against its

^Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 1385 Dulles, Yesterday
in Mexico, 4ll.
^Emilio Portes Gil, interview, Mexico City, July 26, 1 9 6 8 ;
Autobiografia de la Revolucion Mexicana, 487.
Moheno, Cronica de la Revolucion Mexicana, 114.
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members even by Portes Gil, the unions throughout Mexico would lay
down their tools, refuse to work, and call a general strike.

42

Morones’ aggressive statement added to Portes Gil's anger and
annoyance.

The primary objective should have been reconciliation

and cooler heads might have used restraint, but not Morones.

He

boldly voiced his indignation. One explanation of his strategy is
that he resented the position in which he found himself, "had
neither patience nor self-control to await future events, and
43
acted without a well-thought-out plan.”

CROM DISINTEGRATION
Morones' political eclipse meant the disintegration of the
labor movement.

His administration-backed organization had enjoyed

a monopoly, but now without it CROM lost its cohesiveness.

Clank

describes the president's methods which accentuated CROM's depletion:
The police and military forces, so freely used
by Morones in organizing for the C.R.O.M., were
now used just as freely to destroy it; labor
inspectors began to throw their influence
against C.R.O.M. organizations and to create
opposing groups. In difficulties with employers,
unions were given to understand that they could
be entirely successful if, first, they separated
from the C.R.O.M. So great was the pressure
that a number of unions asked the C.R.O.M. for
permission to separate from it openly, although
secretly retaining their membership, as one means
of escaping the persecution of state and municipal
officials. All the methods the C.R.O.M. had
employed were now turned against it .44

TTew York Times, December 8 , 1 9 2 8 .
4^

,

Clank, Organized Labor in Mexico, 141.

44
Ibid., 134.
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Portes Gil was able to use military force against Morones and
CROM partly because "tbe army had always been unfriendly to

I4.5
them."

CROM leaders had used their power in government to attempt

to absorb the railroad brotherhoods into CROM.
ful.
union.

They were unsuccess

They also failed to suppress the C.G.T., a more radical trade
Portes Gil used both these groups, communists, and other

movements to undermine Morones.
As relations between government leaders and CROM chieftains
worsened, widespread dissatisfaction and long-felt antagonisms
against Morones began to be expressed openly.

The speed with

which Morones* CROM had grown was matched by the rapidity with
which it disintegrated.

His organization was racked with one split

after another, most of them fomented or encouraged by state
governors or ministers of the national government in accord with
the regime's overall policy to divide CROM.

In a loosely knit

labor organization and with the president's displeasure, Morones'
sanctions against seceding labor organizations were largely ineffec
tive.

In the textile districts of Veracruz and Puebla CROM unions

maintained themselves for years, but in the country as a whole the
confederation shrank in size.
During its hegemony, CROM maintained censorship.

Morones

exercised his control over printers, linotypers, reporters, and
other newspaper employees to establish a strictly enforced censor
ship so .that no articles critical of CROM or its leadership appeared.

U5
*
Emilio Portes Gil in El Excelsior, December 10, 19 2 8 .
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The control was exercised most directly through the mechanical
departments which held up any article, news item, or editorial
the linotyper deemed objectionable, until it was passed upon by
Eduardo Moneda, one of the leading CROM leaders, head of the Union
de Linotipistas, Federacion de Artes Graficas, and of the govern
ment print shops.

Morones had arrogantly used his power, and the

staffs of the large dailies were delighted to escape from his rule.
The reporters were the first to leave CROM unions.

Emboldened by

their results, they were followed by the workers in the government
printing shops, and later by those in the commercial printing
establishments, especially in the capital.

In mid-December the

Union of Newspaper Editors and Reporters withdrew, and on
December lU charges of misappropriation of funds totaling more
than 1,700,000 pesos by CROM executives were made by the Union
of Slaughterhouse Workers and given wide news coverage.

k6

Luis

Araiza writes of Morones that:
after his resignation and fall, his enemies
departed from their previous cowardice and
jumped like a pack of ravenous hounds and
attacked the man that before they dare not
face flinging insults, injury, or slander.^7
The completely changed status of CROM is evident by reading the
capitoline newspapers after July, 1 9 2 8 .
How could CROM gain independence from political ties?
to become more self-supporting.

It had

This would have required an increased

^Hackett, "Labor Opposition to Portes Gil Government," 8 5 1 .
1+7
Araiza, Historia del movjmiento obrero mexicano, III, IO9 .
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ability or willingness of the members to pay dues, but a serious
consequence of CROM's fall from official favor was a depleted
treasury.

No longer was the government willing to subsidize its

activities or contribute to its party's coffers.

Levies upon

government employees' salaries now went, not to the P.L.M., but
to the P.N.R.

This explanation for the lack of funds was read

before the CROM convention held in 1928 :
.. .the unfortunate events of July, when the
President-elect was assassinated, wrested
from us some sources of cooperation...
since...a large number of employees related
to C.R.O.M... .all of whom had spontaneously
offered their economic cooperation, can no
longer be counted upon for support. ^8
For the first time in its history, it became important that union
dues be paid.

Even in the Grupo Accion, Morones was the only

member in 1929 who was in a position to provide extensive financial
aid to CROM.^ 9
In 1930 Frank Tannenbaum addressed the Fifth Seminar of the
Committee of Cultural Relations with Latin America in the Federal
District and asserted:

*

4-8

Archivo de la CROM, expediente 0/l*4l(000)/8. The privilege
of collecting from government employees was carried to an extreme
undreamed of by labor. Portes Gil, by a presidential decree issued
just before he left office, declared that the salary of every
government employee, from highest to lowest, was subject to a
discount of one day's wage in every month of thirty-one days. The
P.N.R. was derisively dubbed the "Party of the Thirty-one." Clark,
Organized Labor in Mexico, 1*4-3.
^ 9 Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 1*4-3.
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The interesting thing about the Mexican trade
union movement is that it is not in any way a
personal movement. It is true that some
individuals like Mr. Morones have played
important parts, hut it is not a movement
depending on any one individual. This is
significant.50
The now deceased Mexicanist stated further that Morones and 18
others got together 10 or 15 years earlier and
crisis,even at the

through every

death of Obregon when it seemed as

if every

individual of any importance in the trade union movement would
he destroyed, when every pressure was exerted upon them to turn
against the movement and force for themselves a place of prestige,
that "not a single one turned traitor to the group."
opined:

He then

"If Mr. Morones were to die or he killed, the CROM as

such would go on.

This group has left behind an institution

much larger and more enduring than any of the individuals involved.
Subsequent events proved the astute observer's analysis to he
basically correct.

FEDERAL LABOR LAW OF 1931
Article 123 of the Constitution, the expression of labor
ideals, was framed in general terms and required an elaborate code
for its concrete application.

The federal government increased

its legal control over the labor movement with the passage of the
Federal Labor Law in August, 1931j when all the labor legislation

50
Frank Tannenbaum, "Significance of the Mexican Trade Union
Movement," in The Genius of Mexico, ed. Hubert C. Herring and
Katherine Terrill (New York, 1931), 186.

53Tbid.
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that had teen enacted by the various states was rescinded by the
promulgation of this national code for labor.

The legislation

defined the rights and obligations of labor and management in
collective bargaining, aspects of labor contracts, and regularized
relations between management and labor.

52

No Mexican worker, could

be fired or laid off without "just cause."

The worker was con

sidered the owner of his job and compensation must be paid if it
was taken from him.
Morones opposed the new code whose purpose, he claimed, was
"to restrict labor’s rights and attract foreign capital to Mexico."
Speaking before the Union de Empleados de Restaurants y Similares
in Orizaba, Morones alleged that it was evidence of its authors'
incapacity and incomprehension of the situation of fifteen million
Mexicans "feeling the grasp of misery."

To regulate Article 123

in this method was a "backward step, unpatriotic, antirevolutionary,
and beneficial to the patron class and capitalists.

The government

did not realize that the laborers during the depression were dis
satisfied, but reasoned that the agitation was only due to leaders
who wanted to take advantage of the situation and seek the limelight
"they are not dealing with Morones but with a social class."

He

denied that CROM was an element causing confusion and disorder and

^‘TJnited States Department of Labor, Labor Legislation of
Mexico, Bulletin No. 569 of the Foreign Labor Laws Series
(Washington, 1 9 3 2 ), 566-579 contains a sketch of the provisions.
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vaguely urged that '"by using cooperation and discipline, triumph
will he ours."^3
As the world depression engulfed Mexico in the early 1930's,
the masses demanded their right to strike which had been curtailed
by Morones and Calles.

Abelardo Rodriguez as Minister of Industry,

Commerce, and Labor, urged workers not to strike in 1932.

Realizing

that he had to discover fresh arguments to prevent strikes, he
abandoned Morones' worn-out contention that because union leaders
held government posts the interests of the working class were pro
tected without strikes:
...it is logical to infer that the strikes
in communications services are bound to increase
our ills considerably, because the distribution
of products will be upset, raising the prices
of transportation sometimes to a prohibitory
level. Then...the rate of unemployment will
increase, because the...communications are
restricted, the small businessman, the indus
trialist, the farmer, and so on, will paralyze
their enterprises and many will remain jobless
who at present fin£ in these activities their
daily sustenance.5^
Neither Ortiz Rubio, who left office without finishing his term,
nor General Abelardo Rodriguez wfcio succeeded him, did much for the
labor movement during their presidencies, and Morones' power con
tinued to wane.

^3 C.R.O.M., May 15, 1931, 31-36.

5k
,
Abelardo Rodriguez in El Nacional, July 7, 1932.
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"CROM WILL BOUNCE BACK"
Before tlie twelfth anniversary meeting of the founding of the
P.L.M. held in January, 1932, Morones refuted the charge that after
four years of "CROM persecution" the Labor Party was inactive.

What

appeared inertia, he continued, was an avoidance of "ostentatious
movements" -which would hurt the P.L.M.

He then warned that "it will

he no small surprise to P.L.M. enemies to see how CROM will bounce
back."

Later that year, the Labor Party attempted a resumption of

political activity by running candidates for the Chamber of Deputies.
Morones was permitted a vote of only seventy-eight in his district,
which made excellent propaganda against CROM.

So thoroughly did

the P.N.R. control the election that every pro-CROM vote cast was
done at the risk of physical injury.

55

INCARCERATION
Morones* criticism of the authorities and his various actions
brought him to jail only twice; both times were for brief periods.
After attending the Convention of the Syndicates of Workers and
Campesinos of the State of Puebla, Morones visited Colima,
Manzanillo, and Guadalajara before proceeding to Mazatlan where a
meeting of cromistas was to be held.

The l6 th of August he left

for Los Mochis, Sinaloa to investigate a labor conflict in the
United Sugar Companies.

Around midnight of August 17, 1932, Jacobo

Holguin, Chief of Police of Los Mochis, arrested Morones for "spreading

55
Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 146-1^7.
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subversive propaganda," specifically for supposed attacks on the
army and government of the State of Sinaloa.

This action

followed Morones' speech that night in which he had energetically
condemned United Sugar Companies * policies.
According to CROM headquarters, "many” accompanied Morones
to the jail desiring to he detained with him, and "crowds" of
synpathizers spent two days and nights outside the municipal jail
protesting the "unjust" arrest of their incarcerated chief.

Arobal

Ocaya Payan, a CROM lawyer in Mexico City, flew to Morones 1 aid on
the 19 th.

That night Morones was released, and wired CROM offices

in the capital that he had "energetically and clearly answered
numerous accusations before the Ministerio Publico y Procurador de
Justicia.

57

During his brief stay in Hermosillo, Morones discussed

labor problems in general, and cromista difficulties in particular
with the state governor.

He completed his tour speaking in Mexicali,

Tecate, Tijuana, and Ciudad Juarez on August 28.

He returned to

Mexico City, where "fireworks" began within CROM in September.

CROM SPLITS OP 1932
The heterogenity of memberships that produces conflict in
organizations is particularly striking in labor movements.

It

produces lines of cleavage around which struggles often rage with
large degrees of intensity.

In 1932, two new splits proved CROM's

^C.R.O.M. Memoria, 1928-1932, 558; New York Times, August 20,
21, 1932.
57"La comision de la C.R.O.M. que encabeza el companero Luis N.
Morones llego a la Ciudad de Mexico, despues de un resonado triunfo,"
C.R.O.M., September 15, 1932, *+7; C.R.O.M. Memoria, 1928-1932, 558.
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coalition unworkable.

Alfredo Perez Medina had been a CROM "problem

child" for a long time.

Members of the Grupo Accion claim Obregon

had earlier offered him a "considerable sum" to withdraw the Federal
Districts unions from CROM.

In December, 1931, the Grupo Accion

tried one last desperate expedient to rid themselves of Perez
Medina, but to retain control of these unions.

They finally ex

pelled Perez Medina on flimsy charges CROM had passed a motion in
December, 1928 that all its members must withdraw from government
administrative positions, and Perez Medina had continued his position
in the Executive Council of the Rational Bank until December, 1931
without protest.

The official reasons for the expulsion were his

"abusing" his position of secretary general of the Federacion de
Sindicatos Obreros del Distrito Federal and for his "having been
converted into an agent of capitalism."

58

The true explanation was

that the Grupo Accion had long been eager to drive Perez Medina
from CROM, but hoped to do so without subsequent loss of membership.
When he refused to recognize the sentence of suspension, CROM
expelled him, and with him went almost every important CROM union
in the Federal District.
Instead of Perez Medina and his followers admitting they were
outside of CROM, on the contrary, they claimed they were the CROM
in the Federal District.

Previous to this occurrence, Morones'

CROM had been content with a modest sign on its offices at Calle

crQ

"Discurso del companero Luis N. Morones pronunciado en el
Teatro Lirico de la Ciudad de Mexico," C.R.O.M., May 15, 1933, 28.
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Republica de Cuba #60.

No sooner was the separation accomplished

than a huge painted canvas sign was hung, announcing "C.R.O.M."
59
to he replaced by an electric sign of the same nature. ^
The other important secession in 1932 was led by Vicente
Lombardo Toledano, a relatively important leader of CROM since his
entrance.

In 1928, Lombardo had unsuccessfully proposed the dis

solution of the P.L.M., the corrupted political arm of CROM.

In

March, 1932, Morones returned from a trip to Europe and CROM held
a big public meeting to receive him.

To his surprise, Morones was

greeted by boos, hisses, and shouts of derision from the hostile
Lombardo Toledano faction.

Partly as a result of this incident

there was ill-feeling between the two leaders.

Lombardo planned

to take over CROM in its next convention to be held in late 1932,
but was defeated in the election for secretary general.

In

September, 1932, Lombardo was the principal speaker at a workers’
conference and launched a sizzling attack against the army.
Following him on the platform, Morones repudiated Lombardo's remarks
concerning the military, accused him of propagating foreign ideas,
6o
and of betraying the Revolution.
Toledano, having his policies
publicly repudiated, resigned from CROM's central committee the
next day on tactical and ideological grounds.

The following is

a segment of Lombardo's letter of resignation:

^Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 262-268.
go
^
^
Lombardo Toledano, Teoria y praetica, 6 3 .
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Companero Morones is against the ideology that
I have sustained because he thinks it is a
radical one and harmful to the labor organiza
tion. He has stated that the organization
cannot maintain an advanced doctrinary program
nor establish itself as a permanent censor of
the state and its government and, at the same
time, call upon the government to solve its
problems, as I have been constantly doing. He
has stated that the labor organization cannot
hope for its salvation as a social class but
instead must work for the improvement of
living conditions of all social classes, and
that one must not dream of utopias like inter
nationalism.
These assertions, among others, were made
as a criticism of my speech, and the manner in
which they were emphasized suggests, according
to my interpretations...that my presence in the
CROM is a hindrance to Companero Morones in his
present dealings with the government, which
consist of, in his own words, offering anew
his cooperation to the government....
I am an enemy of the bourgeois regime and
often I am against the government, yet I have
friends among government officials, and I make
appointments with all of them to ask for strict
observance of the law and for the protection of
the working class...
I will thus continue being a radical
Marxist, even though not a Communist....1 will
continue being an internationalist and shall
fight against a chauvinistic nationalism and in
sum will continue fighting for the advent of a
better life, having liquidated first the current
bourgeois system.6l
Not only was this resignation accepted, but CROM leadership
expelled him from the labor organization.
Lombardo’s expulsion robbed CROM of one of its more forceful
and dynamic spokesmen.

By capturing some of the old CROM unions

Leafar Agetro, Las luchas proletarias de Veracruz (Jalapa,
19^2), 197-200 in James W. Wilkie and Albert L. Michaels, eds.;
Revolution in Mexico: Years of Upheaval, 1910-19^0 (New York, 1969)5
18 U-I8 5 .
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and by organizing new ones, Lombardo created the C.G.O.C.M. or
Confederacion General de Obreros y Campesinos. A number of his
associates, who had received their training under Morones, were
still open to bribery; but the new organization was considerably
superior to CROM in both honesty and in theoretical foundation.
CROM's influence dwindled to controlling the textile industry in
Puebla and Veracruz, an area where workers had a longer tradeunion tradition, especially with CROM.

As a result of the 1932

secessions, the Mexican labor movement of the early 1930’s was
factionalized.

COMPARISON OF LOMBARDO TOLEDANO AND MORONES
Lombardo Toledano was a contrast to Morones.

Morones was a

laborer risen from the ranks, Lombardo came from a background of
wealth and privilege; Morones was a man of action with little
formal education and a limited intelligence; Lombardo was an
intellectual from the -universities and an author with a broad
philosophical background who wrote from a knowledge of theory, laws,
and ethics; Morones was fat, gross, and ostentatious; Lombardo was
thin, rather short and reserved; Morones put primary emphasis on
building labor unions as political weapons; Lombardo thought
economic weapons were more important; Morones formed his own
political party, Lombardo did not; Morones told the workers to put
national development before social gain; Lombardo rejected this
priority and admonished the workers to fight for present improvement.
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Both, were fiery speakers and ambitious men.

According to one Cuban labor lawyer, Lombardo "era un
orador de primer orden." Fernnn Humberto Arrieta, interview,
Hattiesburg, Mississippi, November l4, 1970. Dr. Arrieta beard
Lombardo address a meeting of the Cuban Federation of Workers
in Havana in the 19^0's.
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CHAPTER I X

MOSQUES' DECLINE UNDER CARDENAS, I93 U-UO

By 1933 s Mexico was tired of callismo.

Catholics were

desperate; campesinos feared they would never own the land that
had been promised them, and workers were chafing under Morones'
diminishing labor dictatorship and his moratorium on strikes.

On

Calles' advice, the P.N.R. convention adopted the Six-Year Plan
as its platform.

The plan was designed to advance the proletarian

cause, solve the agrarian problem, reorganize the national economy,
conduct a vast system of public works, and install better education
in the schools.

General Lazaro Cardenas was selected to sell this

fantastic piece of demagogy to the Mexican people.
The P.L.M. celebrated its eighth convention in the Capitolio
Theater in Mexico City, June 9 ~ H > 1930*

Following Morones' and

Celestino Gasca's farcical nomination as the party's presidential
candidates, Morones stated it was an "inopportune time" to launch
a Laborite's candidacy.

Other nominees were Cardenas of Michoacan,

and Colonel Adalberto Tejeda, ex-governor of Veracruz.

Numerous

delegates were from Veracruz and there was much enthusiasm for the
veracruzano until cromista Sabino Calderon delivered a sensational
speech accusing Tejeda and Lombardo of having sought to use the
P.L.M. and CROM for personal ends; and censured Tejeda for "having
served capitalist classes when he occupied high office."

Cardenas

then won the nomination 765 “22.

191
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Cardenas, invited "by Morones, addressed the convention.

Two

months later Cardenas was invited to attend another P.L.M. rally on
September 29-

Morones, addressing the group in Orizaba's Llave

Theater, informed the presidential aspirant that "We have always
considered you, Mr. Cardenas as a sincere and sane element, a
promise, a new hope."'*'

Cardenas, in his acceptance speech, stated

he would revamp the economy so that Mexico would have a new orien
tation to benefit the working class.
Cardenas was a dark horse who had fought in the revolutionary
ranks and as governor of Michoacan had earned a reputation for
building schools and enforcing the land laws.

Calles was careful

not to allow him too much latitude and Cardenas ’ first cabinet was
filled with callistas in key positions.

When Cardenas was inaugurated

on December 1, 193^» be realized that he was considered as Calles'
instrument, and immediately set out to create a personality for
himself independent of Calles.

He believed in the P.R.R. program

of paper promises and immediately began giving Mexicans some of
the things which Calles had only promised them.

To attract the

peons, Cardenas offered land, not only to the villages in the form
of e.iidos, the former practice of the Revolution, but to individuals
as well.

He carried on a well-planned campaign to gain the army's

confidence, placing military chieftains loyal to him in command of
strategic zones.

'*'"Velada en honor del Gral, de Div. Lazaro Cardenas candidato
del Partido Laborista Mexicano, efectuada en al Teatro Llave de
Orizaba, Ver., patrocinada por el Partido Veracruzano del Trabajo,"
C.R.O.M., supplement no. 225, 21.
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CARDENAS' LABOR POLICY
Cardenas was clever enough to win the loyalty of the peasants,
army, and workers.

To attract this last group, he encouraged

organization and strikes.

Labor renewed its militancy and the

1930's became turbulent years for Mexico as strikes began through
out the country.

In 1930 there were fifteen involving approximately

If, 000 workers, in 193 ^ the strike total rose to 202 involving
li+,685 workers, and by 1935 there were 6b2 strikes.

2

With his advent to power, Cardenas became interested in
unifying the labor movement which had been splintered earlier.

At

first skeptical of Cardenas because he was the hand-picked candidate
of Calles' oligarchy, the Lombardo Toledano unions rallied to
Cardenas' support when he broke with Calles.

Lombardo began nego

tiations with other labor leaders to merge into a single powerful
confederation to fill the vacuum created by CROM's fall.

The

founding meeting of the new labor organization was held in Mexico
City and all existing major labor groups, except Morones' CROM,
sent delegates.

The Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico

(C.T.M.— Confederation of Mexican Workers) emerged from this
conference.

C.T.M. had a class struggle orientation, its original

motto was "For a society without classes."

Although Lombardo held

no governmental position, he ran a bigger, smoother-working monopoly

^Secretarxa de la Economfa Nacional, Anuario estadxstico de los
Estados Mexicanos, 19^-0 (Mexico, D.F. 19^-0), 376. After the election
of 193^, CROM tried to persuade the new president of its good inten
tions and at the same time convince bim of the "sinister" character
of its principal enemy, Lombardo Toledano.
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than did Morones.

The C.T.M. was favored with grants of money,

guarantees of union activity, and persecution of its enemies —
these were favors and obstacles which Morones could not overcome.
Cardenas accelerated his attacks on Calles and Morones by encouraging
all anti-CROM labor elements, including communists, to seek political
shelter under the P.N.R. roof.

Larger in size and political power

than when Morones and Calles were "siamese twins,” the C.T.M.
became one of Cardenas' pillars of support.

Although Cardenas

supported the C.T.M., conditions were never convenient to crush
CROM as' well as some other unions and state federations which
remained outside the C.T.M.

Thus, in the case of CROM at an

earlier date, the ideal of a single confederation acting as a
spokesman for the whole labor movement was not realized in spite
of overt government support.

The story of labor in the late 1930's

was essentially the story of C.T.M. expansion.
One notes a change in Lombardo's tactics.

From 1923 to 1932

when he was in CROM he maintained a strict trade-unionist point of
view, insisting that the labor unions should function primarily as
economic organizations for defense of their rights against employers.
Following his break with Morones who disagreed with this viewpoint
and before the formation of the C.T.M., Lombardo moved toward a
position in which he considered the role of trade unions being
political as well as economic.
Morones selected Lombardo and other opposition leaders as his
"whipping boys" and often lashed out at them during CROM meetings.
Frequent targets were the "Five Little Wolves" who deserted Morones
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in the 1930's and ultimately monopolized the top C.T.M. offices:
Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Fidel Velazquez, Fernando Amilpa, Alfonso
Sanchez Madariaga, and Jesus Yuren.
Labor questions became increasingly complex —

characterized

by conflicts between employers and employees and bitter feuds
between rival groups of labor.
CROM rapidly became hostile.

Relations between the C.T.M. and
In 1935 and 1936, seventy-two workers

were murdered in inter-union wars in the Atlixco textile region.
Soon after the June, 1935 crisis between Calles and Cardenas,
cromistas renewed their attacks with riots, train wrecks, and other
violent disturbances of the peace.
In July, 1935, Morones journeyed to Washington to confer with
A.F.L. leaders.

He went to obtain future cooperation between CROM

andtheA.F.L.; this, he believed, was the remedy for exploitation
of Mexican workers in the United States.

He said in English, with

a heavy Spanish accent, "every Mexican insufficiently paid in the
Southwest or West signifies a U.S. citizen insufficiently paid or
O
idle."
He spent the major part of July 6 with Harvey Flemming,
President of the International Association of Workers of Oilfields,
Wells, Gas and Refineries.

On July 12, Morones made a brief speech

praising Gompers for his cooperation lent to Latin America and laid
a floral offering at his statue at the intersection of 10th Street
and Massachusetts Avenue.

•3

John P. Frey, Santiago Iglesias, William

^C.R.O.M., August 1, 1935> 31*
English.

Morones very seldom spoke xn
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Green, Frank Morrison, Philip Murray, and John L. Lewis, President of
the Miner’s Union were a few of the A.F;L. officials there with
Morones.**
Morones, who was in the United States, was not encouraged to
attend the twelfth CROM convention July 23-26, 1935.

With the

disintegration of Calles ’ political machine in Mexico, the prestige
of his henchman, Morones, fell considerably in labor circles, and
even within his own CROM.

It is not surprising, therefore, that

this convention gave only a luke-warm response to Morones' San
Antonio telegram which "hinted" for a welcoming gesture from the
Grupo Accion

that he end his trip in the American republic.

Relations between Calles and Cardenas worsened.

On Calles'

instructions, Morones organized CROM strikes in Veracruz, Tlaxcala,
and Puebla against "communist activities," a term used by leading
cromistas in reference to the labor agitation permitted by Cardenas.
The growing uneasiness increased a few days later on Friday,
December 13, 1935j when a tri-motor plane returning from Los
Angeles landed at Mexico City's Balbuena Airport.

The aircraft

which brought Morones and Calles, who had stayed a few months in
Los Angeles "for health purposes," had stopped at Hermosillo,
Mazatlan, and Guadalajara, but neither had left the plane.
edly they had returned to Mexico.

Unexpect

Those who welcomed Calles as he

followed Morones out of the plane included Senator Manuel Riva

4

Ibid.
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Palacio (Mexico), Senator Bernardo Bandala (Puebla), Senator
Francisco L. Terminel (Sonora), Rodolfo Elias Calles, Juan de Dios
Bojorquez, Bartolome Vargas Lugo, Ricardo Trevino (CROM secretary
general), Jose Lopez Cortes, General Manuel Medinaveytia (Chief
of Operations in the Valley of Mexico), and General Alejandro Mange.^
A car took Calles, Morones, Mange, and Fernando Torreblanca
to Calles' residence -where the ex-president was greeted by old
friends, among whom were General Jose Maria Tap£a and General
Joaquin Amaro, Director of the Military College.

At first it

appeared that Calles had nothing to say except that he had returned
"to reside definitely in his country."

Later that evening he issued

a strongly worded press statement which said that he had come to
defend the callista regime from the slanders of which he had been
the "victim" for the past six months.
Calles' arrival, accompanied by Morones, aroused a storm of
protest.

Illustrative of this uneasiness were the 80,000 workers

who paraded before the National Palace on December 22 demanding
expulsion.
day.

"Out with Calles and Morones" was the keynote of the

In the halls of the Senate, students agitated against their

presence in the country.

Portes Gil publicly declared, "I consider

that the gravest error Calles has committed in his life is to have
returned and above all accompanied by Luis N. Morones."

^Portes Gil, Autobiografia de la Revolucion Mexicana, 701;
Eduardo J. Correa, El balance del cardenismo (Mejico, D.F., 19^1), 97.
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The political teapot began to boil more furiously than ever
in the four months following Calles * and Morones * return.

The

situation assumed graver overtones when all officials who had
welcomed Calles found themselves out of office.

Senators Riva

Palacio, Terminel, Bandala, Elfas Perez Gomez (Morelos), and
Cristobal Bustamente (Sinaloa); ten members of the Chamber of
Deputies, and the governors of Sonora (Ramon Ramos), Sinaloa
(Manuel Paez), Guanajuato (Jesus Yanez Maya), and Durango (Carlos
Real), were expelled for "treason to the revolutionary program and
■7
conspiring against the country's institutions."

CACHE OF ARMS
On December 18, the Mexican Senate convened as a grand jury
and indicted Morones for sedition and incitement to rebellion.
Mexico City seethed with excitement and two days later the public
was treated to another sensation when the Chief of Police announced
the discovery of a cache of aims, machine guns, rifles, and ammuni
tion in two of Morones' houses on December 20.

At midnight, a

policeman had noticed two men carrying large suitcases in the street.
The late hour and the location made him suspicious of their actions.
The officer halted the pair, forced them to open the luggage bearing
the initials "L.M." and found four machine guns and ammunition.

Upon

being arrested, the men claimed they were "offered 50 pesos each for
carrying the bags two blocks by a man who said he was a member of

Ibid., December 15, 1935; The Times (London), December 20,
1935; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 6 6 1 .
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the army."

Both men were from Orizaba, and police found each had

a return ticket to that Veracruz town.

Entering two of Morones'

properties, the Chief of Police discovered nine Thompson machine
g
guns, approximately sixty 3 0 -3 0 mausers, and 1 3 ,0 0 0 cartridges.
Morones was summoned by the authorities, but waited almost
a week to respond to their call.

On Christmas Eve, Morones appeared

before the Attorney General accompanied by Reynaldo Cervantes
Torres and Anxbal Ocana Payan, the same lawyer who had aided him
in Los Mochis three years earlier.

Explaining his position,

Morones testified that the arms and ammunition had been there
since 1923 and were acquired with Obregon's permission.

These

were to be used to arm laborers during the de la Huerta rebellion.
His evidence consisted of documents revealing that the weapons
were acquired by the Mexican Consul in New York with the official

9
authorization and intervention of the Secretary of War and Navy.
Morones asserted it was impossible that one person constitute "a
rebellion" and "it is infantile to believe we are going to start a
revolution with such old and inservicable arms."
Morones' testimony left many questions unanswered.

He alleged

that the arms were to be used for self-defense against the "imminent

8

*

El Excelsior, December 21, 1935; New York Times, December 21,
1935; photograph in La Prensa photo archives.
%EL_ Excelsior, December 25, 1935; El Universal, December 25,
1935; Hew York Times. December 27, 1935; Casasola, Historia grafica
de la Revolucion Mexicana, III, 2202; "El c. Luis N. Morones, explica
el origen de las armas que se ehcontraron en su poder," „C.R.Q.M.,
supplement no. 273 3 28; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 66 b.
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invasion” of Lombardo-communists •who were going to assault "various
CROM offices and buildings."

He further stated that neither Calles

nor other cromistas knew of the weapons.1^

If Morones was expecting

an "invasion" why would he wish to conceal the possession of the
weapons from the persons and property he wished to defend?

Further

more, how effective would "old and inservicable" weapons be to repel
invading armed cetemistas?

The January 1» 1936 issue of C.R.O.M.

availed itself of the opportunity to declare its organization had
helped boost Cardenas to power, and had never opposed any of his
principles.

EXPULSION OF CELESTINO GASCA
The CROM national council met in early January to treat matters
pertinent to CROM.

One important item on the agenda was the organ's

constituting itself as a grand jury to hear Celestino Gasca defend
comments he had published in El Dia on December 29, 1935-

Following

Gasca's 3i> hour defense, he was found guilty and expelled from CROM.
Allegedly he was ejected because the charges he made against Morones
and the central committee were "inopportune, anti-syndical, and
pernicious for CROM ." 11

The "Old Guard" continued to disintegrate.

1<^For additional information of the arms incident see: New York
Times, December 21, 25, 27, 1935; Josephus Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve
Diplomat (Chapel Hill, 19 U 7 ), 62, and Casasola, Historia grafica de
la Revolucion Mexicana, III, 2202.
^ " E l c. Celestino Gasca expulsado de la C.R.O.M.."
January 15, 1936, 9*

C.R.QiM.,
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"CRIME WITHOUT PRECEDENT"
In April, 1936, the people of the State of Veracruz were
agitated.

For one reason a gubernatorial election campaign was

in progress in which early prominent candidates were Colonel Eduardo
Hernandez Chazaro, the former secretary of President Ortiz Rubio;
and Deputy Manlio Fabio Altamirano, a former manager of the P.N.R.'s
El Nacional. This campaign saw the assassination of Altamirano in
June, and in August, the election of Licenciado Miguel Aleman who
became a strong candidate late in the campaign after the slaying.
Veracruz in April was also the scene of conflicts between Morones'
CROM and Lombardo's recently-founded C.T.M.

At Orizaba, CROM called

-

a strike which President Cardenas declared to be unjustified.

12

The Veracruz incidents were further complicated in April,
when the British-operated Ferrocarril Mexicano's night train from
the port of Veracruz to Mexico City took on an oil-burning locomotive
at Paseo del Macho and began to wind its way through the rugged
uplands toward the capital.

At 9:10 P.M., when the train had

rumbled half way across Paso Grande Bridge two hours out of
Veracruz, a dynamite explosion slapped the locomotive and tender
against the bank of a forty foot ravine and hurled two sleeping
cars to the ravine's bottom.

I*

The other coaches, which had not

reached the trestle remained on the rails, but the wreckage was

12 E1 Universal, April 8 , 1936; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico,

67^ - 675.
•^ E l Universal, April 7, 1936; El Excelsior, April 7, 1936;
The Times (London), April 8 , 1936; "Bomb at Bridge," Time, April 20,

1936, 66.
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engulfed "by the flames which hurst forth from the oil tank car.
Thirteen persons died and eighteen were injured in this "crime
without precedent."

lU

Government investigators discovered two

hundred yards of double wire leading from the bridge to a detonator,
and several passengers testified they had heard a rifle shot,
"obviously" a signal to detonate the dynamite, before the explosion.^
Calles' and Cardenas' problems apparently came to a head with
this startling incident since a contingent of Cardenas' politicians
were passengers on the sabotaged train.

Thus, one motive was

furnished by the presence on the trains of politicians among whom
were the three candidates of the P.N.R. in the primary elections for
the governorship of Veracruz held the previous week.

These were

Colonel Eduardo Hernandez Chazaro, Ochoa Zamudio, and Guillermo
Padilla.

Hernandez Chazaro spoke with Cardenas about the event,

and was convinced that his own enemies had done the bombing.
Despite the fact that there was a large amount of money aboard the
express car, government officials disregarded robbery as a pretext.
For example, Senator Ernesto Soto F.eyes, President of the Left Wing
bloc in the Senate, denied that robbery was the motive, and declared
"the outrage of dynamiting was the work of some politicians."

This

was part of an. accusation issued on April 9s 1936 by the Left Wing in

^ El Universal, April 8 , 1936.
•^Ibld.
El Excelsior, April 10, 1936.
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connection -with the Paso Grande dynamiting:

"It concerns a diabolic

maneuver by a political sector recently displaced from the Administration."

17

This assertion cast doubt on Calles and discredited Morones

and other cromistas ■who were suspected of having masterminded the
catastrophe.

The C.T.M. also issued a strong protest, accusing

various individuals of trying to cause uneasiness and strife:
The reactionary elements, the most intransigent
capitans of the bourgeois, politicians already
liquidated before history, and a group of dis
honest labor leaders have in recent weeks
increased their counter-revolutionary work and
have sought to cause various sorts of upsets in
the normal progress of the country. 18
Despite various allegations of Morones* guilt, no concrete evidence
substantiated these charges.

On the same day that the Left Wing

announced its censure, Police Chief Vicente Gonzalez, complying with
orders "from the top," instructed Lorenzo Diaz Gongalez, acting head
of the Safety Commission, to place Calles, Morones, Luis Leon, and
Melehor Ortega under guard.

Suspected of complicity in the crime,

they were to be thrown out of the country.
the comment:

19

One historian made

"All great men have had in their hour of decline some

fEl Universal, April 10, 1936; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico,
675* One member of the Left Wing was Damaso Cardenas, brother of
the Mexican president.
18
Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 675*
19
Ibid. Morones* widow, son, and personal secretary assert
that Morones was not involved in the tragedy. Emilio Portes Gil,
Alfonso Sanchez Madariaga, and Agustin Zapata Casasola in their
interviews declared that any claim that Morones was the intellectual
author of the railway disaster is pure hearsay and cannot be proven.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

205
weakness, disease, or fault.
Morones.

Napoleon had cancer.

Calles had

.,20

EXILED

The Mexican Chief Executive publicly demonstrated his political
independence that same week when he forcibly exiled the "iron man"
who had governed Mexico as unofficial dictator since 1924.
process was rapid and secret.

The

One day the "Supreme Chief of the

Revolution" and his former strong-arm man, Morones, found themselves
unceremoniously dumped across the U.S. border.

Calles' forced exit

demonstrated graphicly to anyone who might need further convincing
that President Cardenas was master of the political situation.
Unequivocally, but peacefully, Cardenas proved his political inde
pendence and supremacy.
The surprise began when General Rafael Navarro, Chief of
Operations in the Valley of Mexico, accompanied by twenty soldiers
of the Nineteenth Infantry Regiment and eight policemen went to
Calles* home at midnight of April 9» 1936.

The ex-president was

in his bedroom reading Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf when the authorities
entered.

Calmly Calles stated, "At your orders, gentlemen."

"By

orders of the President you are arrested," Navarro replied solemnly,
"and will leave the country at 7:00 A.M."

Calles removed the bed

covers, put on his slippers, stood, and stated:

20

*

"I am your prisoner.

*

Blanco Moheno, Cronica de la Revolucion Mexicana, III, 11.
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I have no forces at my command nor do I need them.
on the airplane or "before a firing squad."

You may put me

21

Earlier that day Morones was apprehended at 2:00 P.M. when
he arrived at his residence on Avenida Insurgentes -where his car
was "curbed" by a detective.

After being informed that Police Chief

Gongalez wished to speak with him and that he must leave his vehicle
to ride in the detective’s, Morones turned pale.
the "last ride" passed through Morones’ mind.

Perhaps visions of

Upon surrendering the

small "Star" pistol which he carried in his coat pocket, Morones gave
the officer a 50 peso bill as a mordida (bribe) requesting that CROM
offices and his wife be informed.

Attempting a bit of psychology

Morones confided, "No one will know I offered you the money."

22

The detective refused the bribe, but accepted the weapon.
Morones protested his arrest and detention at Police Head
quarters.

He was taken to a cell in the Sixth Commissariat, but

objected stating he was no bandit and was undeserving of such "a
sinister place."

He spent a sleepless night, frequently knocking at

the metal door with the hope of easing his predicament.
General Rafael Melchor Ortega, ex-governor of Guanajuato, was
arrested in Tehuacan, Puebla.

Like Morones he was disarmed and

placed in a Sixth Commissariat cell.

p~]

^

^

Carlos Alvear Acevedo, Lazaro Cardenas:
(Mexico, 3.P., 196l),131.

el hombre y el mito

^^El Universal, April 11, 1936; El Excelsior, April 11, 1936;
Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 677.
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Luis Leon, Calles' ex-minister of Agriculture, was arrested
at 6:00 P.M. after leaving his palatial home in Chapultepec Heights.
Leon's detention, like that of the others, was secret, rapid, and
accomplished without difficulty.

23

The following morning Calles was taken to Balbuena Airport
■where to his surprise he found Morones, Leon, and Melchor Ortega
who had teen conveyed from their cells at 6:00 A.M.

2h

The 5o year-

old Calles was silent during the boarding procedure, and the forced
departure from Mexico occurred on Good Friday in a trimotor plane
of the Mexican Airlines.

During refueling in Tampico, the exiles

merely looked out the windows and were forbidden to leave the
aircraft.
Josephus Daniels, the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City, received
a telephone call at 8:30 A.M. from Eduardo Hay, Mexican Minister
of Foreign Relations, stating apologetically that an airplane
containing Calles and others was bound for Brownsville.

The

exiles, Hay explained, "Had not had time" to obtain a visa.

Could

the Ambassador arrange for the Calles party to enter the U.S. as
political refugees?

Daniels telephoned Washington, and arrangements

were made for the ex-president and his cronies to land in the south
Texas town "as visitors to the U.S."

25

They arrived at Brownsville

at 1:50 P.M. and were "escorted" across the bridge by six heavily

2k

El Universal, April 11, 1 9 3 6 .

25

Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat, 6 3 ; El Universal, April 12,
1956; Townshend, Lazaro Cardenas, 136; Johnson, Heroic Mexico, b l6 .
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armed officers.

All were fortunate in their punishment; the

earlier fate of losers in Mexican politics had been lengthy
/

imprisonment or death.
In Brownsville,General Calles was asked by a New York Times
correspondent the reasons for his expulsion from Mexico.

The

following is part of a dispatch attributing the ejection to his
opposition against communism.

He and his three companions signed

it:
General Calles states that the only responsibility
for this situation lies with the government itself,
which, for more than a year, has been developing a
demogogic policy and has been attempting to implant
communism. We have done all in our power as citizens
to combat this tendency without violating the law.
The expulsion of the labor leader Morones is
due to the wish of the government to destroy the
Regional Confederation of Labor (CROM) ■which does
not wish to capitulate to the Communist labor organiza
tion that supports the government and is headed by
Lombardo Toledano.
The desire of the government, whatever declarations
it may make to the contrary, is to socialize the machin
ery of production, disregarding the private property
rights that guarantee our institutions, and to establish
a collective system in agriculture similar to the Russian
system.
We repudiate communism, as we consider it not
adaptable to our country and because the Mexican
people refuse to accept it.^7
President Cardenas justified the deportation by declaring that
the conditions of the country demanded it.

In response to Calles'

statement, Cardenas issued a manifesto which was widely circulated
to his startled nation the following day:

26
El Universal, April 11, 1936; El Excelsior, April 11, 1936.
^ N e w York Times, April 11, 1936.
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I desire to depart from the lamentable precedents
■which exist in the history of our bitter political
struggles and in -which frequently little value has
been placed on the principle of respect for human
life. Therefore I consider the circumstances
demanded, as. imperative for the public welfare,
the immediate departure from national territory of
General Plutarco Elias Calles...Luis Morones...Luis
Leon. ..and General Rafael Melchor Ortega.28
At one blow, Calles, leader of the consertative revolution, and
Morones, c h i e f t a i n o f the CROM corporations of syndicates of
Mexican labor and the major remaining barrier to Lombardo's
ambition to rule as undisputed dictator, were removed.
The plane left Brownsville, stopped in San Antonio, then left
for D a lla s where Calles spent Friday night with his entourage.

In

San Antonio Calles stated,"...! had nothing to do with the bombing
of the Veracruz train.

If the government had thought so they would

have executed me, not exiled me."

29

Calles was met at Los Angeles

by his son-in-law, Fernando Torreblanca.

Morones, the CROM leader

w h o had been instrumental in shaping labor policy for Obregon and

Calles, went to San Diego with Melchor Ortega where he spent a short
time before leaving for New York City.

Morones' organization asserted

that the government deported him without previous investigations of
the train derailing and without clarifying the true public responsibility of the incident.

30

pQ
El Universal, April 12, 1936.
^"Mexico:

solution without blood," Time, April 20, 1936, 25.

^°"Reparacion justiciera, " C.R.O.M., April 1, 1937, 5*
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Calles' son-in-law called Senora Morones telling her of her
husband's presence in California.

Several weeks later she and

Luis Enrique joined Morones in New York City.
funds his family sent him during his exile.

31

Morones lived from
According to his son,

Morones lived on Riverside Drive in Manhattan, and met expenses by
mortgaging one of their Mexican homes and selling various possessions
such as furniture and rugs.
Although Morones spoke and understood very little English
he was very interested in daily activities of American life.

He

was an ardent New York Yankee fan and attended many of their home
games, ate hotdogs (more than hamburgers), and enjoyed riding the
roller coaster at Coney Island.

A man of varied interests,Morones

could enjoy watching sports one day then attend the Metropolitan
oo
Opera the next.'’
Daily activities, however, were not merely confined to hotdogs
and the New York Yankees.

Morones participated in A.F.L. matters.

Two weeks after Morones’ expulsion from Mexico he conferred with
William Green and presented a report on the "serious conditions" of
Mexican affairs.

According to Green, "Brother Morones was expelled

from Mexico and driven into exile.

He was not accorded a trial by

a jury of his peers nor was he permitted to face his accusers."

Green

continued, alleging that "Thirty-nine leaders of the Mexican Federation

Jose Petrieioli, interview, Mexico City, June 25, 19 6 8 ;
Berta Pena Yiuda de Morones, interview, Mexico City, August 2 b ,

1968.

32Luis Enrique Morones Pe’Ba, interview, Mexico City, August 2 b ,

1968.
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are in prison there, not because they committed crimes against the
government but simply because they are known to be labor leaders."
The A.F.L. president ended by saying, "All of this is shocking to
the sense of justice and fair play so universally held by the officers
and members of organized labor in the United States."

This naive

statement reveals that Green knew little of previous Mexican history
and "Mexican justice."
Mexico?

Could American "fair play" be applied in

Green had a simple and uncritical criterion for accepting

Morones' report as official and unbiased.

The gullible president's

reasoning was why should he not accept Morones' report, "It was
submitted through labor channels."
CROM and C.T.M. hostility continued and the latter sent a
telegram to the convention of International Oil Workers meeting in
Tulsa, Oklahoma on June 1.

The C.T.M. objected to Morones' and

Calles' attacks on the Cardenas government made at that conference.
Their communique stated that Morones and Calles were expelled from
Mexico "for labors tending to repress the just demands of the
workers" and for attempting "to establish a Fascist regime."
new Mexican confederation continued its attack by alleging:

The
"The

presence of Calles and Morones at a convention of petroleum workers
is ironical for the policy of defrauding the Mexican people in

OO
All quotes are taken from the New York Times, April 26, 1936.
During Morones' exile, Matthew Woll and Chester Wright "opened the
doors of their homes to him." "La C.R.O.M. ni se rnuere ni se rinde,"
C.R.O.M., November, 1920, 16.
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petroleum matters was due to them.

3b

Verbal attacks were soon supple

mented by physical warfare.
Of all the labor conflicts during Cardenas’ administration,
perhaps none was more hitter than those occurring in the textile
industry, largely because many of them involved inter-union disputes
among the affiliates of CP.OM and C.T.M.

Morones feared C.T.M.

encroachment in Veracruz, and his fears soon materialized as these
C.T.M. intrusions became a great problem.

Constant fights for

jurisdiction in the textile mills in the State of Veracruz led to
murderous warfare ending in scores of deaths between CROM and C.T.M.
Feeling ran high, the industry suffered, and Cardenas' pet idea of
a united front for the working class received a decided set-back.
In September, 1936, trouble between the two federations
exploded in Atlixco, Puebla.

CROM had been supreme there for a

number of years, but agitators from the C.T.M. were making gains.
Late that month Cardenas visited Atlixco, assembled leaders from
both organizations, and stressed that rivalry and bloodshed must
cease.

The ten most irreconcilable leaders of each group were

ordered to leave the area.

An ideal arrangement was formulated.

If a laborer belonging to the C.T.M. were murdered, CROM would
have to indemnify his family, and vice versa.

Practice was divorced

from theory in this case, and Morones ordered his lieutenants to
refuse the bland agreement.

oh
New York Times, June 3, 1936.
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RETURN TO MEXICO
Since Morones' deportation in April, 19 3 6 , CROM's central
committee negotiated with Cardenas for Ids return.

Finally on

February 2 k , 1937, the Mexican Secretary of Interior permitted
Morones' return.

A "great applause" occurred in CROM's meeting

following Ricardo Trevino's announcement of that fact.

In March,

1937, newspaper articles in the Federal District press publicly
revealed that Morones could return to his homeland.

Morones,

however, was not summoned to Mexico by Cardenas to revamp the
labor organizations as he and Green alleged in the U.S.

According

to Lombardo, who had spoken with Cardenas about the matter, Morones
was merely returning protected by the Law of Amnesty, and this neither
constituted special permission nor an extraordinary behest on the
government's behalf.

35

On the other hand, Morones would neither

have any of his rights decreased nor be subject to any extra
restrictions.

Nevertheless, CROM propaganda announced that Morones

had "triumphed over the government, justice was being fulfilled."
Morones, accompanied by his wife and some friends, arrived in
Monterrey and declared that he would enter action in the social
field, and in the political field by reorganizing the Labor Party.
On April 2 9 , his caravan which comprised eromistas headed by Jose
Lopez Cortes who drove to meet him, entered the capital.

Upon

35
*
Vicente Lombardo Toledano in El Excelsior, April 28, 1937*
"Reparacion justiciera," 5-6.
^ L a Prensa, April 28, 1937.
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Morones' entry into Mexico City, lie boldly announced, "I come to resume

oQ
my activities at the service of the labor organizations."
at an opportune time since there was a split in the C.T.M.

He returned
Overesti

mating their forces in the confederation, the communists had tried
to take over in March, and when they failed withdrew their unions.

"THE OIL IS OURS"
Labor troubles had beset oil companies for months as oil field
workers demanded better wages.

Near the end of 1937 a federally

appointed conciliation board told the petroleum companies to raise
salaries by 26 million pesos annually.
redress in court.

They refused and sought

Early in March, 1938, the Supreme Court held the

companies were bound by the decision and ordered that monies be
deposited.

Still the companies refused.

Cardenas in a radio address

to the Mexican nation, approached the microphone at ten o'clock on
the night of March, 19, 1938 and said, "The oil is ours."
In what Nathaniel and Sylvia w'eyi have eulogistically called
"the reconquest of Mexico."

Cardenas nationalized land, railroads,

and ultimately the foreign-owned petroleum industry.

His nationalism

aimed to promote economic independence, protect Mexican industries,
and remedy the conflict long existent between capital, mostly foreign,
and labor, mostly Mexican.

Morones claimed that Cardenas called

In the thirteenth CROM convention Jose Petricioli presented
Morones with a medal from the Sindicato de Dependientes del Comercio
del Distrito Federal. The medal symbolized "brotherly love" and was
neither gold nor silver "which lacked force and were effeminate,"but
of iron which represented tenacity. Since Morones had a reputation
of being a bon vivant, the historonic presentation was a farce.
"XIII Gran Convencion de la C.R.O.M.," C.R.O.M., September, 1937, 13-16.
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Morones to Chapultepec and asked him and Florentino Maya of the
CROM central committee for advise, and for the stolen records of
the 1926 U.S. "invasion" of Mexico, in order to expose the American
petroleum companies' role in plotting the would-be intervention.
After Morones consented, Cardenas never asked for them again; and,
according to Morones, "With an air of theatricalism paid indemnities
39
which cost Mexico millions of pesos and many deprivations.”

If

the story is true, and it is doubtful, it would have been an excellent
opportunity to gain favor with Cardenas.

It would exemplify how CROM,

through Morones 1 efforts, attempted to influence and shape government
policy, but failed.

When asked by newsmen what he thought of the

March 18 expropriation and nationalization of the petroleum companies,
Morones stated that his organization supported Cardenas' actions and
considered them perfectly just, but that he was surprised when he
read the newspapers on March 19 and discovered the expropriation.

1+0

Strife between the C.T.M. and CROM flared again in January, 1938*
At midnight of January 16 a twenty-four-hour general strike began in
the State of Veracruz.

Called by Lombardo as a protest against a

presidential ruling several months earlier favoring CROM workers, its
purpose was to paralyze Veracruz.

Lombardo did not hold free sway.

Cardenas had ruled that CROM workers constituted a majority in the
Cocolapan textile factory at Orizaba, and that C.T.M. must leave

^L u i s N. Morones in El Universal, March 18, 1957; Luis N.
Morones in El Excelsior, September
1953-

lj_0
Luis N. Morones in El Popular, May 18, 1939; Luis N.
Morones in El Universal, March 18, 1957-
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that plant for another nearby.

The decision followed an altercation

between the rival unions in which eight persons were killed and 25
wounded. After the rival unions ignored the president's plea that
they "unite for the Revolution," the situation was so serious that
Cardenas hurried there by automobile.

Following a sanguinary battle

on the 17th, the presence of the Chief Executive, who ordered arms
taken from both groups, brought an "armistice" and relative peace to
Orizaba.

La Prensa was highly critical of Morones'accusing Cardenas

of instigating the agitation which culminated in the loss of lives.
According to this press, the workers of the Cocolapan factory had
progressed in "tranquil fashion" even though there were cromistas
and cetemistas until "Morones arrived in the country and began
ll
agitating the situation."

CROM SPLIT OF I938
In the midst of this struggle, CROM was racked by "fifth
column" pressures.

Since unity and the appearance of unity are

essential ingredients in a political formula for group effectiveness,
most politically-orientated groups are careful to reveal as little
as possible concerning internecine struggles.

Such action did not

characterize Morones' CROM in 1938 when its "Old Guard" experienced
a major split.

Morones had returned from exile under a general

amnesty issued by Cardenas in April, 1937j but remained a staunch

Ul

La Prensa, January 23, 1938.
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enemy of the president.

Cardenas was in the process of forming a

new governmental political party and CROM leadership disagreed about
whether CROM should support Cardenas or follow Morones1 dictates to
revive the P.L.M. and prevent the organization from cooperating with
the government.
Another reason for the leadership's dispute was the inter-union
struggle caused by internal .jockeying for supremacy between the old
Morones clique and leaders with a different orientation.

The night

of January 8 Morones claimed at the Hidalgo Theatre that, "Perhaps
none of the labor organizations that now exist in Mexico have been
attacked as much as the C.R.O.M., but the C.R.O.M. has been able to
exist because of its members' discipline."
his statement concerning CROM solidarity.

Events soon disproved
Eduardo Moneda, Jose Lopez

Cortes, and Eduardo Buenrostro delivered a letter to the El Nacional
office on January 15 stating that they advocated loyal and sincere
cooperation with Cardenas' actions.

They disagreed with Morones'

conduct and announced that "no division exists in the CROM and the
actions of the ex-CROM leader ought to be taken as those of one
single member ."^2
According to the C.R.O.M. Memoria, a Morones organ, Ricardo
Trevino’s treason to the confederation dated from 1936 when he
served as the central committee's secretary general.

When Morones

was exiled, Trevino"considered it an opportune time to become CROM's
only director" and disregarded other opinions.

With Morones' return.

II Nacional, January 1 6 , 1 9 3 8 .
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Trevino and bis following "refused to rectify tbeir ways, continued
to create distrust against Morones," and tried to expel bim from the
confedederation be bad founded.

The C.R.O.M. Memoria alleged that

Trevino and bis allies received aid "from tbose tbey should bave not
been receiving it."

Another charge leveled at Trevino was the

"disappearance" of five thousand pesos of the union's funds.
The split was formalized in April, 1938,when the Moronesdominated national committee expelled Trevino's following from CROM.
Among cromistas ousted were Trevino, Eduardo Moneda, Jose Lopez Cortes,
Juan Lozano Padilla, and Mario Suarez.

Some of these men had partici

pated in CROM's founding; Trevino, Moneda, and Lopez Cortes had served
in the Grupo Accion for 20 years.
The expelled group also called itself "CROM" and looked upon
itself as labor's legitimate representative.

The Trevino CROM devoted

much of its energy to exposing the corruption of Morones' clique;
moronistas retaliated with documentary evidence to prove that these
rivals were corrupt and were subsidized by the federal government.
During Cardenas' administration a principal CROM activity consisted
of inter-union fights between the Trevino and Morones factions.

But

when not fighting each other, they engaged in bloody struggles with
the C.T.M. for jurisdiction of the textile mills.

2^3
On August 5, 1938, Morones presented "copious documentation"
to the general assembly. This consisted of receipts from the central
committee's treasury. A segment of this evidence was a receipt of
Blanca Rubin, cashier of the central committee, which said that
Trevino'took" b ,k 7 5 pesos from the treasury. C.R.O.M. Memoria,
1937-1939 ■< 17^- See pages l 8l-l86 for itemized accounts of Trevino's
alleged graft.
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Despite the fact that the once-powerful CROM had dwindled,
Morones maintained the fiction that his CROM was still potentially
powerful.

He, Reynaldo Torres, Juan Fonseca, and Fernando Rodarte

were invited to participate in the meeting of the Confederacion de
Sindicatos Obreros y Campesinos de Puebla on November 21, 1938, to
celebrate the 28th anniversary of the Revolution.

Morones' speech

at the factory "la Eoonomica," contained this gem of propaganda,
"Despite all the attacks, I have never doubted that the C.R.O.M.
would resurge, that we would triumph, and be the true guide of the
labor movement."

)|)|

Rivalry continued and when anti-Morones CROM

elements in Rio Blanco began a sitdown strike on Saturday, March 16,
I9 U0 , the Morones union consequently refused to cooperate with them.
In September, 1938, Lombardo Toledano convened a labor congress
to create an international Latin American labor federation.

Thirty-

seven delegates from the more important Latin American labor unions
of twelve countries attended.

The C.T.M. took the lead to found the

Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina in September, 1938
in Mexico City.

Lombardo, the leading figure in setting up the

C.T.A.L., was elected president, and shaped its policies during
its formative years.

)|)i

"Los logreros y traidores, son los que hablan de revolucionarismo," C.R.O.M., December, 1938, 9* 1 8 . According to Petricioli,
Morones revised his definition of them as "traitors" to that of
"separatists." Petricioli was describing Morones "qualities of
forgiveness" in his later years. Interview, Mexico City, June 30 3
1968.
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ELECTION OF 19^0 AND THE MORIBUND P.A.F.L.
The founding of ihe :C.T.A.L. helped influence Morones and. the
A.F.L. to "reinvigorate" the P.A.F.L. Matthew Wo 11, •vice-president
of the A.F.L., and Chester Wright arrived in Mexico City in October,

1938 for "a visit of observation" for the A.F.L. executive council.
Only one hope actually remained for the A.F.L. if it wished to
rejuvenate the P.A.F.L. in Mexico:

could Morones spring back into

power?
General Juan Andrew Almaz an believed he had the natural right
to the presidency because he was the highest-ranking officer in the
army.

Almazan expected to receive serious consideration from the

P.E.M., but when the official party ignored him, he joined the
opposition.

Encouraged by generals opposed to Manuel Avila Camacho,

business and landowner interests opposed to Cardenas' radical policies,
Morones' CROM, and certain elements of the Catholic Church, Almazan,
on June 30, 1939,resigned his post as commander of the Seventh
Military Zone in Monterrey.

One month later Almazan launched his

presidential campaign with a manifesto offering positive and specific
advantages to the army, capital, Church, labor and peasantry.

Morones'

CROM through its satellite organ, the P.L.M., endorsed the general
hoping to pick up a few crumbs from the victor's table.
Morones' gamble failed.

Almazan was unsuccessful; Avila Camacho's

main strength came from organized labor, CROM excepted.

When the

defeated general refused to raise the banner of armed revolt to
nullify the official electoral count, he was politically dead; so
was Morones' and the A.F.L.'s hopes to revive the waning P.A.F.L.
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Shortly after his election Avila Camacho publicly declared "Soy
creyente" (I am a "believer), and thus placated many Mexican "Catholics
■who might have supported any rebellion against him.

Furthermore,

President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent Vice-President Henry A. Wallace
to attend the inauguration; and although Wallace was harassed by a
pro-Axis mob shouting "Death to the gringos," Almazan realized that
insurrection would be hopeless.

After the general's electoral

defeat, Morones, his "fair weather" ally, showed his true colors in
an effortless about face when he attacked the general and attributed
-

Almazan’s defeat "exclusively to himself."

1^5

After the 19^0 election Morones tried to revive the A.F.L.'s
interest in the P.A.F.L., but his attempts received little attention.
Still the P.A.F.L. was not dissolved.

The offices of treasurer and

English and Spanish secretaries were combined and given to Matthew
Woll, although he knew no Spanish.

At the last A.F.L. convention

held before the United States entered World War II, there was a
spiritless discussion of the P.A.F.L.

It was clear to everyone that

the organization had practically died with Santiago Iglesias in 1939>
Almazan's defeat provided the coup de gr&ce.
The sixth P.A.F.L. congress was to be held in Havana but the
depression and insufficient funds made reorganization a hopeless task.

^Casasola, Historia grafica de la Revolucion Mexicana, IV,
2kb7. Morones' endorsed Gustavo Casasola's multivolume history "como
un documento de verdadera importancia y como una exacta contribution
a la Historia de nuestro Pais; especialmente en su epoca convulsiva."
Morones to Casasola, January 9s 19^-8, Historia grafica de la Revolucion
Mexicana, IV, 23 3 3 .
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With CROM's influence on the Mexican government virtually nil, the
A.F.L.'s interest in retaining close connections quickly diminished.
There was little the A.F.L. or CROM could gain from continuing close
relations with each other, and contacts between the two movements
rapidly dwindled to little more than occasional ritualistic appear
ances of delegates at each other conventions.

Nevertheless, the

significant international position which Morones' CROM occupied was
that of a trail-blazer among the incipient Pan-American labor
movements.^

U6
Philip Taft in his The A.F. of L. in the Times of Gompers
believes Gompers' death was the greatest factor contributing to the
P.A.F.L.'s decline, because he had been its prime support and inspira
tion. Whether one accepts Taft's thesis or not, it cannot be denied
that the death of Morones 1 intimate and mutual-admiring friend, was
a severe blow to the Federation.
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CHAPTER X

MORONES AND EERONISM

Having failed to support a successful presidential candidate
in 19^0, Morones endorsed Miguel Aleman's election.

During Aleman's

administration, I9 U6 -52 , the name of the governmental party was
changed to Partido Revolucionario Institucional, but the basic form
was maintained.

Therefore, unsuccessful in his efforts to augment

his prestige and power by conventional methods, Morones tried
another tactic —

support from Argentina's Chief Executive.

PERON'S LABOR POLICY
One of Juan Domingo Peron's power bases was the working class
or descamisados (shirtless ones).

His .justicialismo doctrine

stressed political sovereignty, economic independence, and social
justice.

Prior.-to Peron's ascendency, the labor movement played

an insignificant role in Argentine affairs.

He raised wages,

established collective bargaining, set up housing projects, reno
vated social security, and reorganized the Argentine C.G.T.

Through

overtones to Morones, he attempted to extend his influence into Mexico.

LIMA INTER-AMERICAN TRADE UNION CONFERENCE
In I9 U 7 , several South American labor groups wrote the A.F.L.
requesting closer unity with the North American labor movement.

The

A.F.L. assigned Seraflno Romualdi, a Spanish-speaking Italian immigrant
to the United States who had been active in the International Ladies'

22k
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Garment ‘
Workers' Union, to work on this‘project.

Largely as a result

of the efforts of Romualdi and of Bernardo Ibanez, President of the
Chilean Confederation of Lahor, several South American labor organi
zations agreed to an A.F.L.-sponsored Pan-American labor conference
in 191*8 .
On January 10, the Lima Inter-American Trade Union Conference
began its sessions in the main assembly hall of the House of
Representatives with delegations present from the United States,
Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia, Dutch Guiana, Mexico, Puerto
Rico, El Salvador, Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Ecuador.

All commissions had

full powers except those from the Dominican Republic and Venezuela
which were represented by fraternal delegations, and Ecuador, which
only sent observers.

The conference's objectives were to analyze

the situation of the workers' movement in the Western Hemisphere,
study methods of collaboration, raise the standard of living, and
promote human liberty and social progress.^"
CROM secretary general Morones, having been a leading figure
in the P.A.F.L., could not resign himself to play a secondary role
in the establishing of another inter-American labor group.

Morones

attended this conference with his own plan to organize the confedera
tion.

At the beginning of the conference, an Argentine delegate charged

that the A.F.L. representatives were financed by the United States
State Department.

Morones rose, began speaking, and expressed the

1 C.R.0.M. Memoria, 19U7-19U9, 32.
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antecedents of the Argentine case; the conflicts, difficulties, and
misunderstanding created by Romauldi's "awkward politics."

Sabroso,

President of the Congress, interrupted Morones stating that "only ten
minutes is allowed to the speakers and your time has expired."
Morones quickly retorted that the ruling had been approved without
the knowledge of all present and that the members had agreed that
important matters would have no time limit.

Morones emphasized the

"importance" of his topic and continued his delivery.

He accused

Romauldi, "an agent of the State Department," and the A.F.L. of
supplying money for the Lima Conference.

He repeated, "There are

delegates in this hall who have been bought by Romauldi."

Romauldi

denied the allegation and stated Morones had no right to suppose
that the conference was instigated by the United States government.

2

CROM maintained that it had documentary proof that Romauldi
was a United States government agent, and Petricioli showed this
evidence to Professor Alexander in August, 19^8.

It is a letter of

introduction for Romauldi written by Adolf Berle to Ambassador
Messersmith in Argentina (written in the summer of 19^6, after
Berle had ceased having any part in the government).

This corres

pondence mentions Romauldi's war services in the Coordinator's office,
and relates that he is "well looked upon" by the American government.
The damaging portion in CROM's opinion is Berle's statement that a

Ibid., 59j 95- Serafino Romauldi, Presidents and Peons;
Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America (New York, 196 7 ),
7 8 . This work is a personal and first-hand accountof twenty years'
service by a key A.F.L. representative in Latin America.
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number of people, mainly communists, bad been going to Latin America,
alleging they represented United States labor, so Berle suggested to
A.F.L. leaders that they appoint an official representative.

As a

result, Romauldi was named; this is why Morones and CROM considered
Romauldi an official agent.

3

In the Lima Conference the worst criticism of the United States
came from a man who admittedly had contacted the Argentine Embassy
in Mexico City before his going to Peru —

Luis N. Morones.

Morones

charged that the A.F.L. report of March, 19^7 > which damned the
Argentine Labor Confederation as being Peron's tool, was made in bad
faith and resulted from the maneuvering by Romauldi, Latin American
representative of the A.F.L. and key man on the commission of inquiry
that visited Buenos Aires in 19^7-

Morones thus blamed Romauldi for

having "rigged the conference just as Romauldi had rigged the A.F.L.
condemnation of Argentine labor a year ago."

Ij.

Robert J. Alexander interview of Jose Petricioli, Mexico City,
August 27, 19^+8 • Romauldi died of a heart attack in 1967 while serving
in Mexico City as a consultant for the State Department and as a lecturer
at Cuernavaca Labor College. A.F.L.-C.I.0. News, November 18, 196 7 .
^New York Times, January 26, 19 ^8 . In 19^7, Peron attempted to
endear himself to U.S. labor by inviting A.F.L. leaders to visit Argen
tina and observe the freedom of his trade unions. After the visit the
American delegation published its findings that Argentine labor was
dictatorially controlled by Peron's government through such measures
as armed forces, bribery, and expulsion. New York Times, March 10,
I9 V 7 . Morones accused Romauldi of having gone to Buenos Aires with
A.F.L. officials not only to investigate the Argentine labor movement,
but all of Peron's acts for which Romauldi had to flee to Montevideo.
C.R.O.M. Memoria, 19^7-19^-9, 56-57. Born in the province of Perugia
in Italy, Romauldi was forced to leave that country in 1923 , at age
23 , because of his active opposition to Benito Mussolini's dictator
ship — this background helped formulate his opposition to the
fascistic Peron regime and Morones' defense of it.
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A five-nation "Committee of Honor," which resulted from
Morones' denunciations, unanimously rejected all of Morones' charges
against Romauldi at the conference's final session on July lU.

The

convention hailed the commission's findings in which there was no
positive response to Morones' emotionally-based appeal.

A defeated

minority of one, Morones chose to abandon the conference rather
than compromise or accept humiliating defeat.

He neither appeared

before the Committee of Honor when summoned, nor attended the final
plenary session.^

As a result, Morones' name was stricken from the

list of accredited delegates following his departure.^

VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES
According to Petricioli, Morones had not intended to go to
Argentina, but that country's delegation invited CROM to send
"someone" to Argentina,

Morones was given a "hero's welcome" and

following a two hour audience with President Peron, Morones was
the guest of honor at an Argentine Labor Confederation rally held
in Buenos Aires' Luna Park on January 23, 19^8.

Following the

speech of Jnan Barreiro, a C.G.T. official who opened the ceremony,
Morones began his discourse by attacking Romauldi, "a propagandist
against Argentina."

He spoke on the general theme of "imperialist"

^Milton Bracker in the New York Times, January 1^, I9 U8 ;
Serafino Romauldi, "Action at Lima," American Federationist, LV
(February, 19^8), 25. Romauldi summarized the situation writing,
"May I add, modesty aside, that I received a standing ovation and,
in typical Latin American fashion, I was embraced by many." Romauldi,
Presidents and Peons, 7 8 .
g
American Federationist, February, 19 ^8 , 2 5 .
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attempts to infiltrate and manipulate the Latin American working
masses.

Morones assailed Assistant Secretary of State Spruille
7

Braden,

and declared that he had been branded "a liar" at Lima

"only because I dared to impugn the reputation of a member of the
United States delegation.”

He boasted that it had been "an honor

to defend the honor of the workers’ movement of Argentina."

The

meeting with Peron added credence to the circumstantial evidence
and proved to those who suspected that Peron and Morones had schemed
in advance to disrupt the Lima Conference.

ORGANIZATION OF THE C.I.T.
One of the important results of the Lima Conference was the
organization of the Inter-American Confederation of Workers (C.I.T.),
of which the Chilean Bernardo Ibanez was elected president in 19 ^8 .

7

Two weeks before the Argentine presidential election of
February 2 k , 1 9 k 6 , the U.S. State Department published its 131-page
"Blue Book on Argentina," the work of Braden and his staff. It gave
what it termed "incontrovertible evidence," much of it drawn from
recently captured German documents, that "the present Argentine
Government and many of its high officials were so seriously com
promised with the (Nazi-Fascist) enemy that trust and confidence
could not be reposed in that government." Peron himself was prominent
among those against whom such testimony was presented. The "Blue
Book" gained Peron more votes than it lost him, for it was a fresh and
flagrant example of United States intervention in Latin America which
Argentines had long taken the lead in opposing. Arthur P. Whitaker,
"The Election of February 2 k , 19 ^6 : Braden or Peron: Second Phase,"
in Why Peron came to Power. The Background to Peronism in Argentina,
ed. by Joseph R. Barager (New York, 196 8 ), 221-222.
g

New York Times, January 26, 19^8. Morones' speech eulogized Eva
"as an example for all women and for America's first ladies." Morones
was followed by Angel Cofino Garcia, secretary general of the Cuban
Federation of Workers who had missed the Lima Conference, but attested
that had he been there "he would have adopted Morones' attitude." La
Prensa (Buenos Aires), January 2 k , I9 U8 .
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Despite Morones’ actions in Lima and Buenos Aires, Petricioli told
Professor Alexander that "the CROM is not peronista," except that
CROM believed that the "international labor organizations in the
Americas should not be directed by the United States State Depart
ment and its agents in the C.I.T."

One of the purposes in creating

C.I.T., an organization of non-communist trade unions, was to
terminate the communist-orientated C.T.A.L. Lombardo had created
ten years earlier.

The second C.I.T. congress which met in Havana

in 192+9 , refused Morones' demand that his CROM become an affiliate;
o
CROM soon afterwards allied with Argentina's C.G.T.
The C.I.T., a union of paper affiliates and lineal descendent
of the P.A.F.L., failed to prosper and was liquidated in 1952 after
the formation of the world-wide International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions.

Its member organizations joined with several which

had not belonged to the C.I.T. to form the Organizacion Regional
Inter-Americana de Trabajadores (O.R.I.T.).

INVITATION TO THE EERONISTS
Peronists caused considerable disorder at the January, 1951
meeting in Mexico City which organized the American affiliate of
O.R.I.T.

Argentina, Panama, and the Dominican Republic were not

invited to the conference because O.R.I.T. directors in Brussels
assumed that these countries lacked "democratic trade unions free

^Alba, Historia del movimiento obrero en America Latina, 2+71.
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from government control."1^

CROM, however, favored admitting the

Argentine C-G-.T., and Morones took independent responsibility for a
belated cable inviting the Argentine Labor Federation to send dele
gates.

On January 9, three C.G.T. leaders after a last-minute

conference with Peron, left Buenos Aires to fly to Mexico City in
response to Morones’ strategy of issuing an unexpected invitation
the previous day.

A dispute about whether the Argentine delegates

who arrived January 10 should be allowed to participate threatened
to disrupt the conference before it could form a Western Hemisphere
branch of the I.C.F.T.U.

The Argentine group with Morones 1 assistance,

almost managed to enter the meeting hall, but only the timely inter
vention of the chairman prevented a clash with a group of delegates
who rushed toward the door to block their entrance.

Morones, a

member of the United Labor Committee who handled local preparations
for the conference, announced his CROM would not only withdraw if
the Argentine delegation was refused admission, but would hold a
separate protest meeting . 11

In reality, this was an empty gesture.

Morones was in no position to adopt strong measures.

His role was

more negative than positive.

1^New York Times, January 11, 1951.

1 LCbid. When Morones' term as CROM secretary general terminated
in I9 I+9 he was designated as permanent advisor and councilor and
Secretary of International Affairs of CROM, positions he exercised
until his death in 196k . Cromistas felt they "had" to consult Morones
during this period because of his vast experience and knowledge.
Fernando M. Lluck, interview, Acapulco, March 29, 1971.
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After a titter debate, the delegates refused to seat tbe
•peron!stas.

Only CROM which had summoned the Argentines without the

consent of the I.C.F.T.U. secretary general, voted to admit the
C.G.T. Jacob Potofsky, head of the Latin American Affairs Committee
of the C.I.O., and George Meany led the fight against accepting the
Argentines; they were vigorously seconded by the A.F.L. representa
tives who agreed that the C.G.T. did not constitute "a truly free
labor organization."

Both American organizations stated that the

basic principles and policies of the I.C.F.T.U. were opposed to
totalitarianism.

12

Morones' attempt to sneak the three peronistas

in through "the back door" had failed.

He vigorously denounced

"United States maneuvers to dominate the conference" which would
prevent Mexico from electing a president of the hemisphere body and
establishing its headquarters in Mexico City.
Following Morones' announcement that meetings would be held
the following week to hear the Argentine case, CROM representatives
walked out in protest.

The peronistas were the chief speakers at a

reunion where the platform was shared with cromistas. A photograph
in the archives of La Prensa in Mexico City shows Morones, Moises
Calleja, Florentino Maya, and several other cromistas at a banquet
given on January 12 for Isaias Santin, secretary general of the
Argentine C.G.T., Jose Erriole, and Feliz Odorigo, two other
peronistas.

12Ia Prensa (Buenos Aires), January 11, 1951; William P. Carney
in the Hew York Times, January 12, 1951.
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When the C.G.T. representatives were ready to return to
Argentina they encouraged a large number of Mexican trade unionists
to accompany them.
for CROM.

Rigoberto Gonzales and Florentino Maya accepted

In Buenos Aires they were feted at dinners and receptions,

visited the Eva Peron Foundation, and made the customary tour of
Argentina.

Upon returning to Mexico, they published a long and

detailed letter in La Prensa.

This propaganda aid to peronistas

praised Peron, Eva, and the Argentine economic situation.

The

exchange of visits accelerated Morones' and Argentine efforts to
solidify Argentine-Mexican ties to support a new Latin American
labor organization.
The Morones-Peron flirtation of "brothers in purpose and
colleagues in fact" did not go unmentioned in Mexico City after
the visits.

Beginning in January, 1952, Jorge Prieto Laurens

published in the capitoline Todo a series of articles and a letter
Morones allegedly sent to Peron offering his services to implant
.iusticiali.smo in Mexico.

Morones and Petricioli responded by pre

senting an accusation before the Procurador de Justicia of the
Federal District which charged Prieto Laurens with falsification
of documents.
Morones' long-range design to swing Mexico into the column of
the Argentine-led "Third Force" countries in the event of a world
•war, came to light in a strange document, a photostatic copy pur
ported to be a letter from Morones to Peron dated March 3> 1952.
This correspondence which covered twenty single-spaced typewritten
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CROM DELEGATION ARRIVES IN ASUNCION, PARAGUAY, FEBRUARY, 1952

Back row: Maria Teresa del Valle de Morones, Hector Cerrillo.
Front row: Luis N. Morones, Federico Gobernatore, Jesus Corona.
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pages, contained a careful analysis of the Mexican political situation,
plans for establishing the peronista theory of government in Mexico,
and a request for Argentine funds.

The dominant theme ■was an anti-

United States feeling:
In order to spread our anti-Yankee position, we
have been cooperating with the native Stalinist
Communists. This is the only thing on which we
agree with the Communists. Otherwise we are
quietly fighting them and pushing them out of
their positions of influence.^3

DEATH OF EVITA
A few months after Peron established his own international
labor union Morones flew to Argentina in the summer of 1952;

Evita

Peron, whose magnetic charm had captured audiences Peron could not
reach and the heroine of thousands of "shirtless ones,” had died of
cancer.

Morones and his second wife attended the funeral in Buenos

Aires on July 26, 1952.

Morones rendered homage at Eva's burial in

the name of CROM, stood over her coffin during her capilla ardiente
(wake), and placed flowers at the foot of her casket.

Symbolically,

Morones deposited a small chest of Mexican soil in Argentina, and
carried some Argentine earth to his homeland.

1^

A.T.L.A.S
Consistent with the justicialist philosophy of the Third Position
which stressed Latin Americanism and combatted Pan-Americanism, Peron

~*~^New York Times, December 8 , 1952.
•^C.R.O.M. Memoria, 1951-1953, 2Ul, 2^9.
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decided to create his own inter-American "body.

In November, 1952,

CROM co-sponsored the Peron-dominated Latin American Association
of Trade Unionists.'*’^

An overture on November 2 k , 1952 from the

communist-dominated C.T.A.L. to join forces in the fight against
"imperialism" received cold treatment from A.T.L.A.S.

United States

and Latin American labor officials who did not attend the congress
branded it as an Argentine attempt to spread anti-Americanism
through as many Latin American unions as it could influence.

Jose

Espejo, Peron’s ex-Secretary of Labor, announced at the opening
meeting that the organization would be anti-capitalistic, anticommunistic, and dedicated to maintaining the "independence of Latin
American workers."

It therefore came as a surprise when Lombardo

Toledano, head of the C.T.A.L., sent a formal "fraternal salute" and
invited the new organization to formulate a basis for common action.
Morones explained that Lombardo was absent from the conference
because he was deliberately not invited, and emphasized that "there
could under no circumstances be any understanding with Senor Lombardo
because of his known communist connections."

In his formal speech

Morones also charged the United States with "colonial oppression" of
Latin American workers.

3-6

CROM was the only important Mexican

"^See John Terrill Deiner, ^"ATLAS: A Labor Instrument of
Argentine Expansionism Under Peron" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Rutgers University, 196 9 ), for a detailed study of various A.T.L.A.S.
activities, an evaluation of A.T.L.A.S. contributions to peronista
foreign policy, and an examination of its impact on labor organizations
in Latin America.
l6

New York Times, November 2 k , 1952.
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federation in attendence, and by far the largest and most important
contingent non-Mexican federation at the constituent congress was the
Argentine C.G.T.; no other major Latin American country sent delegates.
A.T.L.A.S. was only strong in Argentina and exerted little
influence in the workers' movement of other Latin American countries
where peronistas never accomplished more than making a few contacts
and distributing a lot of Peronist propaganda.

Never powerful,

A.T.L.A.S. became little more than a paper organization after the
Argentine dictator's fall in 1955.
John Deiner, one of Robert J. Alexander's students, concludes
that A.T.L.A.S., which was a part of Peron's propaganda apparatus,
primarily failed because it was obviously an organization oriented
to Argentine interests rather than to those of Latin American trade
unionists.

Morones, though willing to work with the Argentines,

geared his efforts toward Mexican affairs, rather than toward the
promulgation of Peronist ideology.

CROM and C.G.T. were the only

national organizations which ever contributed financial support, and
CROM's donations were insignificant.

In 1924, death deprived Morones

of Samuel Gompers, his chief ally in a foreign country; thirty years
later a coup d' etat achieved the same results with Peron.
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CHAPTER XI

MORONES AND COMMUNISM

The majority of Latin American trade unions in the early
twentieth century were either socialist or anarcho-syndicalist,
except in Mexico where CROM, the dominant labor group of that
period, had a political orientation of its own.

Morones' CROM

has been peculiarly politically minded and not only have communists
and anarchists made little inroads into it, but it has taken a
strong position against communism.

One factor partly explaining

this "immunity" to communism is the fact that CROM was wellestablished before the Communist International, founded in 1919?
had extended beyond the borders of Russia.
Morones abandoned anarcho-syndicalist doctrines which had
dominated the thinking of earlier Mexican labor leaders, and
adopted a socialist philosophy "adapted to Mexican conditions."
This socialism contended that society was divided into two classes,
the "exploited and the exploiters."

It held that the exploited

class consisted largely of manual workers who possessed the right
to declare class war in order to secure economic and spiritual
betterment, and in the end complete liberation from "capitalist
tyranny." 1

^Morones distinguished between socialism and syndicalism. He
conceived of socialism as being an egalitarian doctrine; socialism is
the "idea" and syndicalism, the "action." In the Chamber of Deputies,
Morones, a deputy representing Tacubaya, stated, "In the tribune I
have declared that the thesis we must defend is the application of the

239
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In November, 1918, Morones and M s associates conferred with
Samuel Gompers and other A.F.L. leaders at Nuevo Laredo.

Labor

representatives from other nations were present, and the P.A.F.L.
was established with Gompers as president and Morones later becoming
vice-president.

This first congress was one of organization primarily

but it managed to touch upon all the purposes for which the Federation
was founded, especially the fight against "missionary" communism.

As

would be expected, communistic labor elements in Mexico criticized
this "imperialistic American" association.
A socialist congress meeting the following September was t o m
by dissension over several major issues.

Representatives of the

Socialist Workers' Party, which Morones had organized; and well-known
leftists such as Jose Allen and Manabrenda Nath Roy, an Indian
nationalist, were present.

The desire of the congress to establish

a political party of the proletariat was frustrated because of the
divergent tendencies among the delegates.

Some wanted to create a

communist party w i t M n the International CommuMst Movement w M l e
others like Morones and Samuel Yudico strenuously objected to this
proposal.

T M s resulted in the establisMng of two parties.

The

first, the Partido Comunista de Mexico, was established by Jose
Allen and M s

colleagues in September, 19195 "the second, Morones'

P.L.M., was founded three months later and functioned in Mexico's

Revolutionary criterion." Diario de los debates de la Camara de
Diputados, August 27, 28 , 192 ^. As one can see, this is a vague
remark typical of a Mexican politician where it was not feasible
to oppose the Revolution.
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"democratic" political system.
Morones toured Europe following his participation in the P.A.F.L.
founding.

The soviet foreign office began its dealings with Morones

before Mexico diplomatically recognized the U.S.S.R.

Because of

CROM's ties with the A.F.L., Pravda published several anti-CROM
articles.

Therefore, when Morones appeared at the Russian legation

in Berlin he was refused a visa to visit Russia.

This angered him.

Furthermore, other CROM leaders who later entered Russia were ignored
or shown only minor consideration.
When Calles assumed office he recognized the Soviet Union.
Several factors influenced his decision.

First, Russia was a

possible market for Mexican henequen and other products.

Second, as

president-elect, Calles had gone to Europe where he was received with
great distinction, and military parades and other gestures, especially
in Germany.

Returning via the United States Calles was practically

ignored; thus, one reason for Calles' recognition of the soviet
government was his desire to irritate the United States government
for its slight.

Soviet Minister Petskovsky blundered in Mexico by

criticizing CROM as being a "reactionary organization opposed to the
true interests of the workers and peasants of Mexico."

Morones was

farther angered when the soviet railroad federation sent money to a
rival organization's strike fund during a railroad strike.

Though

the donations were technically sent by the railroad workers, Morones
believed that no money could be dispatched from the Soviet Union
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without the full approval of that government.

2

After a brief flirtation with the Russians in the early 1920’s,
CROM leadership was forced to choose between cultivating close
relations with them or with the A.F.L.

It was obvious that the

A.F.L. could not consider an organization which had close relations
with soviet labor unions as an ally.

The A.F.L. openly admitted that

its cordial relations with CROM had been possible because of the anticommunistic nature of that organization.

Their reasoning is revealed

by the following:
The fact that the Mexican Federation of Labor is
officially connected with the AFL should be enough
to indicate that it is not a communistic movement...
If the Mexican Federation of Labor itself or its :
leaders were believers in the system which has
brought so much wreckage, destruction, and suffer
ing in Russia instead of being affiliated with
the AFL, they would have affiliated themselves
with the Red International.3
In fact, CROM adopted a reciprocal resolution to oppose all attacks

T h e Third Congress of the Mexican Communist Party was held in
April, 1925* The meeting attacked CROM and pledged the communists
to expose CROM leaders "as paid agents of the government and instruments
of American imperialism in Mexico," and to "campaign against their
sowing of divisions in labor's ranks, their attacks against the
independent unions not affiliated with them, their betrayal of all
strikes against American capital, their class collaboration and
anti-strike theories and their servility to the government."
Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick,
1957), 323-324.
O
John P. Frey, "Trade Unions and the Civil War in Mexico,"
American Federationist, 1924, 303-308. The State Department, on the
other hand, persisted that "Relations with Russia are being fostered
through the medium of direct representatives, the present one being
Luis Morones." Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico,
1910-1929, Summerlin to Hughes, February 20, I9 2 3 , 812.20211/ 6
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which the A.F.L. 's enemies undertook against it in Mexico.

CROM

also refused to seat a communist delegate in its sixth convention
held in Ciudad Juarez, November 17-21, 192k.
Green wrote Morones telling him that he was gratified at the
Mexican's refusal to affiliate with the Russians as long as the A.F.L.
5

held aloof.

Green issued various statements that Morones and his

CROM were staunch defenders against communism —
"CROM's clean bill of health."

this constituted

When charges were raised in the

United States Congress that Morones and Robert Haberman were Bolsheviks,
the A.F.L. was ready to defend them with all honesty and a skillful
public relations program.

In July, 1925, the A.F.L. Information and

Publicity Service issued a statement defending Morones and denying
that he was a communist.

A portion stated:

The unwarranted charge made against Mr. Morones
that he is a Communist is most unjust. There
is not scintilla of truth in the charges. Those
who make them know better. But they are pub
lished for the effect,it will have on the people
of the United States.

A.F. of L. Encyclopedia and Reference Book, I H , Part 2, 1593*
'’Green to Morones, November 19, 1925 in Levenstein, "The United
States Labor Movement and Mexico, I 9 IO-I9 5 1 , " 178-179* The A.F.L.
was significant because of the support it was-able to arouse in the
United States for the Mexican Revolution, and because it was able to
counteract pressure in the United States favoring armed intervention
in Mexico. Informing Secretary of State Kellogg of the American
labor movement's efforts to better conditions in Mexico, Green wrote,
"As you know, no other group of American citizens has done more to
make possible a situation under which constructive development is
possible than the American labor movement." U.S. Political Relations,
Mexico, 1910-1929, Green to Kellogg, June 15, 192 5 , 711.12/552.
g
U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929, February 15, 1926,
711.12/5951
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Mexican affairs and recent Mexican-American relations attracted
considerable discussion at the Fifth P.A.F.L. Congress •which opened
July 18, 1927 in Washington.

Morones indirectly answered recent

charges that Mexico was "Red" when he denied that any country affil
iated with the P.A.F.L. found "inspiration in Russian quarters."

He

asserted that "propaganda" to that effect had been circulated by
unspecified "enemies" of organized labor, and that it had spread
just as this congress assembled in an effort to discredit its deliberations and conclusions.

7

The P.A.F.L.'s executive council's

reports denied that CROM was communistic, and at the closing of the
congress the Mexican Federation of Labor was commended for its
resistance to the "overt and insidious activities of the communist
propagandi sts."^
In September, 1925» Morones was interviewed in Washington and
New York by industrialists and journalists regarding possible commu
nistic tendencies in the Mexican Labor Party.

Morones declared that

while there were a "few" individual communists in Mexico, they had
no party and were not recognized by CROM.

He claimed that organized

Mexican labor was an intelligent movement for social betterment, anticommunistic in form, and had improved not only the wages of the
laboring class* but also its food, clothing, homes, and education.
In this Waldorf Astoria interview, Morones remarked that Bolshevism

^New York Times, July 19, 1927.

g
Charles W. Hackett, "Mexican Government frees imprisoned
Catholics," Current History, XXVI (September, 1927), 959*
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had "been grossly exaggerated in Mexico, especially regarding his
connection with it.

He pointed out that each time he crossed the

United States he had always been carefully examined by American
immigration authorities, and concluded that "Bolshevism has the same
Q
chance in Mexico as it has here which makes it rather insignificant."
There was little danger of communism in Mexico in the 1920's,
for the Revolution was too ardently nationalistic to fall under
foreign domination.

Nevertheless, the State Department was vehemently

opposed to anything which savored of Bolshevism; and the occasionally
violent utterances of Mexican officials, which were in reality intended
for home consumption, usually in order to allay the discontent caused
by their failure to do anything "revolutionary," were taken seriously
in the U.S.

Even when CROM was engaged in warfare with the extreme

leftist elements, Secretary of State Kellogg accused that labor
confederation of having intimate relations with the Russian communists.
The State Department and Ambassador Sheffield in particular were
convinced that Morones and numerous individuals surrounding him were
communists, radicals, or "agents."
criterion.

Guilt by association became the

By this standard, Robert Hammond Murray, a one-time

correspondent for the New York World and translator of Calles' public
documents and public addresses, was an "agent for the Mexican govern
ment" in the "employ of the office of the president at a fixed monthly
stipend." 10

According to Sheffield, Frank Tannenbaum was:

q
New York Times, September 2, 1925.

10U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929. February 15} 1926,

711.12/S95T
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...far more Mexican in sympathy than he is
American, a dangerous man for American interests,
apparently a "believer in the personal destiny
of Morones. He is a graduate of Columbia, a
Phi Beta Kappa man, with a distorted view of
society and government.-1-1
Wilbur Bates accused Ernest Gruening of being a radical, professional
propagandist, and Calles' press agent in the United States.

12

Sheffield

also commented on Gruening, "an American citizen having close relations
with President Calles" who "cancelled" an informal meeting between
Calles and Sheffield because of his "indiscretion" in prematurely
releasing information to journalists.

13

Gruening was also "a Phi

Beta Kappa man" and the State Department seems convinced that these
"extremists" served as Morones 1 men.

In its crusade against Bolshevism,

the State Department discovered J.H. Retinger, Morones' first biographer,
who was described in 1926, the year he published his Morones of Mexico,
as "a German radical," and an agent for the Mexican government who
had been "on the payroll of Morones for years."

14

Robert Haberman,

X 1Tbid., Sheffield to Kellogg, February 16, 19 2 6 , 711.12/685.

1 2 Ibid., February 15 j 1926, 711.12 /6 9 5 .
13 Ibid., December 19, 1925, 711.12/658; December 23, I925 ,
711.12/660. Gruening evaluated the American Ambassador when he
wrote, "...Sheffield was a hopeless reactionary and his attitude
was that of a small group surrounding him in Mexico in the Twenties,
and he equated association with Mexicans as treason to the United
States." Gruening to Buford, April 16, 1970, L.S.U. Archives.
Ik
U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929. February 15 >
1926 , 711-12/695. While in Mexico, a lack of funds caused Retinger
to accept employment as interpreter for Morones, head of the
Departamento de Fabriles. Records Relating to the Internal Affairs
of Mexico, 1910-1929, February 12, 1926, &L2.2021l/l8.
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Morones' interpreter and liason agent between Morones and Samuel
Gompers, was an "American draft jumper" who escaped to Yucatan and
"made himself conspicious in that state and Mexico as a Bolshevik and
15
radical propagandist."
The United States Embassy in Mexico City frequently received
"reliable information" concerning communism from unnamed Americans.
Some was forwarded on October 21, 1925, and contained an alleged
conversation between Morones and one of his intimate friends who
held a lucrative position in his department.

"The intimate" is

unidentified as is the source of the information, except that his
memorandum was prepared by "a reliable American."

The passage is

worth quoting in length because it illustrates the type reports
the State Department received.

Morones is supposed to have stated

that:
he had just had his most successful journey
to the U.S.; that he had the Soviet propaganda
going finely in the U.S., with good organizations
in New York, Chicago, Denver, and other cities;
that he fooled the Americans he met by denying
that he had Bolshevik sympathies; that many
people of various nationalities are arriving in
increasing numbers, principally through Tampico

Wilbur Bates to Department of State, January h, 1926,
8l2.5000.152 in U.S. Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929,
February 15, 1 9 2 6 , 711.12/695- Sheffield wrote, I learn from a
well-informed American newspaper source that certain foreigners
in the pay of the Mexican Government draw their pay under assumed
names and receive their mail at Box l855> Mexico City." He included
the following names with corresponding pseudonyms of "agents of the
Mexican' government." John Retinger (Antonio Reachis), Robert
Haberman (Rodolfo Herrera), Ernest Gruening (Erasmo Guerra), and Frank
Tanneribaum (Fernando Torres). Records Relating to the Internal
Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929. Sheffield to Kellogg, April 2 8 , 1926 ,
812.20211/3^-•
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and Veracruz, all Bolshevik!, for propaganda in
the United States, and they are being put over
the border with plenty of money as teachers or
other professions and as tourists; and that the
whole frontier is well organized with his people,
meaning his labor organizations. ^
The Mexican Communist Party continued its efforts to get CROM
to join the Red International of Labor Unions and in Moscow CRQM's
Labor Attache was invited to attend a meeting of the Red International
of Labor Unions Executive Bureau.

The attache invited the Inter

national to send an observer to a CROM convention.

These auspicious

beginnings aborted by the short-sightedness of the First Secretary
of Soviet Legation, who as a dinner speaker at a CROM banquet,
berated his hosts for not holding membership in the R.I.L.U.
Relations between CROM and the International cooled and their
reciprocal invitations were cancelled.

In March, 1926, Morones

used an incident involving snooping by the Russians on Eulalio
Martinez, the CROM Labor Attache in Moscow, as an excuse to sever
connections with the Soviets.

Martinez was withdrawn, and the next

CROM convention was asked to suspend official relations with the
soviet labor movement.

17

Morones was described in the following terms; "for several
years he has been classed as an ultra-radical labor agitator,
working more or less along the lines of Socialism." U.S. Political
Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929. February 16, 1926 , 711.12 /6 9 5 .
17
New York Times, March 9 ? 1926. Morones’ intrigues also helped
to oust the governors of Nuevo Leon, Aguasealientes, Oaxaca, and San
Luis Potosi. The first two refused to back strikers affiliated with
CROM, while the others were in sympathy with the communists. Records
Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929. Bay to Kellogg,
December 10, 1925s 812.504/750.
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Another "reliable friend" dispatch described a farewell supper
allegedly given by Obregon at Chapultepec Castle on November 23, 192 6 .
Calles, Morones, Puig Casaursnc, Luis Leon, and Obregon retired to a
smoking-room to converse and gamble as they drank coffee and liquers.
Obregon is supposed to have said, "I have made it clear to the whole
world that we are not afraid of the Gringos and that I pulled Uncle
Sam's whiskers."

"For several years," he continued, "we have been

sending over our border, daily, many soviet delegates who have been
carrying on an admirable propaganda in the United States."

At this

point, there was much enthusiasm among those present over these
remarks, and Morones embraced Obregon saying, "Now I know that you
are an eternal companion."
this dialogue.

l8

Several questions must be raised about

Whs was the Embassy's "mysterious" informant?

Was

he a qualified intelligence specialist?

Why was Obregon in Mexico

City instead of in Sonora at this time?

Who was meant by "we," and

why was Morones unaware of Obregon's "daily sending of soviet agents
into the 'Gringo Republic?"'

If one is skeptical of the veracity of

this dispatch, and there is sufficient room for doubt, another
communique sent ten days later is more questionable.
On December 17■> 1926, Sheffield sent "absolutely authentic"
data that "an reliable informant" had furnished him concerning an
informal after-dinner talk in Queta's house in Tacubaya.

"Qneta"

was a nickname for Enriqueta,■the alleged mother of Morones' children,

3_8

U.S. Political Relations, Mexico. 1910-1929, December 7,
1926, 711.12/810.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

250
and a ■woman who was reputed to own a tequilerxa or low-class drinking
place.

According to this source, a "friend said" Sheffield had

arrived and asked Morones what would he the Mexican government's
position.

Morones replied the same as ever, "fooling the United

States and making a damn fool of the Ambassador."

He bragged of the

multitudinous elements in Central America, South America, and the
United States "which at the cost of much patience and money we have
been able to introduce among the Gringos thousands of propagandists
of our communist doctrines."

Much of this money, he continued, was

spent, since "we have to pay many newspapers in the United States
and many Americans have helped us in this direction."

Morones

allegedly said that an expert arrived "to show us how to make and
produce aspyziating gases and other advantageous weapons."

Further

more, "our strength" is increased by the fellow feeling of the
working classes of all Europe and Asia, principally that of the
Japanese people and government.

He then praised "our big friend"

(amigota) Madame Kollantay, a great propagandist whose job it was
to work especially among Mexican women destroying their religious
sentiment, "the cause of the misfortunes of humanity."

The supposed

conversation came to a stirring end when Morones declared:
Now you know, boys, that our plan of action with
the Gringos is to make damfools (sic) (pendejos)
of them, telling them that we are not Bolsheviki;
that, on the contrary, we are Christians, for in
this sense our President will shortly make some
declarations. (Applause and singing of the
Internationale).
Sheffield's comment about this "reliable" dispatch was that, "It is
primarily of interest as illustrating the point of view of men in
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government here hut less interesting, perhaps, as an expression of
concrete policy."

19

CROM leaders denied any collusion with the communists.

Morones,

for example, asked the expulsion of the Russian Ambassadoress Madame
Kollantay, "who converted the anbassy into a center of Soviet
propaganda."

20

~

Ricardo Trevino, CROM secretary general, also

wired Kellogg to refute the Secretary of State’s speech charging
that CROM was communistic before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 12, 1927*

21

Following his return from Europe in March, 1930? Morones took
advantage of welcoming receptions to promote discord and harass
Portes Gil.

Addressing a meeting of the P.L.M. in the street in

front of CROM offices, Morones and Lombardo Toledano bitterly attacked
Portes Gil and the P.N.R.

Morones accused the former president of

using communist elements to instigate a plot against the life of

1 ^Ibid., Sheffield to Kellogg, December 17, 1926, 711*12/780.

20

Luis N. Morones in El Universal, August 31? 1956.

^ . S . Political Relations, Mexico, 1910-1929. January 13?
1927?-711.12/855. Kellogg, who was invited beforethe committee to
explain the basis and justification of the government's policy in
Nicaragua and Mexico, claimed: "The plots to combat and overthrow
American imperialism, particularly in Latin America, are formulated
and fostered by the P.L.M., which is the communist organization in
the country." See U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, Sixty-Ninth
Congress, Second Session, LXVIII-Part 2 (Washington, 1927)? 16 U9 -I65 I
for Kellogg's undocumented claims. Kellogg released to the press a
statement which tried to link the Mexican government and its inter
ference in Nicaragua with the communist party in the United States
hence with Russian Bolshevism.
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Courtesy Archivo Casasola

LUIS N. MORONES IN HIE 1930's.

EDUARDO MONEDA IN THE BACKGROUND
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President-Elect Ortiz Rubio during the latter's visit to the United
States.

According to Morones, Portes Gil brought various gunmen from

Chicago and New York with him to Los Angeles "to do the job."

22

Portes

Gil, who was head of the P.N.R. against which the Morones elements
would contend in the July, 1930 election for deputies and senators,
described Morones' accusations as absurd.

There is no reliable proof

to support Morones' allegations that Portes Gil was behind any such
plot.
After its fall from official favor, CROM’s "self-defense
against the Red menace" became the battle cry of a narrow and
embittered faction.

Morones and Lombardo Toledano persistently

accused each other of communism on the one hand, and peculation
and fraud on the other.

During the 19^0' s Lombardo became the

"kingpin" in communist trade union activities in Latin America, but
refused to join the official Communist Party of Mexico.

Morones

continuously labeled Lombardo "communist" in addition to many other
unflattering terms, such as, "traitor," "eunuch," and "man without
a country."

One particular charge, that Lombardo "smokes a pipe to

imitate Stalin," borders on the ridiculous.

23

The formation of the C.T.A.L. in 1938 indicated to the P.A.F.L.
leadership that a new era in international labor organization was
beginning.

There was still available a number of labor organizations

^Miguel Gil in La Prensa, February 12, 1938.
^Luis N. Morones in El Excelsior, July 23, 19^5.
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in Latin America which, might he brought into the P.A.F.L.

Acting on

the A.F.L.'s decision, the P.A.F.L.'s executive committee, including
Morones, decided to make a survey by correspondence in 1939 to
ascertain opinion about assembling a sixth P.A.F.L. congress to
improve international labor cooperation.

Morones met with Green,

Woll, and Iglesias in an executive council meeting in Washington
in May, 1939? and they decided to hold an international conference
in Havana in 1940.

The object was to unite unions of "good faith"

against Nazi, fascist, and communist syndicates.

24

Lombardo Toledano greeted Morones' announcement that the P.A.F.L.
would convene with derision:
The political cadaver of Luis Morones declared
yesterday in Washington, in the name of the
defunct Pan-American Federation of Labor, that
this shadow of.. .Pan-Americanism of the epoch
of Theodore Roosevelt proposes to revive the
tactic hated in all of Latin America, that of
organizing the workers of its nations in order
to subordinate them to the policies of the labor
leaders of the U.S. who are in the services of
the imperialist forces.
Lombardo charged that the real intention of those behind this move
was

to get Franklin D. Roosevelt's and Cardenas' enemies toparticipate

in the
Mexico.

forthcoming presidential elections in the

United Statesand

"Fortunately," concluded Lombardo, "Morones has about as

El Popular, May 18, 1939* At the annual A.F.L. convention
meeting in Cincinnati in November, 1939, Morones again suggested that
the P.A.F.L. renew its activities in Mexico, Central America, and
South America. He asserted that the communistic C.T.M. was attempting
to destroy CROM, and reasserted an empty CROM pledge— to uphold
justice and democracy. "Luis N. Morones pide que se reanuden las
actividades de la Confederation Obrera Pan-Americana," C.R.O.M.,
November, 1939> 26, 2 9 .
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much power in the social life of Mexico as he has in the Dominican
Republic." 25
Morones alleged that Fidel Velazquez, C.T.M. secretary general,
fearful that Lombardo would prevent his re-election and that Lombardo
was implanting communist ideas in Mexico, suggested that CROM and
C.T.M. merge in 19^-3•

According to Morones, a close friend of

Velazquez went to Morones 1 home to invite him to lunch with the
C.T.M. boss.

Morones arrived promptly and was apprised by the rival

secretary general that he wished to combine the two unions to fling
the communistic Lombardo "down from his pedastal" two weeks before
the national C.T.M. congress.

The meeting was cordial, included

+

abrazos, and high praise for Morones from Velazquez.

26

Confronted

by such inconclusive evidence, it cannot be verified that Velazquez
ever approached Morones with such an offer.
In December, 19^+95 Morones instigated his "communist hunt."
He requested Miguel Aleman's government that Lombardo Toledano and
the remainder of the communist leaders be deprived of their nationality
and released his list of "known or suspected communists" to the .press.

27

25gi Popular, May 18, 1939.

26

El Excelsior, July if, 1945; Eduardo Tellez V. in El Universal,
July 6 , 1945; El Nacional, July 6 , 1945* Morones' anti-communist
feelings were "colored" by his belief that cetpim'stas had "sold out"
to Avila Camacho's government. Morones considered Lombardo and C.T.M.
leadership traitors to the working class for their agreeing to prohibit
strikes during World War II. Luis N. Morones in Las Novedades, April 19*-

19^5.
27
'Lombardo Toledano, Ortega Arenas, David Siqueiros, Diego Rivera,
Agustfn Guzman^V., Vidal Diaz Munoz, Alfonso Palacios, Juan Manuel
Elizondo, Gongalez Flores, Marfa Asunsolo, Dolores del Rfo, Flores
Zaragoza, Sanchez Cardenas, Juan O' Gorman, and Narciso B'assols were a
few of those named. Las Novedades, December 30, 19495 La Prensa,
Decenber 30j 1949.
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Later he publicized a copy of information sent to the Cominform by
the Mexican Communist Party relating to a communist congress celebrated
in Guatemala.

Morones alleged that Valentin Campa, who represented

the Mexican cells, said, "I greet you in the name of our comarade and
ex-president Cardenas." This statement, to Morones, signifies that
the ex-president acted as communism’s chief in Mexico.

After this

disclosure, the CROM leader claimed that Cardenas was having his con-

oQ
federation's offices "watched" by cars.

Morones celebrated other

anti-communist congresses in the Palace of Fine Arts in June and
July, 1950.

Stating that misery is the principal ally of the expan

sion of the communist doctrine, Morones urged the remedy of higher
wages; and again read a list of "known communists."

29

During his "fight against international communism," Morones
attended a conference held at Cuenca del Rio de la Plata, Paraguay
in February, 1952.

In his address to the forerunner of A.T.L.A.S.,

Morones asserted that the "executioners and enemies" of the workers
are "capitalistic and communistic imperialism," and urged the
organizing of "the great army of workers of the fields and city."

30

In 1957, Morones wrote that he accepted Russia's governmental
form for its country since "it is the best to judge its own acts,"

pQ
El Excelsior, July 18, 19^5.

29

*

The list included Jesus Silva Herzog, Luis Padilla Nervo, and
Luis Quintanilla among others. El Universal, June 30, 1950; El Zocalo,
July 1, 1950.
^ E l Excelsior, November 23, 1952.
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Courtesy Archivo Casasola

Front row left to right: Robert Haberman, Miguel Aleman. Luis N.
Morones, Rogelio de la Selva. Back row (right of center): Jose
Petricioli and Juan Fonseca.

"but opposed Russia's attempt to transplant its system and -way of
life.

Morones, who was nationalistic and anti “communistic in

orientation, considered both, communism and capitalism as inadequate
answers to Mexico's problems.

He recognized that communism was not

only a threat to national independence, but to his leadership of
Mexico's organized labor movement.

31

Morones wrote, "not only have I never been affiliated with
communism, but I have fought it for a long time." Luis N. Morones
in El Universal, February 20, 1957*
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CHAPTER X U

MORONES, THE MAN

FAMILY LIFE
Since little has "been written about Morones' personal life, the
purpose of this brief chapter is to elucidate this neglected area.
Morones had three wives, but not more than one at a time as was
stated in a United States diplomatic dispatch.

He married Felipa

Pena Morales, Marfa Teresa del Valle Monroy, and Berta Castillo
Angellini.

By his first wife, whom he divorced in 1922, he had

his first child, Luis Enrique, who was born in December, 1 9 1 6 .
Luis Enrique stated that although Marfa Teresa joined Morones in
exile in 1936 and "passed" as his wife, they did not marry until
much later.

Morones divorced her to marry Berta who still resides

in Mexico City.

BSYSICAL APPEARANCE
Berta admits that Luis was not handsome, but claims that his
"magnificent personality" attracted her.

Commenting on Morones'

personal appearance, she used the phrase "siempre estaba bien
presentado"; he wore expensive ties and silk shirts, tailor-made
suits, and never went without shaving.

Professor Robert J. Alexander,

who observed Morones in 19^8, described him as being stocky, advanced
in baldness, and tall for a Mexican.

Alexander commented that Morones

was so well-dressed that he did not resemble a labor leader.

Bertram

Wolfe supplied a fairly accurate portrayal of Morones when he described
him as:

259
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Gross, fleshy, thick-lipped, heavy-jowled,
soft and pudgy-handed, redolent of perfume,
fond of silk underwear and diamonds, he looks
more like the newspaper cartoon conception
of a capitalist than he does a labor leader.
His sybaritic softness of exterior gives' no
inkling of the ruthless hardness and lust
for power that enabled him to bestride the
confused, chaotic, mistrustful and immature
labor movement of the twenties and bend it
to his will.l
Morones was corpulent. Bertram Wolfe's Portrait of Mexico
contains numerous reproductions of murals drawn by Diego Rivera,
one of Mexico's outstanding artists.
for Morones.

Rivera had a strong dislike

One of his murals on the National Palace stairway

portrays Morones' fleshy face with a straw hat over his eyes, and
another portrays him as a huge pig beating cymbals behind a figure
representing Calles.
Labor Lieutenant,"

In this last fresco, "The Big Boss and his
Morones has puffy cheeks and thick lips.

Morones’ son, Luis Enrique, calculates that Morones weighed
220 pounds during 192*4-29.

If his estimate is correct, it disproves

the excessively high figure of 300 pounds which Hubert Herring and
John Edwin Fagg printed (without documentation) in their Latin
American history texts.

Partly because of his obesity, Morones

enjoyed Turkish baths, and his widow relates that he went several
times daily during his latter years.

Bertram D. Wolfe, Portrait of Mexico (New York, 1937), 179*
^Ibid.

See plates 226 and 2*4-6 in Portrait of Mexico.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

261

Courtesy Jose Petricioli
JOSE EETRICIOLI
Courtesy El Excelsior
LUIS N. MORONES ADDRESSING CROM, 19^0

Courtesy Arciiivo Casasola

Courtesy L.E. Morones Pena

ZAPAIA AGUSTIN CASASOLA
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PERSONALITY
Morones' volatile, forceful personality and "blunt manners
aroused strong dislike.

An excitable, emotional and strong-willed

person, bis poignant verbal attacks and demeanor aroused tempests
of polemics.
The point is frequently made that Morones was austere and
humorless, but this basically depended on his relationship and inter
action with those around him.

Carleton Beals, for example, evaluated

him as "a cold man -who tried his test to be cordial."

Ramon Eduardo

Ruiz wrote:
I never met Luis Morones, though I spoke with
many who had. Frankly,. I never had a high
opinion of the man....Katherine Anne Porter's
short story...on Morones...is fiction but, I
think, descriptive of the man. The title is
Flowering Judas.
Since Morones rode in a bullet-proof automobile during his
tenure as Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Labor, Luis Enrique
related an interesting anecdote about his father.

Without specify

ing when the incident happened, he stated that Morones escaped
injury when the car he drove collided with a cow on the Laredo

^Beals to Buford, February 19? 1970, L.S.U. Archives. One of
Morones1 attempts at humor was a pun on Jesus Corona's name: I "Por
que a los perros les llaman chuchos y a las cervezas coronas?"
Petri cioli, El eompanero Morones, 62.
^Ruiz to Buford, December 2 b , 1 9 6 9 , L.S.U. Archives. Miss
Porter knew Morones and had told Carleton Beals that she intended to
write a sketch of the detestable labor boss. Braggioni, a Mexican
labor leader in Flowering Judas, could very easily be Porter's
"fictional" portrayal of Morones: callous, corrupt, malicious,
wicked, vain of his talents, dangerous to offend, powerful, and clad
in expensive garments with a diamond hoop in his necktie.
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Highway.^

ALTHUISM
Since Morones was a ruthless man who faced up to situations
of life and death fearlessly, one is apt to diminish his "good"
side.

According to his widow, if a poor person asked Morones for

"bread on the streets, he would take the impoverished individual
to a restaurant and tell the waiter "to serve this person what he
g
wants." Morones would then pay the hill.
Beals, however, who was
riding in Morones' limousine, witnessed Morones laughingly refuse
7

an elderly woman's modest pleas for fifty centavos.
Remembering the difficulties of his childhood and realizing that
the youth are the future of Mexico, Morones was supposedly generous
to children (especially the newspaper vendors in the streets).
Occasionally he would inquire how many papers the hoys had, then
he would huy ten or twenty issues from them.

These acts, Morones'

g
widow believes, demonstrated her husband's generosity.
Beals described another interesting anecdote concerning two
incidents of Morones' beneficence when he wrote:
He was very kind to one of his secretaries
Mary Doherty, an American girl, who was
faithfully devoted to him. And an American
anarchist, an ex-cook who sabotaged elite

'Interview, Mexico City, August 28, 1 9 6 8 .
^Interview, Mexico City, August 3, 1 9 6 8 .
7

Interview, Baton Rouge, April 12, 1970.

g
Interview, Mexico City, August 3, 1 9 6 8 .
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banquets "by putting emetic in the soup, and
had finally to flee to Mexico, and went insane
while doing a biograpby of Morones. Morones
visited him in the asylum and saw to it he
had good care. 9
Morones’ widow related that Morones had a very noble heart and
was loyal and devoted to his camarades.
his friends," she said.

"He was always a friend to

Judging by Morones’ prolonged hostilities

with Portes Gil, Lombardo Toledano, and Aaron Saenz, the converse
also appears to have been true; "an enemy was always an enemy."

DIVERSIONS AND PASTIMES
Berta describes CRCM as being "the true passion of Luis’ life."
Morones often cancelled plans he had made with her for some unexpected
CF.OM business.

He once told her, "It is my life, I cannot leave it."

After only partially recuperating from surgery in 1958, for example,
Morones travelled to Acapulco to inaugurate a CRCM building in that
port town.

According to Berta, Morones had a paternalistic attitude

toward workers and viewed them as a father would his rebellious

Morones loved music, especially classical, opera, and the
"folklorico" of Spain.

He played a mandolin during his youth, and

%eals to Buford, February 19, 1970, L.S.U. Archives., The would
be biographer thoroughly enjoyed the sight of persons regurgitating on
banquet tables. Beals met the cook on a Mexico City street corner two
days before the latter was committed to the asylum. Interview, Baton
Rouge, April 12, 1970.
^Interview, Mexico City, August 3» 1968 . When asked if she had
read Petricioli's biography, she expressed her disappointment and dis
agreement with the superficial volume. Her husband died an "idealist
with many deceptions"; Petricioli "imagines Luis without knowing him,
what he has written is not Luis — it is too flowery."
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frequently accompanied his friend Jesus Corona who played the piano.
Morones later switched to playing the guitar, which like the mandolin
he never formally studied, hut "played by ear."

He was so captivated

by guitars that he once bought an expensive, beautiful Valenciana
guitar in Spain.
Luis Enrique relates that his father often played dominoes
during his youth, but preferred rentoy, a card game, in his later
years.

He confined his sports to fronton, a handball game which he

preferred to play with a tennis racket to make it a much faster game.
During his interview with Morones in February, 1957, Professor John
W.F. Dulles was impressed by a large stuffed fish which was hanging
on the wall and which Morones stated he had caught several years
earlier.^"

It is unlikely that Morones ever fished since he never

liked to participate in sports.
Morones’ taste in food was cosmopolitan.

Invariably he had a

good appetite and his third wife cannot recall a food he disliked.
Some of his favorite dishes were crepes suzette and sopa de medulla
con criadillos.

He enjoyed drinking wine, whisky, cognac (with or

without coffee), but refrained from drinking beer or pulque.

Beals

states that Morones was discrete in his drinking habits, he had his
copas but Beals never saw him "tight."

Morones likewise smoked

cigarettes but in moderation.

^Dulles to Buford, March 7, 1970, L.S.U. Archives.
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ORATORY
Morones 1 oratorical ability was one of his chief assets.

During

his lengthy career he made thousands of speeches and trained himself
to think and speak on the spot.

Both Portes Gil and Alfonso Sanchez

Madariaga admit that Morones possessed a facility for words and a
quality for speaking effectively.

After reading many of Morones'

unpolished and monotonous speeches (in which he often circumvented
the major questions), it is obvious that his effectiveness depended
on the verve of his delivery and the audience's involvement with the
issues.
Morones often employed an inflammatory oratory which could
seize the imagination of an audience with the persuasiveness of his
speaking style.

An illustration of his success in persuasion occurred

at a private dinner given for the Mexican labor leader in New York
City in 1925*

After having answered questions "of the most searching

character" for almost two hours concerning the extraordinary advance
in the condition of Mexican laborers in the past twenty years, one of
his listeners wrote:
It is encouraging to all who are interested in
the progress of democratic government to have
knowledge of an Administration which is devoted
with such high intelligence to an earnest effort
to know and to seek the truth and to put in
practice principles around which millions of
men have gathered and to which they have con
secrated their lives.^

12

George Foster Peabody in the New York Times, September 10,
1925. In 196 2 , Morones addressed a CROM meeting in the Lxrico Theater.
By this time the seventy-two year-old labor leader had lost his vibrant
delivery. Luis Araiza, Historia de la Casa del Obrera Mundial, 271
Considering that he gave so many speeches, Morones never wrote much
compared with his rivals Lombardo Toledano and Portes Gil.
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MEDICAL HISTORY
Morones suffered diverse illnesses throughout his life.

His

physical misfortunes began in 1916 when a partial facial paralysis
left him inflicted with a nervous tic in his upper lip and right
eyelid.

A bullet pi-reed his left side grazing his left lung during

a gunfight in the Chamber of Deputies in November, I92 I+. Morones
later developed diabetes, uremia, and ulcers.

He fell in the bathtub

fracturing several ribs in 195 ^*
As a result of a gangrene infection, Morones lost the toes of
his left foot; his right foot was amputated to the shin in 1 9 5 7 .
Following this operation, Morones attended the Rehabilitation
Institute in Tlalpan to learn to walk with the aid of parallel bars
and crutches.

He used a wheelchair in his home, but refused to

utilize it or crutches outside of his residence.

Morones was forced

to use a compliment which was added to his left shoe, and a modified
artificial leg for his right appendage.

Although walking tired him,

Morones remained fairly active and continued to address labor meetings.
On one occasion, the seventy-two-year-old leader had to be helped
down the aisle of the Lxrieo Theater by means of a cane held in his
right hand, and walked arm in arm with Dionisio Sanchez for additional
support.^
The last year of Morones’ life was painful.

He was hospitalized

from November, 1963 to January, I96 U because of a tumor on one of his

C.R.O.M. Memoria, 196 1 -19 6 3 , 121; picture in photograph archive
of La Prcnsa.
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kidneys.

Following his discharge from the National Medical Center,

Morones went to Cuernavaca and Acapulco to recuperate.

Two weeks

later he suffered a relapse and doctors decided to return him to the
capital.

Morones lived for the last two months by virtue of injections

and blood transfusions given him at his home.

DEATH AND BURIAL
Morones, undermined by years of illness and suffering from a
renal infection and diverse complications, died in his home on
April 6 , 196 b at 3:00 P.M.

Shortly before expiring,he painfully

murmured to his old friend Reynaldo Cervantes Torres, "Don't move
me from bed...I want to rest in peace for one time."
His corpse was transferred to CROM offices, where his coffin
was placed between four candles and under a crucifix to receive
posthumous homage.

CROM secretary general Antonio Hernandez,

Rigoberto Gonzalez, Jose Petricioli, Fidel Velazquez and Justino
Sanchez Madariaga of the C.T.M., some founders of the Casa del Obrero
Mundial, Licenciado Julio Santos Coy representing President Adolfo
Lopez Mateos, and others stood watch.

Santos Coy stated, "We deeply

lament that one of the pioneers of the Mexican labor movement has
died."

II4.
Numerous government officials sent their condolences.

of these were:

A few

President Lopez Mateos, Benito Coquet, Director of

Social Security; Salomon Gonzalez Blanco, Secretary of Labor; Tomas

^ E 1 Excelsior, April 7» 196 ^.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

MORONES' COFFIN

IN CROM

OFFICES, APRIL

7, I96 U

270

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

271

Morentes, ex-governor of Yucatan; and ex-president Miguel Aleman
who sent a floral arrangement of chrysanthemums and telephoned
from New York.
The Pateon Frances de la Piedad on Avenida Cuauhtemoc was
selected for the funeral services.

Some five hundred persons attended

Morones' last r i t e s L u i s Araiza and Antonio Hernandez helped
carry the gray metal coffin draped with a CROM flag, the word
"lealtad," (loyalty) and later covered with twenty to forty
wreaths of flowers.
Some complimentary things were said at the funeral of the
once criticized and maligned labor czar.

Antonio Hernandez gave

the first speech, a short biographical sketch which was followed
by his praising of Morones' high values as a national director,
politician, and great patriot.

Celestino Gasca, who had been

expelled from CROM twenty-eight years earlier because of Morones'
"trumphed up charges," claimed that "the workers' organizations of

16

the Republic and of the world have lost a great flght."'1"^

Lombardo

Toledano added that "I am a son of the CROM; with all respects,

^ S o m e of those in attendance were: Jose Maria Tapxa, Melchor
Ortega, Undersecretary in Charge of Gobemacion in Calles1 cabinet;
Jesus Yiiren, secretary general of the Federation of Workers of the
Federal District; Julio Santos Coy who represented President Lopez
Mateos; Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Fidel Velazquez who paid homage
for the C.T.M. central committee, Morones' widow, his children (Luis
Enrique, Luis Hernando, Elvira, Josefina, and Alma Morones Viuda
de Vallejo), and several of his grandchildren.
La Prensa, April 7, 196k .
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gentlemen, in these moments we are all equal."

17

/

Alfonso Guzman Neyra,

head of the Mexican Supreme Court:, then said of Morones, "Although he
was very controversial, he was one of the persons who was most
interested in the welfare of his class and fought for it...one must
realize that he was a prominent figure within the Mexican workers'
movement."

18

Following the eulogies and as a band played "Silencio,"

Morones' cadaver was interred at U:00 P.M.

^ E 1 Excelsior, April 7, 19&+-

18

^
Ibid. Morones' well-kept marble grave (No. 183 of the first
avenue of the Panteon Frances de la Piedad), is adorned by a bronze
bust of the labor leader and the inscription, "Luis N. Morones, 11
Octubre I89 O -5 Abril 196 U. Recuerdo cariSoso de su esposa, hijos y
nietos." Berta Castillo bought the burial ]Dlot for Morones on
August 9, 19^5 for 320 pesos. Olga Maria Diaz Portillo, interview,
Mexico City, April 1, 1971. Senora Diaz Portillo is the cemetary's
director.
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CONCLUSION

Although, in its congresses and through its press CROM advocated
direct action, its leaders engaged heavily in political labor action,
■which Morones disguised under the name of multiple action.

Less

radical'than anarcho-syndicalist groups, CROM under the conservative
Morones was content to be a virtual partner of the government and
helped shape labor policy from 1920-28.

In the hey-day of trade

unionism under Calles and Morones, the strength of labor, which
meant the power of CROM, depended upon a federal government whose
head was personally eager to support labor's demands with government's
force.

Instead of the state falling under labor control as Morones

earlier promised in his pre-CROM days, CROM fell increasingly under
state control and served as the backbone of Calles' forces during
his administration.
Morones enjoyed a unique position during CROM's golden years.
The double position of "government man" and union head gave Morones
decisive power to augment CROM membership, enforce the closed shop
in CROM plants, and cripple rival unions.

Morones served as Minister

of Industry, Commerce, and Labor, and other CROM leaders were congress
men, state legislators, and governors.

One must not exaggerate the

implications of this relationship, but one should be careful not to
underestimate it.

If Morones' CROM was not running the government,

it came as close as possible to making the relationship a diarchy.

273
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In appointing Morones to his cabinet (a cabinet position had
greater importance in Mexico than in the United States) Calles, who
liked, trusted, and needed Morones, repaid a political debt, but
exceeded a mere political obligation by giving organized labor a
recognition and standing surpassing any it ever had enjoyed.

As

Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Labor, Morones accomplished
little that was noteworthy.
in that position.

He was, in fact, distinctly mediocre

During his period of control of the government's

labor relations, no labor legislation of any importance was enacted.
A rather ineffectual law was passed in 1925 regulating the right to
work, but it seems to have been forced on Morones by the demands of
labor.
Many of Minister Morones' actions reflected no particular merit
on him.

He served as an actual impediment to advance since he used

his labor dictatorship to smash independent and rival unions (such
as the railway strikes of 1922 and 1926 , and tranviarios strike in

19 2 3 )> practice collusion, utilize extortion, harass business and
industry, attempt judicial subservience, and accomplish little for
the campesinos. Another socially divisive and disintegrating affebt
was the alienation of one wing of labor, Morones' CROM, from other
labor wings and from the agrarians.

In short, Morones was not

"detached" enough to devote to his important ministry the seriousness,
earnestness, objectivity, and enterprise which it required.
Although many of the problems with which Morones contended had
their roots in the past, he knew little of monetary economics, credit
analysis, or agricultural economics.

In addition, he curtailed remedial
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technical progress which he regarded as negative and undesirable.
In order to protect jobs, he misguidedly fought progressive methods
which would have increased factory output.

In order to provide work

for unemployed or •underemployed urban, workers, Morones tended to
emphasize labor-intensive techniques.

He used his governmental

position to prevent progress in the factories by refusing to install
modern machinery, except in the new mills.

Acting under the belief

that efforts to change methods of manufacture would inevitably increase
unemployment, an economic ill which he hoped to limit, Morones carried
his inefficient principles too far and adversely affected the nation's
aggregate product by retarding labor-saving technological develop
ments.
Labor organization is an excellent idea, but ideas, if they
are to be of much use, require intelligent and dedicated direction.
Unfortunately, labor did not receive the altruistic guidance of
leaders who were unselfishly and genuinely interested in the up
grading of the laborers' social and economic position.

One may

censure CROM leaders for sacrificing the labor movement to oppor
tunism, personal fortunes, unscrupulous conduct, and labor liderismo.
The wealth amassed from this graft could have been employed for
beneficial purposes:

the foundation of schools, clinics, and libraries.

Instead, Morones and his cohorts in the Grupo Accion vainly adhered
more to luxury than to noblesse oblige.

Labor leadership under

Morones tended to be corrupt, combined whenever necessary, with
violence and strong-arm methods.

Morones, for example, imposed

Carlos Riva Palacio as governor in the State of tyexico against the
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will of the people "by sending large numbers of laborers to Toluca and
to other important voting centers, by special trains where they were
able to control or prevent voting.
Even when Morones* party, P.L.M., was at the peak of its power,
it made no effort to correct or eliminate any of the major political
evils in Mexico.

A n excellent opportunity was lost during which

leaders might have taken steps toward formulating a federal labor
code, and toward establishing a unified labor movement in Mexico
which would be able to stand on its own merits when a change in
government ended its support.

The opposition of Morones, who wanted

to keep as much control over labor as possible in his own hands and
make himself indispensable to labor by making labor dependent on him,
seems to have partly been responsible for the lack of a federal labor
law.

Regarding himself as the patron of the labor movement, Morones

intended that the rank and file should look up to him for both
economic and political protection; and did nothing to develop perma
nent economic power in the unions and protect labor by legislation.
Therefore, no reform in political practices exists today as a result
of his CROM*s favored position in the government.
Morones’ influence was also negative in the petroleum controversy
where he proved to be an obstacle to harmonious Mexican-United States
relations.

The Mexican government delegated the authority of cancelling

the permits to drill for oil to Minister Morones who spoke rather
vaguely in spelling out "the rules of the game."

The lower Mexican

tribunals decided in favor of the companies; but Morones asking for
revision, passed the case to the Supreme Court.

On November 17, 1927,
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this superior tribunal decided that the Minister of Industry could
not cancel drilling permits for lands on which "positive acts” had
not been made before May 1, 1917> because the owner had failed to
apply for a concession of fifty years prescribed by Article 15 of
the petroleum law*

On December 26, 1927> Calles sent a message to

the Mexican Congress proposing the modification of the articles in
question, and this was done.
Although Morones failed to fulfill many of his demogogic
promises, CROM policies yielded many positive results, and certain
gains accrued to the workers.

Labor came more nearly to the.point

of being completely unified under CROM's banner than at any other
period since Mexico had become "labor-conscious."

Labor, or at

least a part of it, achieved the right to organize, strike, and
bargain collectively.

CROM, through its influence in the government,

helped enforce Article 123 of the 1917 Constitution which provided
for shorter working hours, better working conditions, higher wages,
health and safety measures, indemnification of injured workers, and
partitioned seme lands.
The organization of great numbers of persons who were illiterate,
inexperienced, and who had never previously been organized in any way
into unions, was a tremendous task and was accomplished. .• Morones gave
impetus to the formation of a worker's organization of considerable
importance in the political future of Mexico and no one influenced
or determined the labor movement in Mexico as much as Morones did
until his downfall in 1923.

To some extent,labor was politicized

and admitted to society's decision-making processes.

CromLstas
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participated politically in naming candidates for political offices
and in formulating governmental programs.

This tendency toward a

more pluralistic process broadened the basis of Mexican society and
served as a link between tradition and modernity.
One laudatory evaluation of Morones comes from Frank Tannenbaum,
a leading Mexicanist whose published comments were based on a close
personal association with him.

The American professor wrote in the

early 1 9 3 0 's that:
It has always seemed to me that the work of Morones,
in its general and specific influence upon the place
of labor in the scheme of Mexican life and labor, of
Mexican politics and policy, in the bringing of the
worker into the arena where he is both counted and
counts, compares with that of Zapata in the agrarian
field. It is true that for the moment the labor
movement in Mexico and even the leadership has
declined, as so often everything seems to decline
in Mexico, sacrificed to political ends and personal
ends and personal fortune. The leaders may be cen
sured, but no group in Mexico has been more loyal to
its broader a.img than the labor group collected about
Morones. Neither Calles nor Obregon can boast of
having given to Mexico so permanent and, in the long
>nin
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ends as is to be had in the trade-union movement
regardless of what happens to the personal fortune
of Morones or of the Grupo Aceion.l
The 1928 presidential election, a major turning point in the
organization's history, changed Morones' and CROM's future.

CROM's

leaders believed that it was time that a civilian became president
and, in addition, that he should be Morones.

Ex-president Obregon,

however, had decided that he wanted to return to the presidency, and
Calles not only supported him, but even facilitated the arrangement

■^Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution, 2^+6-2^7.
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by changing the Constitution to make it possible.
It is uncertain whether Morones had anything to do with the
death of Obregon; but it was generally believed.'in Mexico that Obregon
had been responsible, while he Was president, for an attempt on
Morones* life; and it was no secret that Morones did not feel personally
secure with Obregon in the capital in a position of presidential power.
It has been alleged that Morones was the intellectual author of the
assassination, and although it remains problematical, the burden of
proof must lie with the accusers whose charges are indefinite.
One central theme emerging from a study of Morones and his CROM,
and a salient fact that must be underscored, is the key role played
by the federal, government.

Between 1920 and 19^0 there is a direct

correlation between CROM's strength and the favorable or unfavorable
governmental policy manifested toward CROM.
resigned from the cabinet,

Therefore, when Morones

and CROM in effect joined the opposition,

virtual war was declared between the administration and the labor
group.

A number of circumstances contributed to these events:

Morones* support of and partnership with Calles, the labor leader's
possible role in Obregon*s assassination, the personal feud between
1928 and 1930 with President Portes Gil, the Paso Macho train explo
sion, as well as the reactions which finally occurred against this
corrupt gangster, help explain CROM's swift decline during the adminis
trations of Portes Gil and Cardenas whose animosity Morones had provoked.
Morones lacked a few of the essential requisites of success in
political life:

he was not conciliatory, and did not master or grasp

the importance of respecting his opponents’ opinions.

He was incapable
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of shifting with the currents and tenaciously stuck to his "views
regardless of how ruinous and short-sighted they were.

These flaws

quickened his undoing and he committed "political suicide" by
refusing to join the P.R.R.

Morones blundered and hastened the

confrontation with Portes Gil by adopting a collision course.
Morones* power was curtailed and minimized and CROM came out of
the struggle much poorer, less influential, and on the defensive
against continuing threats to its decreasing power.
Morones, characteristic of the Latin American concept of
personalismo, was the labor organization’s major asset under Calles,
yet he was its chief liability under Portes Gil and Cardenas.

It

was more a question of personality and temperament than of fundamental
issues.

It must be remembered that "Morones" and "CROM" were virtually

synonymous.

CROM languished and failed to shape governmental labor

policy under these two presidents because it was chained to a corpse —
the stigma of its unending association with Luis N. Morones.

What

happened after 1935 when a cache of arms was found in two of Morones'
buildings seemed more in the nature of an anticlimax —

any fright

he inspired was due to unpleasant memories he awakened rather than
to his actual power.
Less significant but more spectacular than his exile was Morones'
flirtation with Peronism.

A.T.L.A.S. was strong only in Argentina and

exerted little influence in the labor movement of other Latin American
countries where peronistas never accomplished more than making a few
contacts and distributing Peronist propaganda in Mexico.

Morones was

out of power and tried, but to no avail, to regain his lost prominence.
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The influence of the organized ldhor movement within the
government political party declined considerably in'.the quarter of a
century following the Cardenas administration.

This was due largely

to the stabilization of the country's political life, the economic
development of the nation, and the increased membership of the
Popular Organizations Sector of the P.R.I.

As the security of

the government became greater, and the possibility of armed
insurrection against it declined, the regime came to depend less
than in the past upon the potential military help of organized workers
under leaders like Morones.

An example of this occurred in 1959 'when

Morones advised that the one method to unify the workers would be to
form a Consejo Technico Obrero without a preference of some organizations over others.

2

Such a suggestion from a "powerless power" is

understandable. Morones had fallen from the driver's seat, but still
demanded equal treatment.

Nevertheless, this pioneer labor leader

had made an all-important beginning and accomplished more for organized
workers than had any Mexican predecessor.

^Sl Diario de Mexico, May 3s 1959*
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APPENDIX A

A BRIEF MORONES CHRONOLOGY

I 89 O, October 11.

Born in San Fernando de Tlalpan.

1 9 0 7 . Began to use the initial "N" between his Christian name and
surname.
1913* Joined the Casa del Obrero Mundial.
1915» Named Director of the Mexican Telegraph and Telephone Company.

1 9 1 6 , Secretary of the Pachuca municipal council.
1 9 1 6 „ Sentenced to death by Carranza.
1917 , February. Unsuccessful Socialist Workers* Party candidate
for Federal Deputy.
1918 , May.

CROM founded in Saltillo, Coahuila.

1918 , November.

P.A.F.L. founded in Laredo, Texas.

1919 j August 6 .

CROM-Obregon pact signed.

19 1 9 , December.
1920,

P.L.M. founded in Mexico City.

April 11. Helped Obregon escape from carrancista police in
Mexico City.

1920, April 2 k .
1920, July.

Plan of Aqua Prieta announced.

Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama withdrew from CROM.

1920. President Obregon named Morones superintendent of the Government
Military Manufacturing Establishments.
1920, Deeember-December, I 92 I.
1921,

February.

1923 , January.

Federal Deputy from Tacubaya.

C.G.T. formed.
Crushed streetcar workers’ strike.

19 2 3 , September. Resigned as head of Government Military Manufacturing
Establishments to take charge of Calles* presidential campaign.
1923, September 23-

"First socialist wedding celebrated in Mexico."
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1923j December.
Obregon.

CROM helps defeat de la Huerta uprising against

1924, January 3 . Governor Felipe Carrillo Puerto assassinated in
Merida, Yucatan.
1924, January 23- Senator Francisco Field Jurado assassinated in
Mexico City.
1924, October. Coerced the National Eucharistic Congress to cancel
its production of "El divino Narciso."
1924, November 12.

Wounded in gunfight in the Chamber of Deputies.

1924, November 30-July 21, 1928.
Commerce, and Labor.
1924, December 13•
1925, December.

1926 -2 9 .

Calles* Minister of Industry,

Samuel Gompers died in San Antonio, Texas.

New Petroleum Law and Alien Land Law enacted.

Cristero Rebellion.

1926, December.
1927, January 1.
1927, March 3 0 .
1927, October 3-

Crushed railway strike.
New Petroleum Law and Alien Land Law became effective
Calles refused Morones* resignation.
General Francisco Serrano assassinated in Cuernavaca

1927, November 4.
Veracruz.

General Arnulfo Gomez assassinated near Coatepec,

1928 , March 2 8 . Amicable termination of the petroleum controversy.
1928 , July 17. President-Elect Obregon assassinated in La Bombilla
Restaurant in San Angel.
1928 , July 21. Cromistas resigned from their appointed governmental
positions.
1928 , July 30. Jose Toral, Obregon’s assassin, declared that Morones
had nothing to do with the murder.
1928, December. Elected CROM president; launched strong verbal
attack on President Emilio Portes Gil.
1930, August 21.

CROM-Obregon pact made public.

1932, August 18-20.

Detained in Los Mochis jail.
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1932. Alfredo Perez Medina and Vicente Lombardo Toledano broke with
CROM.
1935j December 13.

Returned to Mexico with Calles.

1935} December 18. Mexican Senate indited Morones for sedition
and incitement to rebellion.
1935} December 20.

Arsenal found in two of his homes.

1936} January.

CROM expelled Celestino Gasca.

1936, April 7.

Paso Macho train explosion.

1936, April 10. Exiled to the United States with Calles, Luis Leon,
and Rafael Melchor Ortega.
1937, February 2 b .
to Mexico.

Secretary of Interior permitted Morones' return

1938} March. Allegedly offered President Cardenas "secret documents"
pertaining to foreign petroleum companies.

1938 } April.

CROM expelled Ricardo Trevino.

1 9 3 8 .. Unsuccessful attempt to strengthen the P.A.F.L.
1939, December 5*
19^1-19^3•

Santiago Iglesias died.

Served as CROM secretary general.

19^3. Fidel Velasquez allegedly proposed C.T.M.-CROM merger.
I 9U7 -U9 .

Served as CROM secretary general.

I 9 U8 , January.

Defended Argentine C.G.T. in Lima Conference.

19^8, January 23- Visited President Peron and addressed C.G.T.
rally in Buenos Aires' Luna Park.
19ij-9. Designated as CROM's permanent advisor and councilor,
1951} January. Received three C.G.T. representatives who Peron sent
to Mexico City at Morones’ request.
1952, July 26.
1952, November.

Attended Eva Peron*s funeral.
A.T.L.A.S. founded.
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1956, December-March, 1957* Wrote "Calles obligo a las companxas
petroleras a cumplir las leyes," his only major writing.
I96 U, April 6.

Died at 3 P«M. in his home in Mexico City.

I96 U, April 7. Buried at 4 P.M. at Panteon Frances de la Piedad,
Mexico City.
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APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

A.F.L.:

American Federation of Labor.

Agrupacion de Trabajadores Latinoamericanos (A.T.L.A.S.):
American Association of Trade Unionists.

Latin

Amparo: Mexican writ combining tbe characteristics of habeas corpus,
mandamus, and certiorari.
Asociacion Catolica de la Juventud Mexicana (A.C.J.M.):
Association of Mexican Youth.
Bloque de Unidad Obrera (B.U.O.):
Callista:

Catholic

Labor Unity Bloc.

follower of Plutarco Elias Calles.

Cardenista;
Carrancista;

follower of Lazaro Cardenas.
follower of Venustiano Carranza.

Casa del Obrero Mundial:

House of the World's Workers.

Confederacion de Trabajadores Cubanos (C.T.C.):
Cuban Workers.

Confederation of

Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina (C.T.A.L.):
Confederation of L a t m American Workers.
Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (C.T.M.):
Mexican Workers.

Confederation of

Confederacion General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico (C.G.O.C.M.):
General Confederation of Workers and Peasants of Mexico.
Confederacion General de Trabajadores (C.G.T.):
of Workers.

General Confederation

Confederacion Interoamericana de Trabajadores (C.I.T.):
American Confederation of Workers.
Cristero:

"man of Christ."

Continuismo:
Cromista:

Inter-

one person maintains himself in power.

CROM supporter.
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De la buertista:

follower of Adolfo de la Huerta.

Establecimientos Fabriles y Milltares:
Establishments.
Gomista:

follower of Arnulfo Gomez.

Grupo Accion:
X.C.F.T.U.:
I.W.W.:
Mordida:

"Action Group."

Elite policy-making group of CROM.

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

Industrial Workers of the World.
bribe.

Moronista:

follower of Luis N. Morones.

Obregonista:
O.R.I.T.:

Military and Manufacturing

follower of Alvaro Obregcn.

Organizacion Regional Interamericana deiTrabajadores.

Pan-American Federation of Labor (P.A.F.L.):
Pan-Ameri cana.
Partido Comunista Mexicano (P.C.M.):

Mexican Labor Party.

Partido Nacional Revolucionario (P.N.R.):
Party.

National Revolutionary

Partido Revolucionario Institucional (P.R.I.):
Revolutionary Party.
Partido Socialista Obrero (P.S.O.):
Personalismo:

Confederacion Obrera

Institutional

Socialist Workers’ Party.

personalism.

Plan Green: alleged United States invasion design for Mexico,
192^-27.
Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (S.M.E.):
Electricians.
W.F.T.U.:

Mexican Union of

World Federation of Trade Unions.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

313

APPENDIX C

CROM SECRETARY GENERALS, 1918-68

Raymundo Valdes

1 919-20

Eulalio Martinez

1920-21

Jose F. Gutierrez

1921-22

Eduardo Moneda

1922-23

Ricardo Trevino

1923-21+

Eduardo Moneda

192 U -26

Ricardo Trevino

1 926-28

Reynaldo Cervantes Torres

1 928-32

Eucario Leon

1932-3^

Martin Torres

193^-35

Ricardo Trevino

1935-37

Eucario Leon

1937-39

Samuel Vargas R»

n ror* )ii

-*-yjy— r-A-

Luis N. Morones

191+1 - 1+3

Florentino Maya

19U3-1+5

Emilio Barragan

191+5 -I+7

Luis N. Morones

19U7-I19

Rigoberto Gongalez Flores

19 ^9 -5 1

Florentino Maya

1951-53

Nicolas Lopez Galindo

1953-55

Florentino Dominguez Leal

1955-57

Antonio J. Hernandez

1957-59
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A g u s t m Perez Caballero

1959-61

Alfonso Elorza S.

1961-63

Antonio J. Hernandez

1963-65

Filemon Perez Cazares

1965-68

Atlas, May 15 > 1 9 6 8 .
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ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE GRUPO ACCION

Luis N. Morones

Electrician

Federal District

Ezequiel Salcedo

Typographer

Federal District

Celestino Gasca

Shoemaker

Federal District

Juan Rico

Linotypist

Federal District

Ricardo Trevino

Carpenter

Tampico

J. Marcos Tristan

Coal miner

Coahuila

Eduardo Moneda

Photoengraver

Federal District

Juan B. Fonseca

Shoemaker

Federal District

Fernando Rodarte

Typographer

Federal District

Juan Lozano

Shoemaker

Coahuila

Jose Lopez Cortes

Typographer

Federal District

Reynaldo Cervantes Torres

Carpenter

Oaxaca

Adalberto Polo

Tailor

Pedro Suarez
Pedro Rivera Flores

Molder

Hidalgo

Salvador Alvarez

Tailor

Federal District

Samuel 0. Yudico

Mechanic

Federal District

Jose F. Gutierrez

Clark, Organized Labor in Mexico, 6 3 ; Robert J. Alexander
interview of Jose Petricioli, Mexico City, August 27, 19^8*
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APPENDIX S

CALLES' CABINET

Undersecretary in Charge of Gobernacion
Licenciado Romero Ortega
Minister of Finance and Public Credit ■
Ingeniero Alberto J. Pani
Minister of Foreign Relations
Licenciado Aaron Saenz
Minister of Communications and Public Works
Cor.onel Adalberto Tejeda
Undersecretary in Charge of War and Navy
General Joaquin Amaro
Minister of Agriculture and Development
Ingeniero Luis L. Leon
Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Labor
Senor Luis N. Morones
Minister of Public Education
Doctor J.M. Puig Casauranc

Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 21.
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APPENDIX F

CALIFS’ EXPLANATION OF HIS EXPULSION FROM MEXICO

A grave attack which violates our constitutional guarantees has
"been made upon the undersigned.

The only reason given by the govern

ment for expatriating us is the anarchical conditions which prevail
in the country.
General Calles states that the only responsibility for this
situation lies with the government itself, which, for more than a
year, has been developing a demagogic policy and has been attempting
to implant communism.

We have done all in our power as citizens to

combat this tendency without violating the law.
The expulsion of the labor leader Morones is due to the wish
of the government to destroy the Regional Confederation of Labor
(CROM) which does not wish to capitulate to the Communist labor
organization that supports the government and is headed by Lombardo
Toledano.
The desire of the government, whatever declarations it may
make to the contrary, is to socialize the machinery of production,
disregarding the private property rights that guarantee our institu
tions, and to establish a collective system in agriculture similar
to the Russian system.
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We repudiate communism, as we consider it not adaptable to our
country and because the Mexican people refuse to accept it.
P. Elias Calles,
Melchor Ortega,
Luis N. Morones,
Luis L. Leon.

New York Times, April 11, 1 9 3 6 . General Calles, when asked by
the New York Times on April 10 why he was expelled from Mexico, issued
the above statement which he and his companions in exile signed in
Brownsville, Texas.
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APPENDIX G

Luis N. Morones
Mexico, D.F.

16 de febrero de 1957

Sr. J.W.F.Dulles.
Apartado 251.
Monterrey, N.L.

Muy estimado senor Dulles:

Me refiero a su atenta carta fecbada el 7 de los
corrientes, la cual no conteste con la premura que debia haberlo
becho, debido a que salx de la ciudad, pero ahora me apresuro a
hacerlo de acuerdo con mi ofrecimiento.
La primera pregunta que usted me bizo es la
siguiente:
1.- En abril de 1920 el General Obregon fugose
de la Ciudad de Mexico despues de baberse presentado como testigo
en el juicio de Roberto F. Cejudo. Segun entiendo el General Obregon
se disfrazo de mecanico a fin de efectuar la^mencionada escapatoria.
De acuerdo con algunas fuentes usted le ayudo a llevar a efecto la
multi eitaaa escapatoria. Serxa usted tan amaule de darme aj-guros
detalles al respecto?
Es tambien: cierto que algunos otros
Obregonistas salieron de la Ciudad de Mexico al mismo tiempo?: el
General Hill, Rafael Zubaran Campany, Cutberto Hidalgo y Miguel
Alessio Robles.
A esta pregunta me permito informar a usted lo
siguiente:
el General Obregon salio para Tampico, y
en esta plaza se inicio en forma precisa, el ataque oficial a la
candidatura, hasta el grado de que fue abierto un proceso como usted
lo dice, y fue citado por las autoridades militares de Mexico que
lo obligaron a presentarse, en dos ocasiones, ante los tribunales
del fuero militar.
Al regresar a esta Capital el General Obregon
se bospedo en la casa del Licenciado Miguel Alessio Robles- ubicada
en las calles de Colima No. 182. En la segunda presencia ante los
jueces militares, el General Obregon se dio cuenta de que deseaban
aprebenderlo y encarcelarlo con el proposito de inbabilitarlo como
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candidato a la Presidencia de la Republica y no estuviera, desde
lnego, en aptitud de continuar su campaSa electoral. El General
Obregon me cito para connmicarme su molestia por la continua
vigilancia de que era objeto por parte de la policia, y tambien
me dijo que habia tenido una conferencia con Margarito Ramirez
conductor del tren que hacia el recorrido de Mexico a Iguala y
que se ofrecio a ayudarlo a salir de Mexico, cosa que se hizo la
madrugada del 12 de abril, en la forma siguiente:
El dia 11 de abril de 1920, a las 9 de la noche,
salio el General Obregon de la residencia del licenciado Alessio
Robles, acompanado del propio licenciado y de Rafael Zubaran Capmany,
otra persona cuyo nornbre no recuerdo y yo. Ocupamos un automovil de
siete asientos. En la parte de atras iban sentados el General y los
licenciados Zubaran y Alessio. Enfiiamos bacia la plaza de Orizaba
y con el auto en movimiento salto el General Obregon ocultandose
rapidamente entre los arboles del parque, para abordar el automovil
Ford, placas 5473 que de antemano le tenian preparado Margarito
Ramirez y Faustino Gutierrez, este ultimo garrotero del tren a Iguala.
Una vez que el General Obregon subio al auto que lo esperaba, tomo
el rumbo de la Colonia Guerrero, y los pasajeros se bajaron en la
calle de Camelia, para dirigirse a pie a la casa de Margarito Ramirez
que estaba situada en la calle de Magnolia No. 2^3j letra C. Los
motocielistas que nos vigilaban no se dieron cuenta de la maniobra
ejecutada por el General Obregon y siguieron persiguiendonos
creyendo que el General seguia con nosotros. Terminamos nuestro
recorrido en el Cafe Colon, que estaba ubicado entonces en el Paseo
de la Reforma. En este lugar ordenamos que nos fueran servidas unas
copas de conac y en esos momentos la policia bizo irrupeion buscando
al General Obregon al cual no pudieron, naturalmente, encontrar.
En el citado cafe acordamos dispersarnos en
distintas direcciones los licenciados Alessio Robles, Zubaran y
yo, y cerca de las 11 de la noche fui a^la calle de Magnolia para
recibir instrucciones del General Obregon y^para informarle que
estaban cumplidos sus encargcs y que ya babia encontrado un lugar
donde pudiera refugiarse el General Benjamin Hill, ^para burlar la
vigilancia de que era objeto por parte de la policia.
Entre los encargos que me hizo fue el cobro de
un cheque contra la COmision Monetaria, en la que me presente a
sabiendas que el General Obregon carecia de fondos en la mencionada
Institucion, pero despues de algunas gestiones logre bacer efectivo
el documento cjue amparaba la^cantidad de quinientos pesos, de los
cuales adquin medicinas, pues se encontraba enfermo, una maquina
dc ccrtar si pelc pcrqus deseaba disfrazarse un poco y del resto me
autorizo a disponer de algo de dinero para dejar a mi familia lo
mas indispensable, cosa que no bice dado lo reducido de la cantidad.
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El lugar donde deje al General Hill fue la casa
del companero Francisco Castrejon, que se encontraba ubicada en el
Jar din de los Martires, de Tacubaya, en San Pedro de los Pinos.
Cuando el General Obregon abandono la casa de
Margarito Ramirez salio con un abrigo puesto, tocado con un sombrero
de los que llamaban ferrocarrilero, o de "pedradas", al cuello un
paliacate y una linterna en la mano. El objeto de ponerse el abrigo,
fue para que no se viera que le faltaba el brazo.
Cuando me separe del General Obregon me dio
instrucciones de que me rcuniera con el en la ruta de Mexico a
Cbilpancingo, sin poder precisar el lugar exscto en donde nos
encontrariamos.
Al dia siguiente o sea el dia 13 de abril sail
con rumbo a Iguala, para reunirme con el candidato, pero no lo
encontre en ese lugar y segui mi viaje, por tierra, rumbo a Mexcala.
En este lugar, se reunio con nosctros el General Obregon, los
licenciados Eduardo Neri, Mastache y yo, y deeidimos continuar el
viaje hacia Cbilpancingo.
La seguda pregunta es:
2.Accion" estaba formado
que dicho Grupo estaba
informar al respecto y
el "Grupo Accion"?

Una fuente me ha informado que el "Grupo
por seis personas. Algunos libros mencionan
formado por veinte personas. Me podria
quiza tambien sobre los fines que perseguia

Respuesta: El "Grupo Accion" fue constituido
por veinte personas, representativas de las agrupaciones obreras en
los Estados. Se reunia periodicamente para conocer los problemas
que la organizacion obrera teraa en todos los lugares del pais y
orientar la lucha sindical dentro del programa que la C.R.O.M.
aprobo en su Congreso Constitutive, celebrado en el mes de mayo de
1918 en la Ciudad de Saltillo. Para narrar el trabajo social que
desarrollo este grupo, se necesita disponer de un gran espacio pero
baste con decir que fue muy importante y que precisamente a su labor
se debio el afianzamiento de las organizaciones obreras en la lucha
por su mejoramiento.
La pregunta tres dice asi:
3-- Cuales fueron las razones por las cuales los
Jefes del Partido Laborista Mexicano no se entusiasmaron con la
propuesta reeleccion del General Obregon en 1928 ?
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Respuesta: En el espiritu de mis companeros
estaba firmemente cimentado el principio de no reeleccion, y cuando
nos dimos euenta de que el General Obregon aceptarxa su nueva
postulacion, y ue que de no apcyarlo las fuerzas revolucionarias
podrxan sufrir un quebranto en su uniaad, decidimos eooperar para
su reeleccion.
La pregunta cuatro dice asx:
1+.- Me podrxa decir algo acerca de la carrera y
personalidad del Coronel Jose G. Preve?
Respuesta: En relacion con el Coronel Preve
puedo decir a usted que fue un elemento de valia y que presto sus
servicios a la Revoiucion en Tabasco, en el campo militar; que
abrazo la causa obrera en Campeche y que se distinguio por su
actividad en ese terreno.
Por lo que se refiere a su carta del dia 8 , me
permito manifestarle que la Secretarxa de Industria cambio su nombre
ante el imperative de la Constitucion de 1917 5 que tiene un capxtulo
dedicado al trabajo, cuya aplicacion necesitaba de ion organo
gubernamental que reglamentara el precepto referido. Como no
existxa la Secrets.*la del Trabajo, la de Industria amplio su radio
de accion cr este capxtulo, creando oportunamente la Junta Federal
de Conciliacion y Arbitrage que tiene por obligacion conocer los
conflictos de jurisdiccion federal. Anos mas tarde quedo establecido
la Secretarxa del ramo en substitucion del Departamento del Trabajo
autonomo, creado en la epoca del Gobierno del General Calles.
En la seguridad de haber dejado satisfechos sus
deseos, me es grato quedar como su atento seguro serviacr.

(Signed)

Luis N. Morones
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APPENDIX H

A NOTE ON SOURCES

CROM OFFICES, AVENIDA KEPUBLICA DE CUBA, NO. 60, MEXICO CITY
The CROM Archive in Mexico City, is virtually unknown to
historians of Latin America in the United States, despite the
richness of its holdings in later history.

Few North American

scholars have used the archives, and there is little in print,
either in English or Spanish, that can acquaint one with what
documentation is available.
The archive itself is contained in one room, which also
doubles for a working area for cromistas. This small, poorlyilluminated room has one long table, a few chairs, and very few
other amenities.

The walls, from floor to ceiling, are occupied

with the archive's holdings; therefore, one looks for data in a
random manner.

The researcher, when using these documents, must

search folio by folio and document by document for information
relevant to his period and topic.

No formalities are necessary

before one may begin to use the archive, and seldom is there any
competition for a good seat (near the windows and, hence, the
light).

Aside from such drawbacks, and the noise from cromistas

inside the building, there are few problems.
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VITA.

Nick Buford, the son of Lena Turano Buford and the late
Norvel

Buck

Buford,

was horn in Port Arthur, Texas on November 20,

I 9 U1 . He received his elementary and secondary education in the
public schools of Houston, Texas, and graduated from John H. Reagan
High School in June, i9 6 0 . Entering Lamar State College of Tech
nology in September, i 960 , he received tne degree of Bachelor of
Arts from that institution in August, 196 ^, and Master of Arts in
May, 1 9 6 7 , after having had a graduate teaching fellowship-,
In February, 1 9 6 7 , Mr. Buford entered Louisiana State
University.

During the years 1968 to 1971 he was a graduate

assistant in the Department of History and Instructor of Latin
American History for the Division of Continuing Education, 1969 -7 1 *
He lived in Puebla de Zaragosa during the summer of 1967 and spent
the summer of 1968 and spring of 1971 researching in Mexico.
On December 27, 1969* He was married in Yonkers, New York.
The bride, Gloria Herminia Creagh-Larramendi, is the daughter of
Dr. Enrique Creagh-Creagh, M.D., and Doctora Marfa Gloria Larramendi
Vivar de Creagh from Guantanamo and Santiago de Cuba respectively.
Mr. Buford was awarded an Organization of American States
Fellowship to Mexico where he completed his research for his
doctoral dissertation in spring, 1971.

He is a candidate for the

degree Doctor of Philosophy at the August commencement.
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